In light of the situation in and around El Fasher, North Darfur, which after 18 months of siege fell to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), with credible reports that crimes under international law are being committed, including in the form of targeted ethnic violence, and with risks of further atrocities in North Darfur and throughout Sudan, the UN Human Rights Council should urgently convene a special session.

The Council should task the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) for the Sudan to prepare a flash report to document atrocities being committed in and around El Fasher. The report should include recommendations to all parties to the conflict and assess the role of external actors with a view to ensuring that those individuals and entities responsible for violations are identified and held accountable. The FFM should be asked to share all relevant information with the International Criminal Court (ICC) to inform the Court’s investigations.

After the Council concluded its 60th regular session (8 September-8 October 2025), during which it extended the FFM’s mandate[1] for a year, the situation in Sudan continued to deteriorate, in particular in North Darfur and in the Kordofan region. The clear message in support of investigations and accountability the Council sent by adopting resolution 60/3[2] requires follow-up to specifically address these new developments.

On 27 October 2025, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights indicated[3] that his Office was “receiving multiple, alarming reports that the [RSF] are carrying out atrocities, including summary executions, after seizing control of large parts of […] El Fasher, North Darfur and of Bara city in North Kordofan state […].” He added that “[t]he risk of further large-scale, ethnically motivated violations and atrocities in El Fasher is mounting by the day,” especially as reports point to “ethnic motivations for killings” of civilians and persons hors de combat. “Given past realities in North Darfur, the likelihood of sexual violence against women and girls in particular is extremely high,” he also warned.

Civil society organisations have also raised the alarm. In a statement, the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P) stressed that “[t]his is not only a humanitarian emergency; it is an atrocity crisis deepening by the day. The fall of El Fasher marks a critical point of no return. Without immediate and decisive action, the city could soon become the site of another mass atrocity etched into Darfur’s tragic history.”[4] Human Rights Watch analysed and verified dozens of videos showing RSF fighters celebrating over large numbers of dead bodies, both in uniform and civilian clothes, executing apparent civilians, and taunting, abusing, and killing severely injured people.[5]

~ ~ ~ 

The international community has a responsibility to act urgently to prevent the commission of large-scale atrocities, to intensify the pressure on external actors fueling Sudan’s conflict, including the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and to fight impunity and advance accountability for violations, some of which amount to crimes under international law.

The FFM has presented its report to the UN General Assembly’s Third Committee and action is considered at the Security Council. The Human Rights Council also has a responsibility to uphold its prevention mandate and to address the crisis in El Fasher in a way that centres the voices of Sudanese victims, survivors and civil society.

The FFM has the mandate, expertise and experience to independently investigate and report on violations committed by all parties throughout Sudan, including the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the RSF, and their allied forces. It should be asked to prepare an urgent flash report on the situation in and around El Fasher and to present to the Human Rights Council at the earliest opportunity, and it should be given resources to support this additional task. It also has a mandate to cooperate and share best practice with other international, regional and domestic accountability initiatives. This includes the ability to share evidence with the ICC, whose jurisdiction (currently covering Darfur) should be expanded to cover Sudan’s entire territory.

Consequently, we urge all Members and Observers of the Human Rights Council to support the urgent convening of a special session on the situation in and around El Fasher, North Darfur, with a view to adopting a resolution that, among other elements:

• Requests the FFM to prepare a flash report on the situation in and around El Fasher, North Darfur, and risks of atrocities throughout Sudan, which includes recommendations to all parties to the conflict and an assessment of the role of external actors with a view to ensuring that those individuals and entities responsible for violations are held accountable, to be presented during an inter-sessional briefing or in any other format, in a manner that reflects the urgency of the situation, by 31 December 2025;
• Also requests the FFM to share relevant information or evidence it collects with the International Criminal Court, to support the Court’s investigations into atrocities, and recalls the important role of the ICC in holding perpetrators of international crimes to account;
• Recommends that the General Assembly submit the reports of the FFM to the Security Council for its consideration and appropriate action; and
• Requests the Secretary-General to provide all the resources necessary to enable the Office of the High Commissioner to provide the administrative, technical and logistical support as is required to implement the provisions of Sudan-focused resolutions adopted in the context of the Human Rights Council’s regular and special sessions. These resources should be adequate to enable the FFM, which is currently severely under-resourced,[6] to collect and preserve evidence in support of accountability processes.

