Afghans are caught between Taliban repression and international punitive policies. Both deepen poverty, undermine rights and leave millions paying the price for political decisions beyond their control.

Afghanistan is no stranger to abysmal levels of poverty that have long threatened the survival and life chances of much of its population. This was the case during the post-9/11 years of the US-led war economy, when economic inequality increased even as access to food, education, healthcare and employment improved. Impunity and corruption were rife and greatly benefitted warlords, international contractors and government-linked urban elites.

The return of the Taliban to Kabul in August 2021, upon the withdrawal of US and allied forces, opened a new economic chapter driven by policies that further marginalised impoverished and vulnerable Afghans. International development aid to Afghanistan mostly disappeared. As part of its punitive, post-occupation policy, Washington also abruptly ended its economic support to Kabul that had covered some 75% of government expenditure. In addition, Washington, in collaboration with some European allies, seized some US$9.1billion of Afghanistan’s sovereign external reserves, thereby significantly disabling the country’s central bank, Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB). This greatly restricted the DAB’s ability to maintain a stable exchange rate, a measure that is key to curbing inflation, thereby enabling the poor to purchase basics such as food and fuel for heating and cooking. Blocking access to the DAB’s reserves throttled the economy and banking system, a situation made worse by the overcompliance of external banks that makes international transactions extremely difficult. 

The re-emergence of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) was welcomed by many in-country Afghans as it heralded the end of armed conflict, air strikes, night-time raids and widespread use of improvised explosive devices. However, the IEA soon launched a series of restrictive decrees that greatly subverted the lives of females including their freedom of movement, access to employment and to formal education for girls beyond 12 years. These measures are detrimental to individuals, their families and society in general, notwithstanding various initiatives by civil society and others to reduce their impact. The IEA is infamous for its contempt for fundamental human rights standards and obligations, a stance that has gained it widespread opprobrium and little international support or formal recognition.

The IEA is routinely denounced, albeit to little effect, in the human rights (HR) arena and various fora which tend to prioritise civil and political rights to the detriment of economic rights. The interdependence of gender equality, the right to work and individual economic security is obvious, but it is difficult to understand why formal HR entities routinely ignore the economic warfare and collective punishment resulting from the seizure of Afghanistan’s external reserves. There is widespread awareness of the ramifications of extreme poverty for individuals and groups. However, there has been little effort to advocate for the ending of policies that actually manufacture poverty and undermine the enjoyment of human rights notwithstanding their harmful and deadly consequences.

Human cost of policies antagonistic to human rights and humanitarian values

The drastic reduction in support for humanitarian action geared to helping those who are most at risk has further exacerbated the vulnerability and marginalisation of women and girls. In 2025 the international humanitarian appeal for Afghanistan received only 42% of the $2,4 billion requested. At the time of writing, the 2026 appeal had only received 26% of the smaller, US$1,7bn requested.

This situation is compounded by the millions of Afghans who have been forced to return from Iran and Pakistan in recent years with some 2.5 million expected by the end of 2026. According to a UNDP report “more than 80% of households are in debt while nearly three quarters rely on negative coping strategies to manage getting through the day”; 92% of recent returnees are unable to secure the basic necessities of life. In provinces heavily impacted by returnees “only 3 per cent of people have formal employment, while 78 per cent rely on casual day labour.”

Food insecurity,which had diminished significantly during the first 12 years of the Republic thanks to large scale food aid for hungry families and investment in agriculture, is now dramatically on the rise. In 2026, 3.7 million children under five are at heightened risk of malnutrition, with severe acute malnutrition cases significantly increasing due to food insecurity and inadequate diets. The situation is exacerbated by reduced international food aid, leading to a severe hunger crisis affecting millions.

A combination of fewer female healthpersonnel and reduced support for health care means reduced access to services with, invariably, fatal consequences. The World Health  Organization estimated that 521 mothers died for every 100,000 live births in 2023, more than double the global average. The UN Population Fund has warned “that continued disruption to health services could lead to 1,200 additional maternal deaths by 2028.” Meanwhile, the closure of more than 420 health facilities this past year has contributed to a “3 to 4 percent increase in infant mortality” and a noticeable increase in maternal deaths.

Notwithstanding prominent narratives and rhetoric on the difficult situation endured by women in Afghanistan, support for organisations geared to helping such women has also declined significantly. A UN survey of 74 Afghan women’s organisations found that nearly three-quarters experienced funding cuts in 2025. More than half of the organisations surveyed indicated that “they were likely to suspend operations or close entirely within the next year.” Similarly, support that helps women earn a living is also shrinking. In Afghanistan, where female-focused organisations are often the only entities able to reach women on the margins of society, they face mounting difficulties to maintain programmes and outreach given significant aid cuts. UN Women notes that “the weakening of women’s organisations is occurring at a time of massive humanitarian need and growing restrictions on women’s rights.”

