Stateless and displaced

The Rohingya are a primarily Muslim minority group, whose citizenship is not recognized by Myanmar, their country of origin. More than a million Rohingya remain stateless today, scattered across refugee camps in Bangladesh, displacement sites within Myanmar, and informal settlements across South and Southeast Asia.

Within this crisis, another deeply troubling trend has emerged: the trafficking of Rohingya women and girls.

The true scale of trafficking is difficult to determine, as much goes unreported. Bangladesh’s interagency Anti-Trafficking Working Group identified, referred, and assisted 316 trafficking victims in Cox’s Bazar in 2024 alone, though it cautions that these figures do not reflect the extent or prevalence of trafficking in the camps.

As the Rohingya remain stateless, their vulnerability to trafficking, exploitation, and gender-based violence continues to grow. Deprived of legal protection, they are frequently treated as illegal migrants rather than refugees entitled to humanitarian protection, encountering further persecution through criminalisation and detention.

Vulnerability to trafficking

Having fled genocidal violence in Myanmar, more than one million Rohingya refugees now live in overcrowded camps and settlements across Bangladesh, most notably in the area of Cox’s Bazar. The arrival of more than 700,000 refugees in 2017 placed enormous pressure on already-overcrowded camps, and severe restrictions on employment, limited educational opportunities, and chronic poverty have left many Rohingya families with few viable means of supporting themselves.

With opportunities inside the camps becoming increasingly scarce, many Rohingya are driven to seek livelihoods and security beyond their boundaries despite the significant risks involved. This combination of desperation and restricted mobility creates fertile ground for traffickers to exploit vulnerable women and girls.

According to the Kaladan Press Network, many Rohingya women and girls are deceived by promises of employment, marriage, or safe passage to countries such as Malaysia and Thailand. Once separated from their families, many are forced into sexual exploitation, domestic servitude, or other coercive arrangements.

Women and girls who remain inside the camps are also vulnerable, with traffickers exploiting their economic insecurity and limited opportunities to recruit them into gendered forms of exploitation. This is not incidental: UN experts estimate that approximately one in four women and girls in the camps have experienced gender-based violence, underscoring that trafficking here cannot be separated from gender itself.

Survivors of sexual exploitation often face profound social stigma, discouraging many from reporting abuse or seeking support. Fear of shame, ostracism, and retribution leaves many victims trapped in cycles of exploitation.

Their vulnerability is further compounded by statelessness: without citizenship or legal recognition, many Rohingya women and girls are unable to access meaningful protection or justice, and because states treat undocumented movement as an immigration enforcement issue, many become reluctant to approach the authorities, leaving them at greater risk of trafficking and exploitation.

Trafficking networks

Trafficking networks target Rohingya women and girls by exploiting the desperation and legal precarity described above. Drawing on interviews with survivors, the Kaladan Press Network’s 2023 report maps out how this unfolds, from the initial deception through to the journey itself.

Women and girls fleeing violence and deprivation are frequently lured by offers of employment or marriage to men in other countries, while those seeking an income may be promised work in domestic labour or factories. In some documented cases, traffickers have adapted their methods by using women as recruiters to build trust and persuade Rohingya girls that offers of employment are genuine.

However, once an offer is accepted, individuals become trapped, forced into gendered labour such as prostitution or domestic servitude, and are not paid the agreed amount, if at all. This practice explains why women and girls account for two-thirds of those who have received support from the IOM in Cox’s Bazar after escaping or being rescued from exploitation.

Financially desperate families arrange marriages for their daughters to Rohingya men already living in third countries, driven by high demand for brides among predominantly male Rohingya migrant communities and their families’ inability to afford local dowry payments. What is framed as a marriage arrangement frequently becomes indistinguishable from a sale, with young girls facing forced marriage once they arrive.

Once a family agrees to send a daughter, the journey itself is organised through a network of brokers operating inside the camps. The overland route to Malaysia alone costs thousands of dollars, paid upfront or in instalments across the journey.

Brokers and smugglers have been documented holding people hostage mid-transit, demanding additional payment beyond what families already agreed, with those unable to pay left stranded, abandoned, or worse.

According to the Kaladan Press Network’s report, those being smuggled are almost entirely women and girls, with only one or two men travelling among them, while the smugglers escorting them are always men. This profound imbalance leaves women and girls travelling in a group with virtually no protection, and under the near-total control of outsider men for the remainder of the journey.

Violence and abuse

For many Rohingya women and girls, what begins as a search for safety or opportunity quickly turns into prolonged exploitation and violence at the hands of traffickers, defined by its deeply gendered and sexual nature.

Survivors who escaped trafficking recount consistent patterns of physical abuse throughout their journeys. Many describe being deprived of food and water, concealed in dangerous conditions during transit, and subjected to beatings and shootings by smugglers and traffickers.

Sexual violence is equally pervasive. In one case documented by the Kaladan Press Network, a group of Rohingya women were abducted at the beginning of their journey, detained, and repeatedly sexually assaulted by smugglers while their relatives were extorted for money in exchange for their release. Other survivors described being isolated under the pretence of contacting their families before being raped in remote forest areas. Women who resisted sexual violence were beaten, tortured, or threatened with death.

For women and girls trafficked into commercial sexual exploitation, the abuse is often prolonged and systematic. Many are forced into the sex trade across countries such as Bangladesh and India, where demand for young Rohingya women and girls sustains a lucrative market for abuse.

The abuse is not limited to paying clients. Traffickers themselves frequently participate in the sexual exploitation of the women and girls under their control. In an investigation by PBS NewsHour, one trafficker admitted that he raped victims before forcing them into commercial sex work, describing how he had sex with all the girls to “take their virginity” before they were sold to clients. His account illustrates that sexual violence and control are part of the traffickers’ exploitation, alongside financial gain.

A BBC investigation into the cross-border sex trade repeatedly found that Rohingya girls were regarded as the least desirable and “cheapest” victims available in the market. This reflects a disturbing reality about statelessness: rather than being recognised as a failure of the state, its consequences become personalised, attaching themselves to an individual’s perceived worth and dignity. In an industry built on the commodification of human beings, Rohingya women and girls are further devalued because of this stigma.

Criminalisation

For many Rohingya women and girls, escaping their traffickers does not guarantee freedom. Instead, they face a new ordeal with the state, characterised by criminalisation, detention and institutional failures.

When trafficked Rohingya women and girls are encountered by authorities, whether in Bangladesh, India, Myanmar or Thailand, they are often treated as immigration offenders instead of victims of trafficking. Instead of receiving legal protection and victim-centred aid, many are sent to detention facilities where the cycle of abuse continues.

In Bangladesh, Rohingya women and girls caught by authorities are arrested and subjected to immigration enforcement. They may be detained for months until they pay a fee before being processed through a National Referral Mechanism upon release. In most cases, rescued women and girls are returned to Cox’s Bazar, to the same environment of extreme poverty and restricted movement that initially left them vulnerable to traffickers.

Rohingya women and girls arrested in India have reported treatment in prison that closely resembled the abuse inflicted by traffickers. One woman recounted being beaten so severely that she miscarried.

In Myanmar, the relationship between trafficking networks and the state is much less passive. Interviewees in the Kaladan Press report described traffickers paying authorities, including the Arakan Army, to pass through checkpoints. In one case, the Myanmar navy allowed an intercepted group to continue after smugglers made a payment.

Those later arrested by the authorities reported being beaten and sexually abused before being detained for illegal travel. Adults were generally sentenced to two years in prison, while minors could spend up to one year in juvenile correction facilities; by contrast, prosecuted smugglers received sentences of 16 years. Whilst in jail, Rohingya received no protection from discrimination by other prisoners, including physical abuse or insults such as “kalaa”, meaning foreigner in Burmese.

The victimisation of Rohingya women and girls extends beyond criminalisation and detention. In some cases, state officials have moved beyond failing to protect victims to actively facilitating trafficking in collaboration with criminal syndicates.

Although the identities of those leading many trafficking networks remain largely unknown, investigations have exposed the involvement of state officials. Thai prosecutors, for example, traced more than US$1 million in bank transfers from a trafficking network to a Thai lieutenant general. The investigation ultimately led to the conviction of 62 individuals, including senior government and military officials.