A special session should start with presentations by a victim, survivor and/or witness, and at least one Sudanese civil society speaker, as well as international and regional human rights experts, including the FFM, the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. To center the voices of those directly affected by the crisis, the Secretariat of the Council should endeavor to facilitate the participation of strong Sudanese voices, including at least one person from within the country or who has fled El Fasher/ North Darfur.

We thank you for your attention to these pressing issues and stand ready to provide your delegation with further information as required.

Sincerely,

1.   African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS)

2.   AfricanDefenders (Pan-African Human Rights Defenders Network)

3.   Aljazeera Observatory for Human Rights

4.   Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA)

5.   Burkinabè Human Rights Defenders Coalition (CBDDH)

6.   Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS)

7.   Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL)

8.   Climate Counsel 

9.   Coalition for Genocide Response

10. Committee for Justice (CFJ)

11. Connection e. V.

12. CSW (Christian Solidarity Worldwide)

13. Darfur Advocacy Group

14. DefendDefenders (East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project)

15. Democratic Civil Society Platform – Sudan

16. Enaya for Feminist Peace

17. Fikra for Studies and Development (FikraSD)

18. Geneva for Human Rights – Global Training & Policy Studies (gva4HR)

19. Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P)

20. Global Human Rights Defence (GHRD)

21. Gulf Centre for Human Rights (GCHR)

22. Humanists International

23. Human Rights Watch

24. The International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI)

25. International Commission of Jurists (ICJ)

26. International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)

27. International Service for Human Rights (ISHR)

28. Journalists for Human Rights (JHR) – Sudan

29. Mouvement contre le Racisme et pour l’Amitié entre les Peuples (MRAP)

30. Movimento Internazionale della Riconciliazione (MIR Italy)

31. Network of the Independent Commission for Human rights in North Africa (CIDH AFRICA)

32. PAX

33. Physicians for Human Rights (PHR)

34. Rights for Peace

35. The Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA)

36. Sudanese Human Rights Monitor (SHRM)

37. Sudanese Organization for Justice and Human Rights

38. Sudanese Women’s Rights Action

39. Sudan Human Rights Defenders Coalition (SudanDefenders)

40. Sudan Rights Watch Network

41. Sudan and South Sudan Forum e. V.

42. United Against Inhumanity (UAI)

43. Women Deliver44. Youth Citizens Observers Network (YCON Sudan)

(List of signatories to be updated on a rolling basis until 5 November, C.O.B.)

The post Sudan: Joint Appeal for a UN HRC special session on the situation in and around El Fasher, North Darfur appeared first on United Against Inhumanity.

Since April 2023, when the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) began their disastrous war, the people of Sudan have been killed, displaced, starved and subjected to appalling acts of brutality. Millions have been driven from their homes, and entire communities live under siege conditions. Reports of widespread sexual and gender-based violence continue to shock the conscience of humanity.

Yet despite the scale of this catastrophe, the international response has been completely inadequate. Multiple mediation efforts have failed to coordinate competing initiatives or persuade the main parties to negotiate an end to the conflict. Humanitarian action has been hampered by chronic underfunding, limited distribution mechanisms and slow adaptation by international humanitarian actors to the context. In particular, it has failed to adjust to the urgency of providing support to locally led frontline mutual aid efforts. Above all, it has been impeded by the refusal of both SAF and RSF to grant meaningful access. Hunger is being used as a weapon of war.

Since June 2024, UAI has convened a Task Team on Sudan, bringing together political analysts, humanitarian professionals, academics, civil society and diaspora representatives. In June 2024, we first called for the appointment of a High-Level Humanitarian Envoy to work alongside the UN Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy. The case for such an appointment is now stronger than ever.  