Need for Community-based sustainable empowerment

External stakeholders that prosecuted the post 9/11 war and propped up the widely despised Republic era governments, coupled with the IEA’s lack of commitment to inclusive and accountable governance, are greatly responsible for appalling levels of poverty and destitution. The competing agendas of the IEA in Kandahar and those who oppose them have sacrificed the human rights and well-being of Afghans for their own ends. Time is running out for millions of impoverished Afghans but it is not too late to re-think failed agendas and invest in community-based, sustainable empowerment programmes. Investment in small-scale enterprises, including those headed by women and other marginalised groups, should be a priority as well as strengthening basics such as agriculture, irrigation and climate-related risk reduction.

Abandoning the imperial-style seizure of the country’s sovereign reserves could be easily done at no cost to donors. This would enable the DAB, the banking sector and the economy to function in a manner beneficial to all Afghans. Recapitalising the DAB in a monitored fashion is a straight-forward proposition; it would help undo the harm that has been imposed on the people of Afghanistan without any acknowledgement of the human cost involved.

While the IEA remains ostracised by the international community, poverty and deprivation remain chronic. The prospect of international development aid remains bleak despite the reactivation of some limited World Bank and Asian Development Bank projects. More can definitely be done to support local and sustainable development. This could mean direct support to communities as well as small enterprises, including some, that the Taliban seem to tolerate, that are run by women.

In the current geopolitical climate marked by drastic across the board cuts to humanitarian and development aid, more creative approaches are needed. These should focus on local employment and the availability of essential services. In Afghanistan as elsewhere, sustainable development projects at the local level have been shown to yield positive results and break the cycle of dependency on humanitarian aid. The recipes are there but the will to use them is missing. This must change. Meanwhile, by releasing the arbitrarily sequestered Afghan reserves, Western donors would give some meaning to the often-repeated phrase that “Afghan lives matter”.

Other relevant articles published by ISPI in August 2026 on this topic:

Afghanistan, Five Years of Taliban Rule: An Assessment, by Giuliano Battiston

Five years after the Taliban’s return, Afghanistan remains trapped in a cycle of crisis. As the regime consolidates power and gains international recognition, a new approach is needed – one that puts Afghans’ rights, needs and long-term stability at the centre.

https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/five-years-of-taliban-rule-five-major-trends-243316

The Geopolitics of the Emirate, by Antonio Giustozzi

Five years after their return to power, the Taliban can still boast diplomatic recognition from only one foreign state: Russia. Other countries in the region – primarily China and Iran – have gradually moved closer to diplomatic recognitionbut have stopped short of taking the final step. In their case, reservations certainly do not stem from the segregation of women within the Emirate or a lack of respect for human rights; the issues lie elsewhere – above all, in the conflict with Pakistan.

https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/the-geopolitics-of-the-emirate-243279

Back to Uncertainty: Afghan Returnees from Iran and Pakistan, by Jelena Bjelica

As Pakistan and Iran expel millions of Afghans, return has become less a durable solution than the start of a new cycle of displacement, poverty and uncertainty in a country ill-equipped to absorb them.

https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/back-to-uncertainty-afghan-returnees-from-iran-and-pakistan-243266

The World’s Worst Women’s Rights Crisis Demands Solidarity and Action, by Shaharzad Akbar

Afghan women face the world’s gravest assault on their rights. As the Taliban institutionalise gender apartheid, governments must prioritise accountability over diplomatic normalisation.

https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/the-worlds-worst-womens-rights-crisis-demands-solidarity-and-action-243325

“The Taliban Continue to Entrench Their System” – Interview with Richard Bennett by Giuliano Battiston

https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/the-taliban-continue-to-entrench-their-system-243280

The EU and the Taliban: Deportations Prioritised Over Human Rights, by Thomas Ruttiq

Behind the language of ‘technical engagement’, the EU is expanding cooperation with the Taliban to enable deportations – testing the credibility of its human rights commitments.

https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/the-eu-and-the-taliban-deportations-prioritised-over-human-rights-243287

The post “Afghanistan: Double Jeopardy”, by Norah Niland and Antonio Donini. appeared first on United Against Inhumanity.

The collective punishment of the Afghan people who had no say in arrangements that have pauperized them or the conditions that contributed to the death of many, poses moral as well as political questions that have largely gone unanswered.