Trafficking networks have also exploited fraudulent documentation to move Rohingya women and girls across borders. According to a Bangladeshi investigator quoted by The Business Standard, traffickers forged passports and national identity cards through several offices in Dhaka, with passport and election officials allegedly involved in the scheme. Once provided with these false identities, trafficked women and girls become absorbed into the system and significantly harder to rescue.

India’s BJP government has characterised the Rohingya as illegal immigrants and a threat to internal security. According to the UN Human Rights Office, at least 40 Rohingya refugees detained in New Delhi were cast into the sea by the Indian Navy near the maritime border with Myanmar and forced to swim for their lives, with their subsequent whereabouts in Myanmar remaining unknown. The Supreme Court later declined to hear a legal challenge against these alleged “illegal deportations”.

Similarly, in 2022, Thai police rescued 59 Rohingya, including children, after they were abandoned by smugglers near the Malaysian border — yet despite receiving humanitarian assistance, they were still detained and prosecuted for illegal entry.

While states have legitimate interests in managing their borders, placing responsibility on trafficked Rohingya women and girls rather than on the highly organised criminal syndicates that exploit them—and the political conditions that force them into irregular migration—risks depoliticising a crisis rooted in statelessness and the systematic denial of rights.

This challenge is compounded by ASEAN’s principle of non-interference, which has constrained regional efforts to address the underlying drivers of trafficking and strengthen human rights protections.

Survivor testimony suggests that the greatest fear during these journeys was not only abuse by traffickers but also apprehension by authorities. Criminalisation and lack of legal status deter many victims from seeking assistance, allowing trafficking networks to operate with relative impunity. Many Rohingya women and girls are aware of the risks they are taking, but will continue to be trafficked because of the dire situation in which they find themselves.

About the Author: Sumayya Ferdous is a researcher interested in humanitarian affairs, human rights and forced displacement. Her work explores the challenges facing displaced populations and the political and institutional factors shaping humanitarian protection.

The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author of the presentation and do not necessarily represent the views of United Against Inhumanity (UAI).

The post “Sexual abuse and servitude: the trafficking of Rohingya women and girls” by Sumayya Ferdous. appeared first on United Against Inhumanity.

As resistance against long-term Rohingya presence in host countries grows, the refugees’ fate is back in the headlines. Malaysia is a recent example. Its government has yielded to growing hate speech against Myanmar refugees, and Rohingya in particular. In September, Malaysia and Myanmar negotiated a controversial repatriation agreement for 5,000 refugees that is not supported by the UN or its refugee agency. Resentment in India and Indonesia has also grown.

Following large-scale Rohingya returns from Bangladesh to Myanmar in the 1970s and 1990s, repatriation efforts started again in 2017, after the enforced flight of 750,000 Rohingya from Myanmar to Bangladesh. Initially, they were based on a Chinese offer to mediate between the two countries. Even though these and later efforts failed, Bangladesh’s pursuit of repatriation continues, and Malaysia has now joined in.

There are many reasons why the repatriation initiatives of the past 10 years have not been successful. A largely unmentioned one is that many initiators wrongly assume that traditional diplomatic relations between states can lead to meaningful dialogue and conflict resolution. This state-centric approach overlooks the key question at the heart of Myanmar’s decades-old volatility:  how power and political authority are shared between Myanmar’s center and its highly diverse regions and ethnic nationalities.  Moreover, since the country’s 2021 military coup, the regime in Naypyitaw has lost control over much of the country. In Arakan (Rakhine State), the birthplace of most Rohingya refugees—and where some 500,000 of them still live—the current regime has control over only three of the state’s 17 townships.

Today’s Myanmar is in transition. It is a country with multiple centers of authority. In some, local territorial control has been in place for decades; in others, it has been established since the military coup of 2021. These ethnic and regional authorities are not against a federal state as such. They are against the current federal union that is based on a constitution that concentrates significant power at the center, and particularly with the armed forces.

Right now, the key question is whether a new form of federalism can emerge, one that leaves a highly centralized system behind and, instead, focuses on existing and newly emerging centers of political authority. A long road lies ahead but in many parts of the country progress is clearly visible.

Arakan is a prime example. As the territorial dominance of the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA) grows, particularly since 2023, it has been transforming into a central administrative authority with local administrative, security and judicial mechanisms.  The Institute for Strategy and Policy in Chiang Mai recently reviewed the progress that has been made and concluded that “despite persistent challenges, a solid institutional framework is emerging”. But it also cautions that following rapid territorial expansion, a performance gap has emerged between public expectations and the administration’s delivery capacity.

A key reason for the delivery gap is that right now Arakan is a war zone with almost daily ground clashes between the AA and Myanmar’s armed forces, as well as attacks by Bangladesh-based Rohingya militias. Moreover, Arakan is now a prime target for attacks by Myanmar’s air force, which deliberately targets civilian structures with bombs of up to 500 pounds. The devastation on the ground is massive, with hundreds of civilians killed and maimed, while schools, markets, clinics and prayer houses have been destroyed. Physical infrastructure is also heavily affected, including by recent massive floods, leading to large-scale disruption of livelihoods and food security.

According to a recent report by the UN Development Programme, 68.4 percent of Arakan’s population (all ethnicities) experience multi-dimensional poverty, while a further 20 percent is at risk of falling into that category. Arakan’s current population is thought to stand at just over 2.4 million, while a Doctors Without Borders report in 2024 estimated that only 636,000 Rohingya remained in Arakan. Today that number will have fallen significantly, as approximately 150,000 more Rohingya have fled to Bangladesh since then.

To be clear, Rohingya repatriation from Bangladesh and other countries will take time. Refugees cannot return if armed conflict continues and before the underlying reasons for their flight have been addressed. To achieve this, a central role for both ULA/AA and the people of Arakan, including the Rohingya, is critical. But at the same time, various factions on the Rohingya side stand in the way of a united approach, particularly those supporting armed militias. Moreover, some of them have been used as a divide-and-rule tool by Myanmar’s military-backed regime.

Arakan’s problems are manifold and a broader vision of identity is critically important, one that acknowledges inclusion and equality as basic building blocks for a stable, secure and prosperous Arakan.

This understanding led the Rakhine Advisory Commission of 2016-17, chaired by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, to focus on solutions to address the legitimate grievances and suffering of all Arakan’s diverse people. Its report and recommendations to Myanmar’s leaders remain highly relevant, based as they are on the central objective of developing conditions in Arakan that will lead to a peaceful, fair, harmonious and prosperous future for all communities. In 2018, the commission published a lessons-learned report focusing on how it operated in Myanmar’s highly politicized and complex context.

Obviously, much has changed since the report was released but it remains relevant, even after the National League for Democracy’s violent removal in 2021. It analyzes Arakan’s situation around three major crises:  a security crisis, an economic and development crisis, and a human rights crisis. These crises persist and could form the basis for an all-of-Arakan approach.

Since 2017, the Annan report has been re-acknowledged annually by an overwhelming majority of the UN General Assembly and the UN Human Rights Council. Yet, no efforts have been made to establish how it might serve Arakan’s people under their current circumstances, and particularly since 2024, when most of Arakan came under the control of the ULA/AA.

Any process leading to a comprehensive plan for Arakan will be complex, not least because of the wide range of actors, functioning at diverse levels. In “The Dilemma of Hard Choices”, published in August, the Center for Arakan studies identifies the heterogeneity of agents as a key issue and adds that it is compounded by the problem of ownership, where most states, armed groups, civil society and international bodies each deflect overall responsibility while pursuing their own narrow strategic interests.

Precisely these diverging interests would make the Annan report a helpful starting point for dialogue. For good reasons, the commission’s recommendations are not highly prescriptive.  Its general understanding was that, while basic principles of governance and human rights should guide the implementation process, details could be developed as part of dialogue processes. The report contains 88 recommendations on a comprehensive set of issues, ranging from economic and social development to freedom of movement, citizenship, health, access to justice, intercommunal cohesion, humanitarian access and internally displaced persons.

