Based on the presentation delivered by Kholood Khair at the UAI General Assembly

Sudan is facing a convergence of crises—humanitarian, political, military, and existential. In her compelling address at the UAI General Assembly, Sudanese analyst Kholood Khair, Director of Confluence Advisory, offered a sharp and deeply informed account of how Sudan reached this point and what the international community continues to misunderstand.

A Revolution Interrupted

Khair traced the roots of the conflict to the 2018–2019 revolution, a national awakening that went beyond the traditional urban centres to include peripheral regions that had long suffered under neglect, exploitation, and militarisation.

The revolution was followed by a fragile civilian–military partnership that collapsed with the 2021 military coup, which:

• Restored entrenched military and economic elites
• Reinvigorated Islamist patronage networks
• Reversed Sudan’s brief re-engagement with global institutions

The war that erupted in 2023 was not an isolated event but the culmination of a counter-revolutionary project aimed at dismantling the civic forces that had challenged the old order.

Militarisation and the Breakdown of Society

The war has resulted in:

• Forced recruitment by both the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)
• Ethnicised violence and targeted displacement
• Widespread hunger and collapse of services
• The systematic dismantling of civil society networks

Khair stressed that this is not merely a “civil war.” It is a war on civilians, designed to destroy the infrastructure of resistance committees, professional associations, women’s groups, and youth movements that powered the revolution.

The Battle for Global Opinion

A major theme of Khair’s presentation was the weaponisation of narrative.

Both SAF and RSF run sophisticated international propaganda efforts:

• SAF positions itself as the defender of national sovereignty
• RSF presents itself abroad as the anti-Islamist, technocratic, stabilising force

These narratives distort the conflict, reducing it to a binary that excludes civilians, erases the revolution, and obscures the deep structural drivers of violence.

Gulf Power Politics: A Critical Layer of the Conflict

Khair made it clear that Sudan’s war cannot be understood without acknowledging the strategic involvement of Gulf states—particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Why the Gulf is deeply invested in Sudan

Sudan’s value to Gulf powers lies in:

• Red Sea access and military positioning
• Land and agricultural projects linked to Gulf food security
• Gold trade networks, particularly those connected to RSF-linked companies

These interests make Sudan not simply a neighbour, but a geopolitical prize.

Saudi Arabia’s Influence

While Saudi Arabia publicly presents itself as a mediator—most visible through the Jeddah negotiation track—Khair highlighted that it also shapes the international frame through which Sudan is interpreted.

Riyadh’s influence results in:

• A diplomatic approach that prioritises elite-level stability over democratic transformation
• International messaging that sidelines Sudanese civilian political actors
• External pressure to favour agreements that maintain militarised political orders

Saudi Arabia’s close alignment with Western policymakers amplifies its narrative power.

The UAE’s Strategic Entanglement

The UAE, Khair noted, has longstanding ties to:

• RSF leadership
• Gold extraction and export chains
• Security contractors and logistical networks

These connections create strong incentives for Abu Dhabi to maintain influence over whichever actors can secure its economic and security interests.

Gulf Rivalries Exported Into Sudan

Although Saudi Arabia and the UAE are partners, their visions for Sudan diverge:

• Riyadh prefers a more consolidated, state-centric security arrangement
• Abu Dhabi has cultivated relationships with non-state actors, particularly the RSF

These tensions export Gulf rivalries directly into Sudanese political and military structures, often at the expense of civilian governance.

The Consequences for Sudan

Khair emphasised that Gulf influence has:

• Militarised Sudanese politics, deepening war economies
• Marginalised civilians in peace talks and international diplomacy
• Fragmented international policy, as Western actors treat Gulf states as indispensable partners in Sudan policy

In short, regional geopolitics—not Sudanese aspirations—often shape the world’s approach to the conflict.

A Call for Civilian-Centred Solidarity

Khair closed with a sobering assessment: Sudan is experiencing the world’s largest displacement crisis, a rapidly escalating famine, and a collapse of humanitarian access. Yet only a fraction of the UN’s funding appeal has been met.