Following the Taliban takeover in Kabul in 2021, some US$9.5 billion of Afghanistan’s external reserves were seized by the US government.  Roughly US$7 billion held in the US Federal Reserve Bank in New York, and smaller amounts held in Europe, were effectively frozen. This action triggered a long legal and political dispute over ownership and control of these assets. Under President Biden’s 2022 Executive Order 14064, US authorities split the American-held reserves into two parts: US$3.5 billion was allocated to a Swiss-based not-for-profit Foundation, the “Fund for the Afghan People” also known as the Afghan Fund in Switzerland (AFS) while the remaining US$3.5 billion was set aside for litigation claims brought by American victims of the 9/11 attacks.[1]

The freezing of Afghanistan’s central bank, Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB) reserves revived long-running litigation tied to claims by families of victims of the September 11 attacks and other terror related cases against the Taliban. Plaintiffs, in legal parlance, sought to attach, meaning to seize or take control of the DAB’s reserves held at the Federal Reserve Bank, arguing that the Taliban’s control over Afghanistan entitled a claimant in receipt of a judicial decision to pursue a legal claim against the seized reserves. Civil society organizations filed amicus briefs opposing the seizure, contending that the reserves belonged to the Afghan state and the population rather than to the Taliban as a sanctioned entity.

In a series of rulings beginning in 2022, federal courts in New York rejected attachment claims finding that DAB assets retained sovereign immunity protection under the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and could not be treated as Taliban property.[2]  In 2025, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld these decisions, confirming that private litigants could not seize the reserves to satisfy 9/11 related judgments. Although the rulings prevented confiscation of the reserves, they did not restore Afghanistan’s legitimate access to them, leaving most of the assets beyond reach or “frozen”.

While the Afghan Fund in Switzerland is accruing interest, there has been no disbursement to-date to recapitalize the DAB although the stated aim of the AFS is to “protect, preserve, and – on a targeted basis – disburse its assets for the benefit of the Afghan people”.

Critics describe the AFS as an unprecedented form of external financial control over a sovereign state’s reserves; the legal basis for administering and allocating central bank assets in this way could be challenged.[3]  The creation of the AFS also signals that externally-held central bank assets may be exposed to political and legal risk during periods of geopolitical dispute.  At the same time, supporters of the AFS mechanism argue that it prevents misuse by a sanctioned regime even though there is no evidence that the DAB has acted unlawfully or in a manner contrary to its statutory purpose.[4]

Efforts by UAI and others to elicit information on the AFS activities and plans have not proved productive. As of mid-June 2026, the Fund’s website had not been updated for over a year with the exception of the recent announcement of the appointment of Jonathan Greenstein of the US Treasury Department to the Board of Trustees. The general lack of AFS action and transparency raise questions about its usefulness and Switzerland’s role as an enabler of US foreign policy agendas that are tantamount to imposing collective punishment on the Afghan people. Meanwhile the AFS continues to accrue interest – presumably in the millions of US$ – while Afghans struggle to survive in desperate conditions.

The outcome of Biden’s 2022 decision is a prolonged state of paralysis in which the DAB lacks access to Afghan reserves. In addition, the creation of the AFS shows the increasingly blurred line between internationally authorized sanctions and unilateral coercive measures. Although many restrictions imposed after 2021 were presented as “sanctions” against the Taliban, the use of the reserves did not arise from a UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions regime but rather from unilateral actions by the US and other Western governments. This distinction matters because measures lacking explicit UNSC authorization, raise questions about the legality of unilateral measures such as these.

Meanwhile, the chronic poverty and harrowing deprivation suffered by millions of Afghans, have worsened as international aid budgets continue to diminish. Humanitarian organizations have repeatedly warned that funding cuts by major donors have forced reductions in food assistance, healthcare, and nutrition programmes even as millions of Afghans face hunger, drought, displacement, and economic collapse. Child malnutrition is a major concern. Nearly 40% of infants, who were less than six months when admitted for treatment, suffered severe wasting with medical complications according to the UN in June 2026.[5]

Of course, aid reductions and sanctions-related restrictions are connected. Before 2021, external assistance made up a large share of Afghanistan’s GDP and public spending. In recent times, much needed humanitarian and other support has been slashed drastically

Financial restrictions, including the freezing of central bank reserves and limits on banking transactions, have isolated Afghanistan from global markets, restricted liquidity, and weakened private-sector confidence. Sanctions-related banking barriers have also complicated trade, disrupted remittance flows, and hindered humanitarian operations even where formal exemptions exist.

The Afghan case serves as a stark reminder that while sanctions and financial restrictions are formally aimed at governing authorities, their real effects are borne primarily by affected citizens including children born into desperate levels of poverty and deprivation.

The post “Deepening deprivation blights Afghan lives while politics obstruct the release of seized sovereign reserves” appeared first on United Against Inhumanity.

This piece was originally published by Swissinfo on April 27, 2026.