Obviously, dialogue cannot be based on the Annan report alone, but it could be a starting point. Additional questions must be raised to take account of developments since 2017.  The first is the clarification of victimhood.  Who are the victims of decades of oppression, persecution and violent conflict? A second is the “fog of war” that distorts a clear view of what is happening on the ground.

Obviously, it is not necessary to argue that the Rohingya are victims; that is accepted around the world. But what about the other communities in Arakan—the Rakhine, the Maramagyi, the Mro, the Chin, the Hindus and others?

They too are victims, yet their plight has been getting far less attention. They too have had their villages bombed and burned, their clinics, schools and livelihoods destroyed, while thousands are displaced in areas where relief goods cannot reach them. But their plight is not as widely documented. Acknowledgment that all Arakan’s people are victims could be a first step in reconciliation. And clearly, there are different degrees of victimhood and these too must be acknowledged.

The second point concerns the current “fog of war” and the urgent need to establish independent investigations. As in other places around the world, violent conflict, displacement and hunger obscure a clear view of developments on the ground. In such situations, deliberate disinformation thrives. We should not pretend that we have a clear view of what is happening in Arakan and in the refugee camps in Bangladesh. Lack of independent access and blocked internet facilities compound the problems.

Independent investigations will be needed to establish what has happened in Arakan and Bangladesh since 2017. While a significant body of research about the Rohingya exists, research on Arakan’s other communities remains scant. Moreover, research should also focus on disturbing allegations about what has been happening in Bangladesh. How did Rohingya militias manage to get a firm grip on the population in the refugee camps? Where did funding for their arms and operations come from? And how can large numbers of refugees and militia fighters continue to cross the Bangladesh-Myanmar border seemingly unnoticed?

Since 2018, the Independent Investigating Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) has been collecting and preserving evidence to facilitate criminal prosecutions of those most responsible for atrocity crimes. But it only shares its findings with investigative, prosecutorial and judicial authorities in national and international courts. As a result, a vast body of information remains inaccessible to the public. Moreover, IIMM’s mandate does not cover other truth-seeking needs, such as documenting and public acknowledgment of crimes through truth and reconciliation bodies and publicly accessible archives. These limitations underline the importance of establishing additional mechanisms to ensure that accountability is pursued as an integral part of transitional justice and reconciliation. This should be part of a comprehensive approach: an all-for-Arakan approach.

Using the Annan report as a credible starting point for dialogue could be a first step towards creating a better understanding of the needs of all Arakan’s people. Moreover, its repeated recognition by the UN General Assembly might help to rally much needed support for such an exercise at a time when resources are scarce.

Laetitia van den Assum is a former Dutch diplomat. She was also a member of the Rakhine Advisory Commission (2016-2017), chaired by Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary-General.

The post “An ‘All-for-Arakan’ Approach Is Needed to Address the Rohingya Refugee Crisis” by Laetitia van den Assum. appeared first on United Against Inhumanity.

Five years after the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA), officially known as the Pretoria Agreement, between the government of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), Ethiopia faces another round of conflict with wider political and humanitarian implications. On Sunday, October 4th, Ethiopian National Defense Force troops recaptured Mekelle after it had been taken over by TPLF forces. These developments come as communities in Tigray are dealing with a severe El Niño–driven drought while still recovering from the war that ended in 2022.

On September 20th, six armed factions from the Amhara, Afar, Oromo, Benishangul-Gumuz and Somali regions joined the TPLF to announce the formation of the ‘Ethiopian Alliance for Survival’, with the objective of overthrowing the government in Addis Ababa. There is speculation about the alliance’s prospects: whether the combined forces will be strong enough to unseat the government, and whether they offer a real, coherent policy to tackle the many issues facing Ethiopia.

These events are also occurring during a global climatic event that is affecting livelihoods and food security in the Horn and in many other regions of the world.

Aid Reduction Impact in Ethiopia

In January 2025, the international development and humanitarian community was rocked by an earthquake emanating from Washington, DC: the sudden and abrupt cutting of all US aid programs and the start of the process of dismantling USAID.

USAID, with an annual budget of over $40 billion, had been supporting millions of people across the globe. Nowhere was this truer than in Ethiopia, long its second-largest recipient: between 2020 and 2023, for example, humanitarian spending in Ethiopia exceeded $3.8 billion.

The cuts have had a severe impact, resulting in program reductions, staff redundancies and terminated vendor contracts. The hardest-hit sectors have been health, education, water and agriculture, along with the very important Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET). Despite the cost to organizations, Ethiopia still has a large community of national NGOs, with 368 currently registered under the Consortium of Christian Relief and Development Associations (CCRDA). It also has its own national Red Cross society, one of the oldest in Africa. All of them continue, to the best of their ability, to work at local and regional level alongside international agencies, and they can reach communities in need.

Still, Ethiopia has long hosted a large UN and NGO presence, and it now has to adapt to these changes in the middle of ongoing conflict and refugee influxes from the crises in Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia. This is bound to cause additional strain and to weaken capacity to prepare for and respond to sudden new displacement and to crises affecting health, water, food security and livelihoods.

There is also the memory of strained relations with the government during the last conflict (2020–2022), when UN agency staff were expelled.

Ethiopia’s new national disaster policy on emergency assessments, targeting and relief provision asserts control over data collection and distribution, as part of major commitments to self-reliance and “statistical and humanitarian sovereignty”.

These measures could allow penalties for public discussion of aid and for sharing false information about it, which could affect national and international agencies alike.

For two years running there has been no Humanitarian Appeal Process. The country was also excluded from the 2026 Global Report on Food Crises because of disagreements over estimates of beneficiaries and internally displaced people, and because of restricted access to the crisis-affected areas.

Violence, Modern and Conventional

Warfare in Ethiopia is itself changing, with both government and opposition forces using drones. The Ethiopian government has invested heavily in its own capacity to manufacture different kinds of weapons and in improving its technical capacity in drone technology.

Drones helped stall the 2020 conflict with Tigray and have been used ever since in several parts of the country to target militias, often harming civilians and civilian structures. In a surprising development, there have been reports of sporadic drone attacks in Addis Ababa.

At the same time, conventional ground fighting has killed and displaced thousands. Traditionally, forces have occupied towns by first shelling them heavily and dispersing their populations. The 2020–2022 war with Tigray, which killed over 600,000 people, was notable for its viciousness, vengefulness, human rights violations and weaponized sexual violence. Blockades of humanitarian assistance, the targeting of civilians and humanitarian staff, and the looting of schools, hospitals, warehouses and other infrastructure caused a breakdown of basic services and inflicted extreme suffering and displacement on civilians.

The resumption of fighting today raises the specter of renewed atrocities and protection concerns.

An already militarized society will become further militarized through more recruitment and conscription of young people and the creation of new civilian militias to fight the opposition.

Regional Implications

All this is happening in a regional and global context of accelerating volatility that threatens to spread and engulf neighboring countries in the Horn.

Tensions between Ethiopia and Egypt over the Nile are ongoing, and Ethiopia also accuses Egypt of thwarting its attempts to gain access to the Red Sea and the port of Assab. Relations with Sudan have been complicated: Tigrayan rebels have been accused of receiving support from the Sudanese Armed Forces in Khartoum. In response, the Ethiopian government has allowed the Sudanese anti-government Rapid Support Forces to operate inside Ethiopia’s borders. The government perceives that Egypt and Eritrea have now joined forces with the internal Alliance for Survival, and that together they pose an existential threat to the nation. Further complications arise from the US–Iran war and the Houthis’ recent moves to control access and transport along the entire Red Sea coastline.

Conclusion: Urgent Action on Protection and Assistance

The international community cannot stand by and allow internal and external actors to push Ethiopia and the region further into chaos, destruction and potential famine. There must be a concerted effort to stop the fighting. In all mediations, the warring parties must commit to allowing immediate humanitarian access, and resources must be accelerated to maintain emergency logistics and pipelines.