A dedicated Humanitarian Envoy could:
– Focus international attention on civilian needs and sustain momentum when the political track is stalled;
– Re-energise fundraising by mobilising donor capitals and raising public awareness at a time when the 2025 Humanitarian Response Plans for Sudan and for Sudanese refugees remain massively underfunded;
– Support negotiations for humanitarian access across front lines, including in RSF-controlled areas, where new de facto governance structures are emerging;
– Provide strategic coherence with respect to the three million Sudanese refugees in neighbouring states, who currently fall between different UN country offices;
– Reinforce the work of the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Port Sudan, whose remit and operating space are constrained by the authorities.

Precedent already exists for such a role. Ambassador Tom Vraalsen, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Humanitarian Affairs for Sudan (1998 -2004), demonstrated the value of an independent humanitarian voice able to negotiate access and sustain international attention during a period of intense conflict. Drawing on that example, a new high-level Humanitarian Envoy could combine diplomatic authority and humanitarian legitimacy to engage across conflict lines and regional actors, helping to restore access and confidence in the UN’s neutrality and impartiality.

This proposal reflects not only the views of humanitarian actors and some supportive governments, but also the widest Sudanese pro-democracy coalition, Somoud, which has explicitly called for a special humanitarian coordinator in its Political Vision. Developments such as the Tasis Alliance’s parallel government in Nyala and the effective partition of the country underline the urgency of senior-level engagement from outside Sudan. Precedents such as Jan Egeland’s appointment on Syria show that a high-profile humanitarian figure can make a decisive difference.

UAI therefore urges governments, international organisations, civil society and the media to:
– Back the appointment of a High-Level Humanitarian Envoy for the Sudan emergency;
– Insist on a single international mediation mechanism to replace the current fragmented approaches; Increase financial and other support for local mutual aid groups and strengthen local leadership of humanitarian response and resilience building;
– Inject  significantly more resources into humanitarian operations and accountability efforts, including the pursuit of war crimes investigations.

Sudan is today the world’s largest humanitarian crisis. Its people deserve more than indifference.

The post “The World’s Worst Humanitarian Crisis: Immediate Action Vital for Civilians in Sudan” appeared first on United Against Inhumanity.

A new report from United Against Inhumanity (UAI) and the United Nations Association – UK (UNA-UK) presents the findings of a multi-stakeholder workshop convened 5 September 2025, entitled ‘Alternative approaches to the Rohingya refugee situation’. 

Myanmar’s Rohingya population has been denied citizenship rights and subjected to systematic exclusion and mass expulsion for decades, with the result that most of its approximately three million people are now to be found in other states.   

Responses to the crisis have been predominantly short term and humanitarian, focused on meeting the basic needs of those displaced outside and within Myanmar. This approach has been inadequate. A broader strategy is now required, simultaneously addressing the political, security and developmental dimensions of the situation. 

This paper and its recommendations are submitted for consideration by participants at an international conference on the situation of Rohingya and other minorities in Myanmar, being held at the UN General Assembly in New York on 30 September 2025. 

Read the report here

The post New report: “An alternative approach to the Rohingya refugee situation”, by UAI and UNA-UK appeared first on United Against Inhumanity.

The humanitarian discussion around Rohingya refugees often portrays Bangladesh as a generous host burdened by circumstances beyond its control. This “burdened host” humanitarian storytelling is everywhere. But this narrative misses the real story.

Bangladesh has built a political economy of containment around the Rohingya refugee population. In fact, its posture as a reluctant host masks a calculated strategy. Successive governments have adapted to the Rohingya presence through policies that convert exclusion into domestic political capital and international leverage. Control and restriction are not unfortunate by-products of crisis management; they are deliberate, embedded in policy, and materially rewarding for political and economic elites.

We’ve seen the same pattern again and again — from forced returns in 1978 and the 1990s, to the refusal to register Rohingya after 1992, to the post-2017 regime of restrictions. Temporary shelter is offered, but long-term marginalisation is the rule.

The camps have been deliberately kept isolated and securitised. Barbed wire fencing, bans on formal education, livelihoods, and movement, and the tolerance of armed groups and abusive policing all serve a dual purpose: to avoid integration and to maintain a constant crisis atmosphere that is useful for bargaining.

The real question is: how do we make it more costly for Bangladesh to maintain the current system of Rohingya exclusion?