Her message to the GA was unequivocal:

Sudan needs a global solidarity movement that places civilians—not militaries and not regional powers—at the centre of diplomacy, aid, and political engagement.

Without such a shift, Sudan risks being permanently trapped between the interests of warlords and the strategies of powerful external actors.

The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author of the presentation and do not necessarily represent the views of United Against Inhumanity (UAI).

The post Sudan’s War of Narratives appeared first on United Against Inhumanity.

This April marked the extension of Sudan’s brutal civil war into its third year. According to the chair of the Independent Fact-Finding Mission by the UNHCR, Mohamed Chande Othman, it is far from over. The UN has already claimed the conflict as the world’s “largest humanitarian crisis” with the forced displacement of 15 million Sudanese, the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians, the weaponisation of humanitarian aid, the outbreak of deadly, yet preventable, diseases like cholera and the systemic practice of sexual violence by armed agents.

The term “sexual violence” refers to a broad category of abuses like rape, sexual torture, mutilation, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution and unwanted pregnancies. This phenomenon can occur during both peacetime and wartime and is often used as a weapon of war by warring parties to instill fear into their victims. While sexual violence affects people across genders and ages, women and girls bear a disproportionate burden.

Sudan is no exception to this rule. In the Women Peace and Security Index for 2023, Sudan ranked 164th out of 177 countries, a low, yet unsurprising position. While the democratic revolution of 2018 was a source of optimism for Sudanese women, the recent descent into violence has dashed the hopes of many. Currently 4.2 million women and girls are estimated to be at risk of sexual violence. This statistic is supported by distressing reports of widespread sexual violence perpetrated by militants from both principal warring groups; the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).

However, owing to ethnic divisions in Sudan that are currently being exacerbated by the conflict, the sexual violence experienced by Sudanese women and girls takes on a particularly grim, racial dimension. The racism that victims encounter is deeply rooted in Sudan’s history as a slave raiding and trading state where a binary racial division between “Arab” and “non-Arab”, or “Black”, peoples was consolidated.

British colonial rule preserved this oversimplified racial divide, as well as the hierarchies associated with it, and a series of oppressive Arabization policies post-independence reinforced it further. This has led to the development of a strongly racialised and exclusive “Arab” national identity which, combined with a failure to address its racist past, has allowed ethnic tensions in Sudan to escalate unchecked.

A report by Human Rights Watch details the sexual slavery experienced by “non-Arab” Sudanese women and girls, particularly from Nuba communities, by “Arab” RSF fighters and affiliated gunmen. These women and girls were victims of harrowing gang-rapes and kidnappings. Once relocated to an RSF fighter base in Dibeibat, they were “held in conditions of enslavement”, chained together in kneeling positions, only fed flour and water, and raped at will by RSF soldiers.

The report also contains personal testimonies from women describing the racial slurs directed at them by RSF fighters during these attacks. A report from OHCHR addresses some conclusions from the Fact-Finding Mission and highlights that this widespread sexual slavery may qualify as both a war crime and, if implemented systematically on a large scale as in the case of Sudan, as a crime against humanity.

However, such ideologically and racially charged sexual violence towards non-Arab communities in Sudan predates the outbreak of this recent civil war. In 2003 during the Darfur Genocide, the mass rape of non-Arab women, particularly from Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa communities, was reported. Despite numerous investigations into the consequences of such brutal sexual violence along ethnic lines during wartime, attempts to fully resolve this issue during post-war periods of relative peace have failed, as demonstrated by the recent spike in attacks after April 2023.

Cases like that of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), demonstrate that inaction towards human rights violations during times of war, specifically sexual violence, can have long-lasting, detrimental effects on society. In the eastern parts of the DRC, where the majority of the recent conflict has unfolded, sexual violence has become endemic. Some experts talk of a “rape epidemic” in which the sexual violence perpetrated during periods of conflict has infiltrated the domestic context and societal gender relations more broadly, leading to an increase in gender-based violence, both during civil war and peace-time.