• The monitoring mechanism established by the African Union must be reconvened and made operational in the country, to ensure neutral, accountable monitoring and public reporting on conditions in the conflict area and on citizens’ access to aid.
• The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights should closely monitor the situation in Ethiopia, release regular public reports and brief the UN Human Rights Council.
• The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission must also be allowed access to all areas.
• The Ethiopian government must ensure that civil society organizations working with survivor communities have immediate access to provide physical and mental health support to victims of sexual violence.
• The federal government and the warring parties must allow Ethiopian and other journalists to cover and report on conflict-affected areas.
• Assessment and monitoring missions should ensure equal representation of the National Disaster Commission, the Ethiopian Red Cross, the Red Crescent, local NGOs, and the UN and donor agencies in the country.
• Donors are encouraged to fund flexibly, targeting local organizations already working at regional and community level.

Angela Raven-Roberts is an independent researcher and consultant focusing on the Horn of Africa. She is a former senior program officer in UN’s Emergency Programs.

The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author of the presentation and do not necessarily represent the views of United Against Inhumanity (UAI).

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One year after the Gaza ceasefire agreement was reached, more than 100 humanitarian, human rights, and other civil society organisations say the ceasefire exists in name only, with Israeli forces continuing to kill and injure Palestinians daily, and restrictions on aid, equipment and rebuilding materials preventing families from recovering.

The killing and deprivation in Gaza must not be normalised under the cover of a ceasefire agreement, the organisations working on the situation in the occupied Palestinian territory warned today.

Mohsen Abu Ramadan, Palestinian NGO Network Board Member, said:

“Palestinian organisations are responding to immense needs under Israeli occupation with destroyed offices, displaced staff, and shrinking budgets. Local and national organisations are first responders and will remain, but we need to be protected. Governments must act to end Israel’s attacks and restrictions on our work and donors must provide direct, flexible funding to meet the needs.”

Over the past year, Israeli strikes, shootings and military operations have killed more than 1,400 Palestinians, including at least 327 children. Families and rescue workers have recovered hundreds of bodies from the rubble, often with their bare hands, as Israeli authorities restrict the entry of machinery needed to reach them. Many more remain buried and unreachable.

The Israeli military has also moved the so-called Yellow Line further into Gaza, beyond the withdrawal line set out in the agreement, squeezing Palestinians into an increasingly small and overcrowded area.

Inger Ashing, Save the Children International CEO, said:

“A ceasefire is meaningless if children are still being killed and families are still unable to rebuild their lives. Since the ceasefire was announced, nearly one child has been killed every day. Families remain trapped in a devastating cycle of loss and deprivation, unable to recover. Governments that backed this agreement must use their influence to stop the killing and ensure children can access food, healthcare, shelter and education. Gaza’s children have a right to safety and a future. Governments have the power to help secure both, and they must use it.”

Recent satellite imagery shows the scale of devastation caused by Israeli forces, with neighbourhoods reduced to rubble, homes flattened and agricultural land razed. More than 80% of structures across Gaza have been damaged, including around two-thirds that have been destroyed.

As winter approaches, hundreds of thousands of families still live in tents, makeshift shelters or damaged homes and face a fourth winter exposed to cold, wind and flooding. Nearly one in four households in Gaza is now headed by a woman, and these families are far more likely to be living in unsafe or inadequate shelter.

For many, there is simply nowhere safe to go. Families are sheltering in war-damaged buildings at risk of collapse. In September, 21 people, including 12 children, were killed when a damaged building collapsed in Gaza City.

Jan Egeland, Norwegian Refugee Council Secretary General, said:

“It is utterly shameful that a full year after the ceasefire was signed, so little has improved for Palestinians in Gaza. Families are still being forced to make impossible choices, between sheltering in damaged and dangerous buildings or living in tents facing unbearable temperatures. Israeli restrictions are still preventing the required equipment or materials, which are the only ways for communities to begin rebuilding their lives. As winter approaches, all governments must take concrete steps to ensure that the flow of aid increases without hindrance, so that Palestinians can finally begin the vast task of recovery and reconstruction.”

These same restrictions are devastating essential services. Not one of Gaza’s 36 hospitals is fully functioning, while medicines, equipment and fuel remain critically scarce. Newborn babies in incubators, patients requiring oxygen or intensive care, older people and people with disabilities and life-changing injuries are among those facing acute risks as specialised treatment, rehabilitation and assistive services remain severely limited.

More than 18,500 patients, including at least 4,000 children, still need medical evacuation, and over 1,000 have died waiting.

Meanwhile, 1.4 million people are facing crisis-level hunger or worse through the end of the year. At the same time, unsafe water and devastated sanitation systems continue to drive the spread of preventable disease.

A year on, the pattern is unmistakable. Families are still being killed. Children are still dying of preventable illness. Gaza is still littered with unexploded ordnance. Homes lie in rubble that cannot be cleared, and aid cannot reach the people who so desperately need it. This is not what a ceasefire was meant to deliver. It reflects the same conditions that twice led the UN Commission of Inquiry, in September 2025 and again in June 2026, to conclude that Israel has committed genocide. The international community’s responsibility does not end with an agreement on paper.

Agnes Callmard, Secretary-General of Amnesty International, said:

“Accountability cannot be swept under the rubble. The recovery and future of Gaza cannot be separated from a framework grounded in international law, justice, and the rights of victims. The persistent failure to hold Israel accountable and press Israel to comply with the International Court of Justice’s binding orders continues to fuel the atrocity crimes on a mass scale against Palestinians.”

EDITOR’S NOTES

• Casualties: At least 327 children killed and 547 injured during ceasefire period, according to Gaza Ministry of Health; more than 5,000 injured overall (WHO – Global Health Cluster); more than 630 bodies recovered from rubble; many more remain buried or unreachable in areas under Israeli military control (OHCHR).
• Yellow Line: area under Israeli control expanded from ~53% to ~63% of Gaza over the ceasefire year (OCHA).
• Destruction: 82% of structures damaged, over two-thirds completely destroyed (UNRWA); 61 million tonnes of rubble, ~20x the amount generated by all wars worldwide over the past 18 years (The Guardian; UNDP).
• Destruction continuing under ceasefire: 9% increase in structures classified as completely destroyed, 11 October 2025 to 11 August 2026. (UNRWA; UNOSAT)
• Concerns raised regarding rubble removal risking destruction of evidence of international crimes; estimated 10,000+ people still buried beneath debris (OHCHR)
• Health: engine oil/spare parts shortages forcing hospitals to ration power; humanitarian vehicles and ambulances grounded; deaths from preventable/treatable conditions, including pregnancy-related complications. (OCHA)
• Women-headed households: nearly 1 in 4, roughly double the pre-war rate. (UN Women)
• Funding: <40% of the 2026 humanitarian response funded as of July. (OCHA)
• Water insecurity: >9 in 10 households. (OCHA)

Signatories:

Zeina women Charity ZWC

A New Policy

Act Church of Sweden

Action For Humanity

ActionAid

Agricultural Development Association (PARC)

Ajyal Association for Creativity & Development

Alanqaa Association for Community Development

Al Najda Social Association

Al-dameer Association for Human Rights

Al-Foukhary Association For Rural Development

Al-Muntada Cultural Forum for Youth

Alrahma charitable society for rehabilitation

Alwaleed Charity Association

American Friends Service Committee (AFSC)

Amnesty International

Applied Research Institute-Jerusalem

Arab Agronomists Association

Arab Center for Agricultural Development (ACAD)

Basma Society for Culture and Arts.