Bangladesh extracts four key benefits from its restrictive approach:

1. Political dividends: Bangladesh portrays itself internationally as a humanitarian host. By doing so, it secures global legitimacy and donor goodwill — even as it enforces draconian policies against the Rohingya.
2. Economic gains: Bangladesh secures aid flows, infrastructure development, and contracts for local elites.
3. Labour exploitation: Bangladesh benefits from undocumented Rohingya workers in various industries.
4. Geostrategic leverage: The refugee population becomes a bargaining chip in relations with China, India, ASEAN, and the West.

Wherever you read about the Rohingya, you will read that they are “aid-dependent.” But let’s deconstruct that.

The idea that the Rohingya are merely passive recipients of aid erases their economic contributions and, more crucially, their systematic exploitation in Bangladesh’s informal labour markets. Far from being idle, many Rohingya work — without rights, protections, or fair pay — in agriculture, construction, salt farming, and informal garment production. These roles remain unrecognised precisely because formal recognition would require labour protections and disrupt a supply of cheap, exploitable labour.

The “aid-dependent” label functions ideologically: it naturalises containment, justifies exclusionary policies, and conceals the surplus value extracted from Rohingya lives. It also serves the interests of both Bangladeshi elites and international agencies — one gains control and patronage, the other maintains funding pipelines and institutional relevance. In truth, the Rohingya are made vulnerable not because they are a burden, but so they can be exploited — both as cheap labour and as commodities within the aid economy.

When aid is cut and work is criminalised, refugees are pushed into unregulated, exploitative labour markets just to survive. The system traps them between dependence and danger — punished if they rely on aid, punished if they try to be self-reliant.

This is why framing the challenge as one of “mitigating impact” through infrastructure or investment is so misleading. The issue is not the presence of refugees, but the architecture of exclusion that keeps them from contributing safely and legally. The greatest constraint on economic potential in Cox’s Bazar is not the refugees themselves, but Bangladesh’s deliberate policy of containment. Restrictions on movement, work, and education have disabled meaningful participation while fuelling dependency and resentment. Infrastructure without rights becomes another tool of control.

A serious strategy ought to begin by enabling safe, lawful livelihoods — not as a political reward, but as a practical necessity in a protracted crisis. Denying Rohingya the ability to work legally compounds both humanitarian dependency and local economic dysfunction. It prevents them from living with dignity and denies host communities the potential gains of shared growth.

Forward-looking investment must integrate both refugee and host communities through area-based development: co-owned enterprises, skills training centres, and joint access to services, energy, and water. Development finance must be made conditional on rights-based reforms and not used to entrench a regime of exclusion. Any serious economic strategy must begin by restoring Rohingya agency.

This architecture of control is enforced top-down through the Camp-in-Charge (CiC) system. It is a command structure run by government officials with absolutely no democratic accountability to refugees. CiCs sit at the top of an exploitative hierarchy, overseeing everything from aid distribution to information flows. They act as gatekeepers for UN agencies, NGOs, and refugees alike, wielding authority through favouritism and coercion. The CiC system does not increase protection or participation. Instead, it entrenches dependency and sidelines Rohingya voices from decisions that shape their lives. It is not a humanitarian mechanism; it is an authoritarian one.

Local hostility to the ideas proposed by United Against Inhumanity is almost inevitable unless the structural drivers of resentment are confronted. For years, state narratives and media framing have cast the Rohingya as job-stealers, resource burdens, criminals, and security threats — a portrayal weaponised by political elites to justify harsh restrictions while ignoring the role of state policy in manufacturing this tension. Any serious alternative must go beyond service delivery and confront this manufactured hostility head-on.

To elicit support from both local people and authorities, the strategy must centre on shared prosperity, not parallel systems. That means:

• Area-based development that visibly benefits both groups (e.g. joint access to schools, health clinics, water, and transport infrastructure);
• Transparent governance of aid funds to reduce elite capture and corruption;
• Job creation schemes that favour Bangladeshi–Rohingya collaboration, rather than competition;
• Narrative re-framing, supported by independent media and civil society, to dismantle the image of the Rohingya as burdens and instead show them as contributors.

So what does it really mean to go beyond the tired script of “repatriation and relief”?