Furthermore, discriminatory social norms and stigmas have prevented dialogue and justice within communities, in some cases “normalising” rapes to the extent that the women and girls are seen to “provoke” them. Such findings demonstrate the long-term, and often generational, impacts of leaving crimes of sexual violence during war unaddressed.

While the cases of Sudan and the DRC differ in many crucial ways, there are undeniable lessons from the suffering of Congolese women and girls that are relevant to their Sudanese counterparts, namely, that the root causes of sexual violence should be addressed before such brutal practices become embedded in society. The European Parliament has emphasized the importance of educational programmes and training to eliminate stereotypes among public agents as a strategy to tackle sexual violence post-war. Similarly, a UNIDIR report that uses evidence from the Sahel draws attention to the importance of long-term norm change initiatives when addressing sexual violence in affected communities.

Although tackling the root causes of sexual violence post-war remains an enormous task, certain organisations are putting these recommendations into practice. Geneva Call, for example, focuses on engaging members of armed groups and de facto authorities in dialogue and training in adherence to international humanitarian norms. Without confronting the underlying attitudes and norms that fuel sexual violence, as the case of the DRC shows, women and girls will remain at risk. This long-term, resource-intensive work within communities is central for ensuring sustainable peace and protecting survivors’ rights and wellbeing.

While it is important to shed light on different post-conflict reconstruction approaches, one reality remains: the war in Sudan continues. Any meaningful behavioural change efforts that protect those at risk of sexual violence cannot be implemented until the violence ends. Sudan is on the brink of being classified as a failed state while the international community witnesses the biggest drop in international aid ever recorded and an apparent total absence of political will. Governments and international organisations are turning their backs on the conflict in Sudan, a conflict they surely cannot afford to ignore.

About the Author: Amaia is a European Social and Political Studies student at University College London who volunteers with UAI. Specialising in the field of comparative politics, she is particularly passionate about understanding the processes that lead to politically motivated violence. For more of her work on Sudan, please refer to her previous article on the vital work of mutual aid groups on UAI’s website: “Mutual aid groups in Sudan: How can you get help to starving families?”

The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of United Against Inhumanity (UAI).

The post “Confronting Sexual Violence during the War in Sudan: Possible Lessons from the DRC”, by Amaia Echebarrieta. appeared first on United Against Inhumanity.

The conflict currently engulfing Sudan began on the 15th of April 2023 and since then, the country has been immersed in chaos and violence. Estimates suggest that 15,500 people had been killed by the end of June 2024 as a result of the conflict. Widespread sexual violence towards women and girls and ethnically motivated killings of non-Arab groups like the Masalit in Darfur have been reported. According to the UN’s International Organisation for Migration, more than 10 million people have been forced to flee, leading to the current largest global displacement crisis. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification warns that over 755,000 Sudanese are facing famine in the next few months, while another 8.5 million people are at Phase 4, the second most severe level of starvation, where the risk of hunger-related deaths is rapidly increasing.

Despite the scale of widespread violence and suffering, the international community has been slow to respond to the cries of the Sudanese people with the conflict receiving limited media coverage. When it has been mentioned, the conflict has often been referred to as the “war of two generals”, focusing on a “personal rivalry” between General Abdel-Fattah al-Burhan and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo. This narrative reduces the war in Sudan to a domestic conflict, exempting international state and corporate actors from their responsibility in exacerbating the violence by supplying the warring parties with weapons. According to the recent Amnesty International report from July 2024, substantial evidence suggests that recently manufactured Turkish, Russian, Serbian, Chinese, Yemeni, and UAE weaponry and ammunition are being supplied to the warring parties in Sudan.

Those international actors who have been keen to deliver aid to Sudan have struggled to pull together an adequate humanitarian response due to the rampant violence, targeting of aid workers, bureaucratic barriers and, more recently, the exploitation of humanitarian aid as a weapon of war by both warring parties.