Beesan Benevolent Association

Brilliant Tomorrow for Homes Sons Society

Bystanders No More

Caritas Internationalis

Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD)

Catholic Caucus , Christians for Free Palestine

Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC)

CESVI

Child Rights International Network (CRIN)

Children Not Numbers

Choose Love

Christian Aid

Christian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament

Churches for Middle East Peace

CIDSE – International family of Catholic social justice organisations

CNCD-11.11.11

Community Development and Media Center – CDMC

Council for Arab-British Understanding (Caabu)

DanChurchAid

Danish Muslim Aid

Danish Refugee Council

DEFENCE FOR CHILDREN INTERNATIONAL

Democracy and Workers’ Rights Center in Palestine

Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN)

Doctors Against Genocide

Dr. Haider Abdel Shafi Center for Culture and Development

Etijahat Center

Fares Al-Arab for Development and Charity Works

Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR)

Friends Committee on National Legislation

Future Association for Development & Environment (FADE)

Gaza Urban & Peri-urban Agriculture Platform

General Palestinian Union For People With Disabilities

Give Palestine Association

Glia

Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P)

Global Legal Action Network (GLAN)

Greenpeace International

HelpAge International

Human Rights and Democracy Media Center-SHAMS

Humanity and Inclusion (Handicap International)

International Commission to Support Palestinian Rights- ICSPR

International Development and Relief Foundation (IDRF)

International Media Support

Islamic Relief

JAHALIN SOLIDARITY

Japan International Volunteer Center (JVC)

Just Foreign Policy

Karama for Culture and Arts

Kotof El-Khair Association

LABOR RESOURCES CENTER

Local Communities Organization

MA’AN Development Center

Médecins du Monde International Network

Medical Aid for Palestinians (MAP)

Medico international

Mennonite Central Committee

Nafs for Empowerment

National Justice and Peace Network

Nipponzan Myohoji – New England Peace Pagoda

Nonviolent Peaceforce

Norwegian Church Aid

Norwegian People’s Aid

Norwegian Refugee Council

Olof Palme International Center

Oxfam

Palestine Association for Development and Justice

Palestine Avenir for Childhood Foundation

Palestinian Crescent Society for Relief and Development

Palestinian NGOs Network (PNGO)

Palestinian Women Union Association

Pax Christi England and Wales

Pax Christi International

Peace Action

Peace Action New York State

Première Urgence Internationale

Priests Against Genocide USA

Refugees International

Right to Childhood

Roya Association For Development Abilities

Saferworld

Save the Children

Scottish Catholic International Aid Fund

Society of Women Graduates

Taghreed Association for Culture and Development

Tearfund

Terre des Hommes Foundation

Terre des Hommes Germany

Terre des Hommes Italy

Terre des Hommes Netherlands

The Coalition for Accountability and Integrity – AMAN

The Danish House in Palestine (DHIP)

The Middle East Children’s Alliance

The Palestinian Developmental Women Studies Association (PDWSA)

United Against Inhumanity (UAI)

United Nations Association – Denmark

UNRWA USA National Committee

War Child Alliance

Women’s Program Center- Beach Camp

Youth Vision Society

The post “Gaza ceasefire exists in name only”, say more than 100 organizations. appeared first on United Against Inhumanity.

The cuts to humanitarian aid by key donor countries are having devastating impacts on the lives of millions of the most destitute people in the world. The cuts are also having a profound, structural, and long-lasting impact on the organisations that provide aid. The operations, services, and response capacities of the global humanitarian system are being seriously weakened, leading to dramatic consequences for those people who rely on this system. 

International funding for humanitarian assistance – a key solidarity and foreign policy instrument of our times – had been steadily rising over the past decade in response to mounting needs. It reached an all-time high of $43 billion in 2022, when response to the COVID19 epidemic and the new crisis in Ukraine triggered extraordinary donations. Aid flows started to decline in 2023, with Germany, the US, the UK and several other Western countries leading the way, with some noticeable exceptions (Ireland, for example). As of 2025, global funding had dropped by approximately 35%, reaching the lowest levels in a decade, with further declines expected in 2026. Funding from private sector and philanthropies also contracted significantly during the period. 

The drastic, unplanned and uncoordinated cuts to humanitarian aid, conducted in stark contrast to the commitments made by states in the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative, adopted over two decades ago , have exposed the fragility of an international aid system that relied on voluntary donations of critically needed resources to ensure the lifeline of millions of vulnerable people. 

This contraction in funding takes place at a time when humanitarian needs continue to rise due to the combined effects of armed conflicts, socio-economic downturns and climate change. Initial estimates indicate that US cuts alone, including the abrupt shutting down of USAID, will cause up to 22 million additional and preventable deaths by 2030.  

How has the international humanitarian system responded to this unprecedented funding crisis? Instinctively, most international and national organisations moved into an “emergency management and survival mode,” adopting inward looking response measures principally aimed at cost-containment. This has included the hyper-prioritization of response with a focus exclusively on life-saving interventions, slashing internal workforces by up to 40%, implementing a drastic reduction in capacities, services, geographical presence and outreach, and dropping programmatic links and synergies, notably with agencies focused on peace and development 

Humanitarian goals and ambition levels have collapsed. In 2026 only 87 million vulnerable people out of the over 239 million people identified as in need will be “prioritized” and reached by international aid, if adequate resources come in.  This will leave largely unattended the assistance and protection needs of millions of women, men and children living in fragile conditions. It is an announced humanitarian catastrophe in the making.    

Deep cuts have also impacted system-wide emergency preparedness capacities at a time when the world is entering a hyper-complex poly-crisis, driven by overlapping local and global factors, including escalating conflicts and violence, the onset of a severe El Niño, the wide socio-economic effects of the Hormuz crisis and war in Ukraine, and climate change. The value of investing in preparedness is well documented with evidence of significant return on investment in terms of future response costs, community empowerment, local institution building and shortened emergency response times. Slashing global capacities to anticipate, prepare for, and mitigate the effects of preventable crises is irresponsible and potentially catastrophic for the lives and livelihoods of millions of people. 

What is most striking is that the global humanitarian aid system has not yet been able to move beyond its own initial survival mode response, attempting to restore confidence and elaborate a vision and narrative for the future. Within the humanitarian space the concerns the impact of defunding have been widespread, however leaders from the donor community, international organizations, national entities and the UN system have thus far failed to develop a common, reality-facing strategy in relation to the tragedy of the hundreds of millions of people who will not be reached by international aid and will be left behind. They have not been able to get the message about these dramatic developments across in a coherent manner. Lack of public awareness of the impending humanitarian crisis may help to explain why politicians and decision makers in donor capitals are not under more pressure to respond. This is why, for example, governments can afford a war in Iran costing well over $1 billion per day, when a single month without such war would help cover the cost of nearly the entire humanitarian appeal for 2026.

Now is the time to confront this reality as part of our collective responsibility towards those most in need. The current crisis provides us with the opportunity to move forward with a long-awaited reform of the global aid system in a world undergoing important transformations. Leadership and vision are urgently needed. It is hoped that this reform and the debate about the future of humanitarian principles and action will be a priority on the agenda of the new UN Secretary General. Underpinning all this, a far-reaching reflection is required that brings together local community groups, civil society organizations, national governments and private constituencies, humanitarian actors and organizations, UN entities and governing bodies, and international donors, to agree on the meaning of human solidarity, our common ethical obligations, the future of humanitarian action and the future of our civilization.

About the authors:

Carlo Scaramella, Independent Researcher and Advisor, former UN World Food Programme Senior Official. 

Amir Mahmoud Abdulla, Former Deputy Executive Director, UN World Food Programme & Former UN Coordinator Black Sea Grain Initiative.

Martin Barber, Secretary of United Against Inhumanity (UAI) and former Director of the UN Mine Action Programme.

The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author of the presentation and do not necessarily represent the views of United Against Inhumanity (UAI).

The post “The Defunding of Humanitarian Aid – Leaving Millions Behind” by Carlo Scaramella and others. appeared first on United Against Inhumanity.

On one of Europe’s most visited coastlines lies a border where people are pushed back, detained, and sometimes die trying to cross. This report is an attempt to make that reality impossible to ignore.

The Solidarity Programme for Refugee Help (SPRH) is an initiative founded by students of the Sciences Po Paris Menton campus. Every weekend, its volunteers head to the Franco-Italian border between Menton and Ventimiglia to distribute food and document, firsthand, what is happening to people on the move. This sixth edition compiles testimonies gathered between October 2025 and May 2026, paired with rigorous legal and academic research grounding each story in French, Italian, and EU law. United Against Inhumanity supports this initiative.