It means breaking with the architecture of containment — a system that international agencies have too often stabilised through funding models, risk aversion, and bureaucratic inertia. Donor models remain timid: short-term, optics-driven, and allergic to political confrontation. By avoiding issues like movement, legal identity, or work rights, they end up reinforcing the very architecture of containment they claim to alleviate.

Institutions like the World Bank, ADB, UNDP, UNHCR, and IOM must fundamentally reorient their engagement.

That means:

• No more funding without rights. Development finance must be tied to concrete gains: freedom of movement, access to work, education, and legal identity.
• No more secret MOUs. How on earth would that be acceptable to the Rohingya?
• No more parallel systems. Investments need to link refugee well-being to host community prosperity — not as some kind of charity, but through inclusive planning and shared governance of infrastructure, services, and livelihoods.
• No more empty theatre. Stop staging high-profile visits while the real economy is built on refugee exploitation.

To conclude: Bangladesh’s model of Rohingya containment is not a temporary holding pattern — it is politically and economically rewarding for the state. International actors must stop sustaining it. That means recalibrating the cost-benefit equation: confronting the aid-industrial complex, dismantling the fiction of dependency, and building pathways to refugee agency through enforceable rights and economic inclusion. Anything less will simply reproduce the very exclusions we claim to oppose.

About the author: Shafiur Rahman is a journalist and documentary filmmaker focusing on the politics of refugee management in South and Southeast Asia. He writes the Rohingya Refugee News newsletter.

The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of United Against Inhumanity (UAI).

The post “The Architecture of Rohingya Exclusion”, by Shafiur Rahman appeared first on United Against Inhumanity.

In 2024, 233,000 people were killed in wars, a 30 percent increase from 2023. The trend seemed inexorable. Political apathy in the face of relentless human suffering fuelled public disgust with government leaders. But then, on 8 December, came a rare piece of apparently good news. One of the world’s most brutal dictators, Bashar al-Assad of Syria, was overthrown.

Does this outbreak of good news herald the arrival of new opportunities for peace-making, or is it just a pause in the agony? This article looks at the situation in Syria from the perspective of a retired UN official who worked in humanitarian, refugee and peacekeeping operations, as well as on UN humanitarian policy and disarmament. How does this historical moment in the Levant look from this perspective?

Lost Opportunities

In early 2012, living in the UAE, I made a bet with a colleague that Assad would be gone from Syria by the end of June of that year. On 8 December 2024, nearly 13 years later, it finally did happen. In the meantime, half a million of the Syrian population of less than 30 million people had been killed, nearly 7 million had fled the country, around the same number had been uprooted, many more than once, within Syria, and tens of thousands had been incarcerated, tortured, and killed in the regime’s notorious prisons. A once stable economy was wrecked, and widespread poverty took hold. All this was the consequence of failures of international leadership and many lost opportunities to shorten the conflict.

The Failure of UN Efforts

As I watched Kofi Annan, Lakhdar Brahimi, Staffan de Mistura, and Geir Pedersen struggle in vain to bring Assad and opposition leaders to the negotiating table, it became clear that the lack of pressure on Assad to accept compromise had doomed their efforts.

Human Rights and Justice

Senior diplomats from the US, the UK, France, Canada, Germany, and the Netherlands often voiced support for dislodging Assad and holding him accountable. However, they did not put enough resources or political capital behind efforts to achieve this objective. As one commentator put it, ‘In Syria, billions have been spent on weapons, billions on humanitarian aid, millions on political initiatives, but almost nothing on justice and accountability’. Blessed are the peacemakers, but our governments will spend their money on weapons and humanitarian aid to help those wounded by the weapons.

The Military Industrial Complex and the International Humanitarian System

The military-industrial complex thrives on war, and can always find ambitious leaders to pursue their political ambitions with violence. Humanitarian organizations have always been ready to request more funds for relief. Until now, wealthy governments have preferred to be seen as generous in disbursing aid but have shied away from prioritizing genuine peacemaking efforts and enforcing adherence to the laws of war, enshrined in the Geneva Conventions.