Despite this vacuum of international assistance, Sudanese mutual aid groups have not allowed their people to be forgotten. These mutual aid groups operate at the local level and have been vital for the survival of millions of struggling Sudanese citizens. Some of these grassroots groups, known as “Emergency Response Rooms” in English (ERRs), have their origins in the Resistance Committees (RCs) that evolved ahead of the Sudanese Revolution in 2018. These groups are not so much institutions, but horizontally organised networks of community-based volunteers that have been essential for the de facto distribution of aid.

While some ERRs have more informal foundations, the RC networks from which many ERRs originate were deliberately decentralised and unofficia in order to avoid violent repression from the state. By not having a clear leader or being registered as a civil society group, they were able to largely stay under the radar of the Sudanese security forces and avoid violent repression. Nevertheless, today, the warring parties have exploited the supposed “political” connection between previously existing RCs and current ERRs as an excuse to target aid workers.

The ERRs within Khartoum state help demonstrate the structure and organisation of these community-based groups. Within the state there are 69 different “base”  or community level ERRs, then 23 coordinating ERRs and 7 district level ERRs. This network of groups collaborate through different bodies, the most established being the “State of Khartoum Coordination Unit”. Previously, these groups worked in isolation as coordination made them vulnerable to state oppression, however the scale of the crisis has forced ERRs to establish links between themselves in an attempt to maximise humanitarian aid distribution.

The work of the Kotsi-based ERR in the White Nile state offers an insight into what kind of humanitarian work ERRs have been implementing during the war. This ERR set up shelter centres in dormitories and schools and organised local residents to host displaced people. They also provided a range of medical services, including consultations, tests, treatments, and even referrals to the Wad Madani Hospital. They organised meals for those in need and transport services to reunite family members who had been separated by the violence. Despite their impactful work, the Kotsi ERR had to close as a result of a lack of funds, highlighting one of the most significant challenges for these vital aid groups; financial constraints.

Although the work of local responders such as ERRs is becoming more internationally recognised, they have mostly been excluded from the international process of aid financing and distribution and hence, are struggling to make ends meet. Most groups are partly self-funded and partly supported by the Sudanese diaspora, however, even the vital support from Sudanese citizens abroad is not enough to cover the scale of humanitarian need. The informal nature of ERRs, in which they are not registered as NGOs and therefore cannot receive external funding under standard donor-approved processes, has made their work increasingly challenging. INGOs like the Norwegian Refugee Council, which has managed to offer some support to local groups, has called for international donors to relax their conditions for funding as often, the sheer scale of paperwork required for grants is a significant bureaucratic barrier for these rapid response groups.

Anti-money laundering regulations and other barriers to bank transfers from the UK to Sudan have made it more challenging to support Sudanese citizens on the ground, however, one way in which you can assist these mutual aid groups is by donating to them directly via online platforms like “gofundme”. For example, the Khartoum Aid Kitchen runs 17 kitchens across Khartoum state to ensure that displaced people, as well as those who are not fit for travel, do not go hungry. By donating directly through their “gofundme” page, you can ensure that your money makes a real difference. It should be noted that before donating to any cause, it is worth briefly researching your selected beneficiary as not all online appeals are genuine.

If you are not able to support these groups financially, you can also assist mutual aid groups through advocacy work, ensuring that people are aware of the sacrifices and risks undertaken by local volunteers. When so much of Sudan’s suffering is forgotten and the international community continues to fall short of delivering an adequate response to unfolding atrocities, you can make a small difference.

About the Author: Amaia is a European Social and Political Studies student at University College London who volunteers with UAI. Specializing in the field of comparative politics, she is particularly passionate about understanding the processes that lead to politically motivated violence. She completed this article as part of a month-long internship with UAI this summer.

The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of United Against Inhumanity (UAI).

The post “Mutual aid groups in Sudan: How can you get help to starving families?” – by Amaia Echebarrieta. appeared first on United Against Inhumanity.