A few things you’ll find inside:

• 121 individuals from over 20 countries were recorded crossing the border in the data collection period — from Morocco and Sudan to Afghanistan and Pakistan.
• Testimonies of migrants signing documents they couldn’t understand, with no interpreter present — a direct breach of both French and EU law.
• Accounts of minors pushed back with falsified birth dates, and of biometric “age tests” that fail to meet the EU’s own legal standards.
• A man with valid refugee status and an Italian ID, still turned away at the border for lacking “adequate” paperwork.
• First-hand accounts of the psychological toll of displacement — from PTSD rates eight times the national average, to a young man’s suicide following a violent assault.
• A clear-eyed look at what’s coming next: how the EU’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum, in force since June 2026, risks deepening the very abuses this report documents.

This isn’t a report about statistics — it’s about the people behind them, and we share it as part of UAI’s “Stop Inhumanity at Europe’s Borders” campaign, because bearing witness is the first step toward accountability.

Read the full report, share it, and help make sure these stories don’t go unheard.

The post The SPRH Border Surveillance Report: 6 Years of Bearing Witness at the Franco-Italian Border appeared first on United Against Inhumanity.

Dear Prime Minister,

United Against Inhumanity (UAI) and the signatories below call on you and your government to withdraw the government’s plan to return a group of refugees from Myanmar to their country of origin on 29 September.

UAI is also urging relevant organizations of the UN system, including the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to intervene with your government to ensure that the proposed repatriation does not go ahead, while conditions for safe, dignified, and voluntary return of refugees to Myanmar are not in place.

UNHCR has registered 193,824 refugees and asylum seekers from Myanmar in Malaysia, comprising 126,144 Rohingya, 15,774 Chins, and 33,002 members of other ethnic groups from conflict-affected areas or fleeing persecution in Myanmar. For the large majority, this movement entailed a hazardous journey by sea and/or land. Despite Malaysia being an upper middle income country, its treatment of refugees and asylum seekers from Myanmar falls short of expectations and has recently not met international standards for the protection of refugees. Their legal status is tenuous, and the community has been the target of periodic crackdowns involving detention, corporal punishment, eviction and other forms of harassment.

While few details of the proposed repatriation have been released, return of any refugees to Myanmar in the circumstances currently prevailing in that country would be completely inappropriate.

The majority of refugees from Myanmar in Malaysia are Rohingya, a predominantly Muslim minority group who have been denied citizenship in the largely Buddhist state of Myanmar, where they have been subjected to genocide, mass expulsion and other grievous human rights violations.

Adult Rohingya in Malaysia have few livelihood options and are often forced to eke out a living by working in the unregulated labour market, while Rohingya children are barred from attending Malaysia’s public schools. Political and popular hostility to the Rohingya has been growing in recent months, inflamed by social media posts unfairly accusing Rohingya refugees of criminal and anti-social behaviour.

In July, your government announced that 1476 refugees from Myanmar would return to their country of origin, purportedly on a voluntary basis on 29 September. The government stated that Myanmar’s military junta had agreed to take back 5000, approximately half of the 10,000 Myanmar refugees currently in Malaysian immigration detention centres, and designated as members of Malaysia’s refugee community ‘authorized’ to return to Myanmar.

Given the extreme pressures currently being placed on the Rohingya and other ethnic minorities in Myanmar, UAI does not believe that any return of refugees at the present time would be voluntary in nature. As such, it would violate the internationally recognized principle of non-refoulement, which prevents refugees from being returned to a place where their life and liberty would be at risk.

Such a risk evidently exists in Myanmar, where the junta is engaged in a vicious war against its own people, including a variety of ethnically-based armies.

While the Myanmar junta has said that a small proportion of Malaysia’s refugee population would be allowed to return, it has given no indication as to where they might settle or what guarantees would be offered for their safety and livelihoods.

Rohingya refugees in Malaysia and throughout South and South-East Asia have repeatedly expressed their desire to return to Myanmar, provided that they can do so in a safe, dignified and voluntary manner, with full recognition of their citizenship and respect for their human rights.

Rohingya community groups based in Malaysia have made it clear that those conditions do not currently exist. They have called for the planned repatriation to be suspended, and for your government to consult with UNHCR and refugee representatives before proceeding with any returns. In the words of one of their number, “we are stateless. There is no way we can return home safely when we face ongoing genocide back home.”

UNHCR itself has stated that conditions in Myanmar are not conducive to refugee returns, and has made it clear that the organization will have no involvement in the proposed repatriation.

In these circumstances, we would urge you to abandon the scheduled repatriation of refugees from Myanmar, and to acknowledge their continuing need for international protection. We would also urge you to allow refugees from Myanmar to remain in the country with a secure legal status enabling a range of rights and protections, including the right to work and access to education and other services.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of our highest consideration.

Signed on behalf of United Against Inhumanity (UAI) by the individuals listed below,

a group whose signatories include former United Nations Assistant Secretaries-General, former ambassadors and senior UN and humanitarian officials, and leading academics working on refugee protection and Myanmar:

SIGNATORIES

Laetitia van den Assum
Former Ambassador and Member of the Rakhine State Advisory Commission

Dr. Richard Anson
Former World Bank Staff, Independent Consultant and Affiliate of HDPI

Martin Barber
Secretary, International Executive Committee, UAI and former Director of UN Mine Action Service

Mark Bowden
Former UN Assistant Secretary General

James Brasher III
Former Special Assistant to President Jimmy Carter and Founding Director of the Global Philanthropists Circle

Jeff Crisp
Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford

Antonio Donini
Co-founder and Member of the International Executive Committee of UAI

Sumayya Ferdous
Convener of the UAI Task Team on Myanmar

Iain Guest
Former UNHCR Official and International Journalist

Maggie Heraty OBE
Hon Sec UAI in the UK & Advisor on Humanitarian Logistics

Catriona Jarvis
Director and Chair of Trustees, Methoria

Chris Kaye
Former UN WFP Director, Hon Prof. (Bristol University)

Ian Martin
Former United Nations Official

Professor Kirsten McConnachie
School of Law, University of East Anglia, UK

Salem Mezhoud
Vice-Chair, International Executive Committee of UAI

Michael Mosselmans
Co-chair of UAI in the UK and Head of Humanitarian Division, Christian Aid

Christine Mougne
Former UNHCR Staff

Norah Niland
Co-founder of United Against Inhumanity, Former Director Human Rights UNAMA

Roger Pearson
Former UN Official

Sir Charles Petrie
Former United Nations Assistant Secretary General

Jean-Baptiste Richardier
Co-founder and Member of the International Executive Committee of UAI

Patricia Rogers
Chair, United Nations Association, London and South East Region

Claudio Schuftan
Member of People’s Health Movement

Gerald Sousa Mendes
UAI and Fundação Aristides de Sousa Mendes – General Council

Frederick Spielberg
Former Humanitarian Specialist, UNICEF, UNDP, DHA

John Williamson
Former UNHCR Social Services Officer

The post “No Time to Return Refugees to Myanmar”: An Open Letter from UAI to Malaysia’s Prime Minister appeared first on United Against Inhumanity.

Recent events in Ceuta, a Spanish enclave on Moroccan territory, cost over 100 lives and affected thousands of people. Their causes and potential impact are debated, but UAI is concerned by the facts, which are not contested.

When the Prime Ministers of Italy and Denmark persuaded 22 other European countries to sign a letter to the European Commission condemning the Spanish government and justice system for offering what they considered a threat to European borders and the Schengen area, not only the Spanish government but also Spanish civil society reacted strongly, defending those policies and correcting much of the disinformation surrounding them.

One of the strongest reactions came from Jorge Serrano Paradinas, the coordinator of the citizen-led initiative behind Spain’s regularization of undocumented immigrants. It is his response to the joint letter by European leaders that we publish here.

Mr Serrano’s letter strongly rebuts many of the myths and inaccuracies that have found favour among certain elements of society and government.

The crucial points in Serrano’s letter

Spain’s regularization is strictly retroactive and grants no rights to anyone crossing into Spain today. It therefore cannot logically be a “pull factor”, as some leaders have claimed. Blaming the policy for a crisis it could not have caused deflects attention from the harder question of why people are still dying at Europe’s borders.