What to Expect in Syria in 2025

Will the international community learn from the failures in Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan? Will refugees be able to return without premature pressure? Will transitional justice be introduced in a region that lacks precedents for such initiatives? A paper from the ICG (International Crisis Group) warns against repeating in Syria the mistakes of Afghanistan, while Khaled Mansour argues for a complete overhaul of the UN’s presence in Syria.

No to Early Elections

Rushing to elections often undermines peace-building efforts. It pushes political leaders to take extreme and polarizing positions to ‘shore up their bases’. Yet Western states and the UN have often insisted on this approach. This obsession must be resisted.

Syrians Are Up for the Challenge

Despite the 13-year delay in Assad’s downfall, I remain optimistic. The people of Syria are ready to take on the challenge. Let’s try not to get in their way.

Conclusion: A New Beginning for Syria

The fall of Assad presents an opportunity for Syria to rebuild on a foundation of justice and accountability. However, the international community must resist the urge to impose rushed solutions, such as premature elections, which could destabilize the fragile recovery process. Instead, efforts should focus on removing sanctions that impede economic recovery and on supporting Syrians in establishing inclusive governance structures that break away from the past cycle of authoritarianism. Given the space, Syrians can re-shape their country’s governance system in ways that escape the constraints of patron-client relationships and offer genuinely equal rights and opportunities to all citizens.

About the author: Martin Barber is an Associate Fellow at Chatham House, a former Director in the UN Department of Peace-keeping Operations and a co-founder of United Against Inhumanity (UAI).

The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of United Against Inhumanity (UAI).

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As Geir Pedersen, the UN envoy to Syria, left the abandoned Sednaya prison near Damascus, a woman spat in his direction and threw her shoes at his car — a gesture of deep disrespect and disdain in the Middle East. Prior to the collapse of the Assad regime on December 8, Pedersen had not been known for openly defending human rights or engaging in any serious dialogue about transition in Syria.

Footage aired on local TV captured the woman shouting: “Where have you been for 13 years? You come now after everyone has been killed? Get out of here right now!”

Pedersen and his UN team may not have been able to accomplish much during their six years in office, but this is precisely why the UN Secretary General should appoint a new team for Syria. Pedersen’s diplomatic UN-speak on the need for political transition, reconciliation, and reconstruction fell flat with Syrians who did not find him, or his words, credible. His call for free and fair elections in a country that has not seen any such process for several decades rang hollow, and showed just how much he lacked political understanding of the new reality in a country that has just overthrown a 50-year regime rooted in severe repression, cronyism, sectarianism and corruption.

It is time for Pedersen to go. Perhaps this Norwegian diplomat was the right choice for Syria’s political stagnation from 2018 onwards, treading water while Assad and his Russian and Iranian backers pacified large swathes of Syria through their war crimes, including indiscriminate barrel bombing. But that era is over. The current political transition requires fresh ideas – and different expertise – from UN teams, if they are to play any meaningful role in balancing the competing domestic, regional and global interests in Syria.

Changing the UN leadership in Damascus and appointing someone more suitable could be a late Christmas gift from UN secretary General António Guterres to the Syrian people – including the angry woman who spat and threw shoes, who reportedly was at Sednaya to search for her missing brother and cousins. This notorious prison has dominated our screens for the past couple of weeks as thousands have been freed from its gruesome dungeons and from similar incarceration centres in Syria after the fall of Assad. However, over 100,000 Syrians are still believed to be missing, possibly killed or forcibly disappeared by the regime and armed groups.

While top UN officials in Syria might claim that they did all they could under the murderous Assad regime, in reality they more often than not enabled it under the pretext that, as intergovernmental organizations, they had to work with the “legitimate” sovereign government.For many years, the UN international aid workers have stayed at the Four Seasons hotel in Damascus, drawing widespread criticism and alienating themselves from a country where the vast majority of people were suffering from dire poverty and hunger. Their choice of accommodation also facilitated surveillance by the country’s various intelligence services. But Syria has entered a new season, and with it must end the era of the UN’s Four Seasons.

The UN needs to return to its approach during similar seismic changes, such as occurred in Afghanistan in 2001 or in Iraq in 2003, when it deployed far more seasoned, politically savvy and suitably experienced teams to lead on political, development and aid matters.