What the Spanish law reveals is a truth that UAI and its campaign partners have argued since the Campaign’s inception: safe, legal, and dignified pathways are possible where there is political will.

The Spanish law is the result of the mobilization of more than 700,000 Spanish citizens, over 1,000 organizations, and some 17,000 volunteers, and it was adopted by 310 parliamentary votes against only 33.

Not new detention or new deterrence

Despite improvements in the situation, events such as those in Ceuta continue to be the object of manipulation and opportunistic political instrumentalization.

If Ceuta becomes a pretext for weakening Schengen, expanding detention, or further outsourcing migration control, then more people will die, not fewer. This is precisely the warning given by UAI and its campaign partners in their June 2026 statement on the EU Pact and Strategy.

The five steps set out in the Manifesto of the Campaign to Stop the Inhumanity at Europe’s Borders remain the alternative: stop pushbacks and protect life at sea; humanize reception; end third-country containment; build real safe routes; and guarantee justice and redress.

Watch, read, and join us

Watch Jorge Serrano’s speech; read our statement on the EU Pact and Strategy; and read the Campaign Manifesto in full.

There is another and better way. Let us embrace it.

The post Ceuta: Crisis, Instrumentalization, and UAI’s Better Way appeared first on United Against Inhumanity.

Afghans are caught between Taliban repression and international punitive policies. Both deepen poverty, undermine rights and leave millions paying the price for political decisions beyond their control.

Afghanistan is no stranger to abysmal levels of poverty that have long threatened the survival and life chances of much of its population. This was the case during the post-9/11 years of the US-led war economy, when economic inequality increased even as access to food, education, healthcare and employment improved. Impunity and corruption were rife and greatly benefitted warlords, international contractors and government-linked urban elites.

The return of the Taliban to Kabul in August 2021, upon the withdrawal of US and allied forces, opened a new economic chapter driven by policies that further marginalised impoverished and vulnerable Afghans. International development aid to Afghanistan mostly disappeared. As part of its punitive, post-occupation policy, Washington also abruptly ended its economic support to Kabul that had covered some 75% of government expenditure. In addition, Washington, in collaboration with some European allies, seized some US$9.1billion of Afghanistan’s sovereign external reserves, thereby significantly disabling the country’s central bank, Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB). This greatly restricted the DAB’s ability to maintain a stable exchange rate, a measure that is key to curbing inflation, thereby enabling the poor to purchase basics such as food and fuel for heating and cooking. Blocking access to the DAB’s reserves throttled the economy and banking system, a situation made worse by the overcompliance of external banks that makes international transactions extremely difficult. 

The re-emergence of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) was welcomed by many in-country Afghans as it heralded the end of armed conflict, air strikes, night-time raids and widespread use of improvised explosive devices. However, the IEA soon launched a series of restrictive decrees that greatly subverted the lives of females including their freedom of movement, access to employment and to formal education for girls beyond 12 years. These measures are detrimental to individuals, their families and society in general, notwithstanding various initiatives by civil society and others to reduce their impact. The IEA is infamous for its contempt for fundamental human rights standards and obligations, a stance that has gained it widespread opprobrium and little international support or formal recognition.

The IEA is routinely denounced, albeit to little effect, in the human rights (HR) arena and various fora which tend to prioritise civil and political rights to the detriment of economic rights. The interdependence of gender equality, the right to work and individual economic security is obvious, but it is difficult to understand why formal HR entities routinely ignore the economic warfare and collective punishment resulting from the seizure of Afghanistan’s external reserves. There is widespread awareness of the ramifications of extreme poverty for individuals and groups. However, there has been little effort to advocate for the ending of policies that actually manufacture poverty and undermine the enjoyment of human rights notwithstanding their harmful and deadly consequences.

Human cost of policies antagonistic to human rights and humanitarian values

The drastic reduction in support for humanitarian action geared to helping those who are most at risk has further exacerbated the vulnerability and marginalisation of women and girls. In 2025 the international humanitarian appeal for Afghanistan received only 42% of the $2,4 billion requested. At the time of writing, the 2026 appeal had only received 26% of the smaller, US$1,7bn requested.

This situation is compounded by the millions of Afghans who have been forced to return from Iran and Pakistan in recent years with some 2.5 million expected by the end of 2026. According to a UNDP report “more than 80% of households are in debt while nearly three quarters rely on negative coping strategies to manage getting through the day”; 92% of recent returnees are unable to secure the basic necessities of life. In provinces heavily impacted by returnees “only 3 per cent of people have formal employment, while 78 per cent rely on casual day labour.”

Food insecurity,which had diminished significantly during the first 12 years of the Republic thanks to large scale food aid for hungry families and investment in agriculture, is now dramatically on the rise. In 2026, 3.7 million children under five are at heightened risk of malnutrition, with severe acute malnutrition cases significantly increasing due to food insecurity and inadequate diets. The situation is exacerbated by reduced international food aid, leading to a severe hunger crisis affecting millions.

A combination of fewer female healthpersonnel and reduced support for health care means reduced access to services with, invariably, fatal consequences. The World Health  Organization estimated that 521 mothers died for every 100,000 live births in 2023, more than double the global average. The UN Population Fund has warned “that continued disruption to health services could lead to 1,200 additional maternal deaths by 2028.” Meanwhile, the closure of more than 420 health facilities this past year has contributed to a “3 to 4 percent increase in infant mortality” and a noticeable increase in maternal deaths.

Notwithstanding prominent narratives and rhetoric on the difficult situation endured by women in Afghanistan, support for organisations geared to helping such women has also declined significantly. A UN survey of 74 Afghan women’s organisations found that nearly three-quarters experienced funding cuts in 2025. More than half of the organisations surveyed indicated that “they were likely to suspend operations or close entirely within the next year.” Similarly, support that helps women earn a living is also shrinking. In Afghanistan, where female-focused organisations are often the only entities able to reach women on the margins of society, they face mounting difficulties to maintain programmes and outreach given significant aid cuts. UN Women notes that “the weakening of women’s organisations is occurring at a time of massive humanitarian need and growing restrictions on women’s rights.”

Need for Community-based sustainable empowerment

External stakeholders that prosecuted the post 9/11 war and propped up the widely despised Republic era governments, coupled with the IEA’s lack of commitment to inclusive and accountable governance, are greatly responsible for appalling levels of poverty and destitution. The competing agendas of the IEA in Kandahar and those who oppose them have sacrificed the human rights and well-being of Afghans for their own ends. Time is running out for millions of impoverished Afghans but it is not too late to re-think failed agendas and invest in community-based, sustainable empowerment programmes. Investment in small-scale enterprises, including those headed by women and other marginalised groups, should be a priority as well as strengthening basics such as agriculture, irrigation and climate-related risk reduction.

Abandoning the imperial-style seizure of the country’s sovereign reserves could be easily done at no cost to donors. This would enable the DAB, the banking sector and the economy to function in a manner beneficial to all Afghans. Recapitalising the DAB in a monitored fashion is a straight-forward proposition; it would help undo the harm that has been imposed on the people of Afghanistan without any acknowledgement of the human cost involved.

While the IEA remains ostracised by the international community, poverty and deprivation remain chronic. The prospect of international development aid remains bleak despite the reactivation of some limited World Bank and Asian Development Bank projects. More can definitely be done to support local and sustainable development. This could mean direct support to communities as well as small enterprises, including some, that the Taliban seem to tolerate, that are run by women.

In the current geopolitical climate marked by drastic across the board cuts to humanitarian and development aid, more creative approaches are needed. These should focus on local employment and the availability of essential services. In Afghanistan as elsewhere, sustainable development projects at the local level have been shown to yield positive results and break the cycle of dependency on humanitarian aid. The recipes are there but the will to use them is missing. This must change. Meanwhile, by releasing the arbitrarily sequestered Afghan reserves, Western donors would give some meaning to the often-repeated phrase that “Afghan lives matter”.

Other relevant articles published by ISPI in August 2026 on this topic:

Afghanistan, Five Years of Taliban Rule: An Assessment, by Giuliano Battiston

Five years after the Taliban’s return, Afghanistan remains trapped in a cycle of crisis. As the regime consolidates power and gains international recognition, a new approach is needed – one that puts Afghans’ rights, needs and long-term stability at the centre.

https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/five-years-of-taliban-rule-five-major-trends-243316

The Geopolitics of the Emirate, by Antonio Giustozzi

Five years after their return to power, the Taliban can still boast diplomatic recognition from only one foreign state: Russia. Other countries in the region – primarily China and Iran – have gradually moved closer to diplomatic recognitionbut have stopped short of taking the final step. In their case, reservations certainly do not stem from the segregation of women within the Emirate or a lack of respect for human rights; the issues lie elsewhere – above all, in the conflict with Pakistan.

https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/the-geopolitics-of-the-emirate-243279

Back to Uncertainty: Afghan Returnees from Iran and Pakistan, by Jelena Bjelica

As Pakistan and Iran expel millions of Afghans, return has become less a durable solution than the start of a new cycle of displacement, poverty and uncertainty in a country ill-equipped to absorb them.

https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/back-to-uncertainty-afghan-returnees-from-iran-and-pakistan-243266

The World’s Worst Women’s Rights Crisis Demands Solidarity and Action, by Shaharzad Akbar

Afghan women face the world’s gravest assault on their rights. As the Taliban institutionalise gender apartheid, governments must prioritise accountability over diplomatic normalisation.

https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/the-worlds-worst-womens-rights-crisis-demands-solidarity-and-action-243325

“The Taliban Continue to Entrench Their System” – Interview with Richard Bennett by Giuliano Battiston

https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/the-taliban-continue-to-entrench-their-system-243280

The EU and the Taliban: Deportations Prioritised Over Human Rights, by Thomas Ruttiq

Behind the language of ‘technical engagement’, the EU is expanding cooperation with the Taliban to enable deportations – testing the credibility of its human rights commitments.

https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/the-eu-and-the-taliban-deportations-prioritised-over-human-rights-243287

The post “Afghanistan: Double Jeopardy”, by Norah Niland and Antonio Donini. appeared first on United Against Inhumanity.

Dear President von der Leyen,

Dear High Representative / Vice-President Kallas,

Dear Commissioner Šefčovič,

Dear Commissioners, 

We, the undersigned human rights and humanitarian organizations and trade unions, are writing to urge you to propose a regulation to prohibit EU trade with Israel’s illegal settlements.

 20260622Letter to CoC on trade ban Art. 207

Amid growing calls from EU member states’ ministers of foreign affairs, the High Representative has repeatedly requested the Commission to prepare a proposal to restrict trade with Israel’s illegal settlements. As many of us raised in a joint letter in February 2025 we believe that the EU must ban such trade and should do so under article 207 TFEU, as a measure necessary to bring EU trade into compliance with international law, including as most authoritatively interpreted by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its landmark advisory opinion of 19 July 2024.

The Court found that “Israel’s settlement policy, its acts of annexation, and its related discriminatory legislation and measures are in breach of international law” (para. 230). It further found that Israel’s unlawful policies and practices are in breach of the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination, a peremptory norm of international law which carries obligations erga omnes for all states, and that Israel is in breach of the prohibition of racial segregation and apartheid (par. 225-229). The Court concluded that “the continued presence of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is illegal” (para. 266).

Concerning third states, the Court found they have an obligation to “take steps to prevent trade or investment relations that assist in the maintenance of the illegal situation created by Israel in the [OPT]” (par. 278), adding that “it is for all States, while respecting the Charter of the United Nations and international law, to ensure that any impediment resulting from the illegal presence of Israel in the [OPT] to the exercise of the Palestinian people of its right to self-determination is brought to an end” (par. 279).

The current EU policy with regard to settlement products is manifestly inadequate in light of these obligations. EU measures aimed at excluding settlement products from preferential tariff treatment and correct labelling clearly do not constitute steps to prevent trade with the illegal settlements. On the contrary, they are designed to continue this trade, which contributes to the sustainability of such illegal situation. While recent reports also suggest considerable flaws in the implementation of the current EU differentiation system, we note that the problem is the policy itself, which, even if enforced to the letter, would still fall short of meeting the EU’s obligations under international law as laid out by the ICJ.

Moreover, Israel compensates settlement businesses exporting to the EU for the tariff difference, which cancels out the effect of the EU’s existing policy even if perfectly enforced. These compensation payments would also likely offset or reduce the impact of any possible increases to the EU tariffs, short of a full ban. Furthermore, the collection of tariffs would result in the EU profiting off Israel’s unlawful occupation, illegal settlements and related abuses.

By any available estimate, EU imports from illegal Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory vastly exceed imports from the Palestinians themselves, and this trade occurs without Palestinian consent.

Settlements are manifestly illegal under international law, and all EU member states have repeatedly condemned them as such. They are the result of the transfer of civilian population from an occupying power to an occupied territory, which is prohibited by the Fourth Geneva Convention and, according to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, is a war crime.

For all the above reasons, it is clear that the current EU trade relationship with the territory occupied by Israel since 1967 is not consistent with international law, and in fact contributes to “the maintenance of the illegal situation created by Israel”, in breach of the obligations identified by the ICJ, fuelling human rights violations that the EU regularly condemns. 

Under Articles 3(5) and 21 TEU and case-law of the EU Court of Justice, the EU must respect international law and ensure that its external action, including trade policy, is consistent with it. 

Therefore, the Commission has a duty to propose a regulation under Article 207 TFEU to stop trade with the illegal settlements. This applies not only to goods from settlements, but also to services.

We note that the EU has previously used Article 207 TFEU inter alia to ban import of products made with forced labour and products used for torture and to restrict trade in conflict minerals, in order to align its trade policy with its principles, and that the Council legal service has recognized that measures to restrict trade with Israel’s illegal settlements could be adopted on the same legal basis. The same logic must be applied to trade with Israeli illegal settlements.

Should the Commission refuse to propose such a measure under Article 207, we encourage member states to consider litigation before the Court of Justice of the European Union to ensure compliance with EU and international law.

In the face of the intensification of Israel’s violations against Palestinians in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem, also through rampant state-backed settler violence, the European Union must show moral leadership starting with banning trade that contributes to Israel’s illegal settlement enterprise.

We stand ready to discuss these pressing issues with you.

1. 11.11.11
2. ABVV-FGTB
3. ACAT Belgium
4. Acat Italia
5. ACAT-France
6. ACT Alliance EU
7. ActionAid International
8. ACV-CSC Belgium
9. Amnesty International
10. Avaaz
11. Avocats Sans Frontières
12. Broederlijk Delen
13. Christian Aid Ireland
14. Christians for the Abolition of Torture-Spain/Catalonia
15. CIDSE – International Family of Catholic Social Justice Organisations
16. CNCD-11.11.11
17. Comhlámh
18. Comité Pour Une Paix Juste Au Proche-Orient
19. Confederación Intersindical Galega
20. Confederación Sindical de Comisiones Obreras (CCOO Spain)
21. COSPE
22. Danes je nov dan
23. Danish Church Aid (DCA)
24. Ekō
25. ELA
26. Entraide et Fraternité
27. EuroMed Rights
28. European Middle East Project (EuMEP)
29. European Trade Union Network for Justice in Palestine
30. Focus Association for Sustainable Development
31. Gibanje za pravice Palestincev
32. Human Rights Watch
33. Humanitas – Centre for Global Education and Cooperation
34. International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
35. La Coordinadora de Organizaciones para el Desarrollo – España
36. LAB Sindikatua
37. NOVACT
38. Olof Palme International Center
39. Oxfam
40. PAX
41. Pax Christi Flanders (Belgium)
42. Pax Christi International
43. PIC – Legal Center for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment
44. Platform of French NGO for Palestine
45. Pravna mreža za varstvo demokracije
46. Sadaka-The Ireland Palestine Alliance
47. Save the Children
48. Sindikat Mladi plus (Trade Union Youth Plus)
49. Slovene PEN Centre
50. Slovenian Union of Journalists
51. SOLIDAR
52. Solsoc
53. The Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO)
54. The Good Lobby
55. The Rights Forum
56. United Against Inhumanity (UAI)

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