Most aid agencies in Syria have either been infiltrated by former regime agents or led by UN senior staff who, at best, avoided confrontation with the government, and at worst were complicit with the failing dictatorship. Many UN officials do not have the trust of, nor credibility with, Syrians and experts who have spent years monitoring their programmes and policies. Some of these agencies have reportedly been involved in corruption through deals which benefited the regime and its cronies.

The UN World Food Programme, for example, especially in the early years of the civil uprising in Syria, acquiesced with the Syrian regime in effectively cutting off aid shipments to opposition-controlled areas which were besieged by government forces. Starvation, denial of medical and other basic humanitarian supplies, destruction of schools and hospitals, and the killing of medical staff had all become regular weapons of the war in Syria, used largely by the regime, but also by the opposing militias.

According to an OCHA evaluation report, “UN agencies were simply not willing to jeopardize their operations in Syria by taking a tougher stance with the Government… [a position that] will surely be scrutinized unfavourably at a later point.” We are now at that later point.

Future UN positions and actions must be informed by a full evaluation of the role of aid agencies in Syria since 2011. This process is essential for any principled organization to learn and improve. Until such a detailed review is undertaken, the entire UN leadership in Damascus should be replaced with a fresh team that will not be associated with years of regime complicity. The UN faces Herculean tasks in Syria: supporting a Syrian-led political transition, managing reconstruction, and facilitating the safe return of millions of displaced people and refugees. Accordingly, all UN staff must leave the Four Seasons as soon as possible, in order to engage directly with the people they are supposed to serve, now that the season in Syria has changed.

This article has been previously published in Aljumhuriya.net, an independent media and knowledge production platform from Syria, founded in 2012 by journalists, writers, and academics.

About the author: Khaled Mansour worked as a journalist, a UN spokesman and a communications director for 25 years in many countries including Egypt, South Africa, Afghanistan, Sudan, and the USA. He is now a full-time writer.

The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of United Against Inhumanity (UAI).

The post “A New Season in Damascus”, by Khaled Mansour. appeared first on United Against Inhumanity.

We call on world leaders to act urgently to protect UNRWA from the unprecedented and dangerous attacks it faces from the Israeli Government. The Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee passed two bills on 6 October 2024 aimed at ceasing UNRWA’s operations. These bills await final readings in the Knesset Plenum as soon as 28 October 2024. This could see UNRWA evicted from premises it has held for over 70 years and have its immunities revoked, severely blocking its ability to provide essential services such as healthcare and education to millions of Palestine refugees. This reckless move threatens to dismantle the backbone of the international humanitarian operation in Gaza, aggravating an already catastrophic crisis.

These bills seek to ban UNRWA from operating in areas under Israeli control, which would lead to the closure of its offices in the occupied Palestinian territory (OPT). The proposed legislation would also terminate the agreement between Israel and UNRWA from 1967 in which Israel committed to facilitating UNRWA’s work. This will effectively paralyse the agency’s ability to fulfil its mandate as set out by the UN General Assembly in 1949.

Dismantling UNRWA would be catastrophic for Palestinians especially in Gaza and the West Bank as they are deprived of essentials such as food, water, medical aid, education and protection. It will also have catastrophic consequences for millions of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria where essential humanitarian aid is crucial for both the refugees and the host communities.

These actions are part of the wider strategy of the Government of Israel to delegitimise UNRWA, discredit its support for Palestine refugees, and undermine the international legal framework protecting their rights, including the right of return. If passed, these laws will severely impact not only UNRWA’s operations but also the rights of Palestinian refugees.

If these proposed laws proceed, they will have devastating operational and legal impacts on UNRWA’s ability to provide services in the occupied Palestinian territory, including in Gaza. These laws will not only harm the refugees who rely on UNRWA but also jeopardise the agency’s personnel many of whom have been killed by Israeli attacks, and the ability of other UN and humanitarian agencies to operate. Contrary to claims of concern over UNRWA’s neutrality, the real intent appears to be, in part, to undermine its efforts to uphold the status of Palestine refugees and obstruct a future political resolution.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has ordered Israel to take all measures within its power to prevent the commission of all acts within the scope of Article II of the Genocide Convention. By blocking UNRWA’s operations, Israel is disregarding the ICJ provisional measure to ensure the delivery of life-saving aid into Gaza. The ICJ stated in March 2024 that: 

“In conformity with its obligations under the Genocide Convention, and in view of the worsening conditions of life faced by Palestinians in Gaza, in particular the spread of famine and starvation, Israel shall: (a) take all necessary and effective measures to ensure, without delay, in full co-operation with the United Nations, the unhindered provision at scale by all concerned of urgently needed basic services and humanitarian assistance”. 

According to human rights groups, halting UNRWA’s services is part and parcel of the Israeli authorities’ unlawful siege of the Gaza Strip, which amounts to the war crimes of collective punishment and the use of starvation as a weapon of war.

There is no viable alternative to UNRWA. UNRWA’s essential and irreplaceable role in supporting Palestine refugees cannot be overstated. With a mandate from the UN General Assembly since 1949, UNRWA provides crucial services such as education, healthcare, and social support to millions of refugees. The idea of dismantling or undermining this agency is not only an affront to the values of multilateralism, but it also sets a dangerous precedent with global implications. Unilaterally tearing up UNRWA’s mandate would challenge the integrity of the international system, undermining the trust that underpins cooperative global governance.

We demand that world leaders use all diplomatic means to prevent this legislation from advancing. They must stand against Israel’s illegal actions and uphold the principles of the UN General Assembly Resolution on the ICJ Advisory Opinion (ICJ AO).

This is not a time for silence—it is a call to action. The global community must intervene now before more Palestinians are killed. The people of Gaza cannot endure further delays. Immediate, decisive action is needed to safeguard their rights, uphold their dignity, and enforce the recent International Court of Justice advisory opinion, which ruled Israel’s presence in the occupied Palestinian territory as unlawful. The future of millions of Palestinians is at stake, and the world must act without hesitation.

Signatories:

1. ActionAid  
2. ABCD Bethlehem  
3. Action for Humanity  
4. Amos Trust  
5. Asamblea de Cooperación por la Paz  
6. ATELIER ONGD (Valencia, Spain)  
7. Caabu (Council for Arab-British Understanding)  
8. Children Not Numbers  
9. Christian Aid  
10. Colectivo CALA (Extremadura, Spain)  
11. COODECyL (Castilla y León Platform of Cooperation Organizations)  
12. Coordinadora Andaluza de ONGD  
13. Coordinadora Cántabra de ONGD  
14. Coordinadora de ONGD Castilla La Mancha  
15. Coordinadora de ONGD de Canarias (CONGDCA)  
16. Coordinadora de ONGD de La Rioja  
17. Coordinadora de ONGD de Navarra  
18. Coordinadora Extremeña de ONGD  
19. Coordinadora Galega de ONG para o Desenvolvemento  
20. Coordinadora Valenciana de ONGD  
21. DanChurchAid  
22. Embrace the Middle East  
23. Euskadiko GGKEen Koordinakundea  
24. Federación Aragonesa de Solidaridad  
25. FONSA  
26. Gender Action for Peace and Security (GAPS)  
27. Global Justice Now  
28. Humanity & Inclusion – Handicap International  
29. Human Rights Watch  
30. INTERSOS
31. Johanniter International Assistance  
32. La Coordinadora de Organizaciones para el Desarrollo – Spain  
33. Lafede.cat – Organitzacions per a la Justícia Global  
34. Lawyers for Palestinian Human Rights  
35. Medico International  
36. Medical Aid for Palestinians (MAP)  
37. Mennonite Central Committee (MCC)  
38. Middle East Children’s Alliance  
39. Movimiento Extremeño por la Paz  
40. Movimiento Por la Paz – MPDL  
41. Médicos del Mundo España  
42. NOVACT Institute for Nonviolence  
43. Norwegian People’s Aid  
44. Oxfam  
45. Quakers in Britain  
46. Sabeel-Kairos UK  
47. Sodepaz  
48. The Huauquipura Association  
49. United Against Inhumanity  
50. War Child  
51. War on Want  
52. Welfare Association  

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