Afghanistan has been shaped by its rich and diverse cultural history from ancient to contemporary times. Although blessed with a wealth of untapped resources, nowadays, millions of Afghans are preoccupied with survival. Life, for many, is a daily battle against hunger, degraded or non-existent essential services such as clean water, sanitation and health care. Mounting debt and profound levels of poverty make Afghanistan one of the poorest countries in the world. This raises questions as to whether Afghan lives matter to those governments which have orchestrated unprecedented levels of destitution.

This opinion piece focuses on the policies of different stakeholders who have prioritised penalising Afghan citizens by means of economic warfare – an agenda of manufactured poverty – rather than engaging with the Taliban authorities, who take pride in their infamous rulings however repulsive to others. These edicts reinforce the Taliban’s interpretation of Afghan culture and deep-seated norms that have long discriminated against women and girls.

Poverty in Afghanistan is not a new phenomenon. It can be traced, in part, to almost five decades of armed conflict, including a post 9/11 war economy that sharpened structural inequalities. The United States-led occupation aggravated weak and corrupt governance and fuelled impunity. It also contributed to the return of the Taliban to Kabul in August 2021.

The re-emergence of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan – the official name of the Taliban administration – triggered a host of punitive measures by the US and its allies. This included the immediate cessation of economic support to Kabul that, previously, relied on Western funding for 75% of government expenditure. The US blocked $9.1 billion (CHF7.1 billion) of the country’s external, sovereign reserves in 2021. This handcuffed the central bank, or Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB), thereby suffocating the economy and banking system. As Dr. Shah Mehrabi, a respected economist noted at the time, the DAB’s lack of access to its dollar-denominated reserves would undermine its historic ability to maintain a stable exchange rate and curb inflation. Indeed, in any setting, an economy cannot function effectively in the absence of an experienced and credible central bank.

Given the dire straits faced by impoverished and destitute Afghans, the United Nations organised a system to, literally, fly in cash dollars to support humanitarian programming. This also proved a lifeline for the DAB, which could use these US dollars, once lodged locally, to undertake regular currency auctions to stabilise the value of the afghani, the local currency. This, in turn, enabled financial transactions and commercial trade.

This “fly-in cash dollars” system is now in jeopardy given the dramatic reduction in Western funding for humanitarian action that began last year and the absence of support for sustainable development since 2021. The US, which had provided “more than 40% of all aid in 2024” to Afghanistan, ended its assistance in a sudden and brutal fashion in April 2025. Coupled with drastic cuts by other donors such as Germany and the United Kingdom, Tom Fletcher, the UN’s most senior humanitarian official, notedafter a visit to the country last year that the humanitarian sector, overall, would shrink and many vulnerable people would die.

Data shows that 21.9 million Afghans, or 45% of the population, are in desperate need of humanitarian action this year. More than a third of the Afghan population of 45 million are currently experiencing devastating levels of hunger. Soaring rates of acute food insecurity means that a “staggering 3.7 million children will need malnutrition treatment”, reports the World Food Programme. The closure of more than 420 health facilities this past year has contributed to a “3 to 4 percent increase in infant mortality” and a noticeable increase in maternal deaths.

The Politics of Collective Punishment

A loud cacophony of condemnation of repressive Taliban policies by politicians, human rights actors and others have effectively made Afghanistan a pariah state while ignoring how measures that have shackled the DAB continue to strangle the economy. This policy of collective punishment ignores how poverty further marginalises the women and girls who bear the brunt of the Taliban’s disabling restrictions – restrictions that inhibit their presence outside the home including access to education, health care and employment.

Unceasing poverty has stretched traditional coping mechanisms to breaking point. Extended family networks are key in times of stress, as is migration to neighboring countries, remittances, debt and sale of essential farming and household assets. The forced return of some 5.4 million Afghans from Pakistan and Iran primarily, as well as Europe, in recent times has scuttled the flow of remittances and intensified economic hardships. A UN report last year indicated that nine in ten families, including many female-headed households that tend to be hardest hit by poverty, use harmful coping practices to survive.

In September 2022, the US transferred US$3.5 billion – half of the blocked Afghan reserves – to a newly created Fund for the Afghan People in Switzerland, ostensibly for the benefit of Afghans. It was assumed that this would help ease the economic and liquidity crisis in Afghanistan. Initially, the Afghan Fund focused on developing in-house procedures but this past year it has, apparently, gone into hibernation mode as indicated by the pace and content of its Board meetings. These days, my enquiries on this matter go unanswered, unlike in the early days of the Fund. To me, it appears to be stymied by politics rather than inertia in organising measures to recapitalise the DAB, even though this means ignoring the fact that the blocked assets are the property of the Afghan people, whose deliberate deprivation means ever greater mortality rates.

Strong-arm tactics have shaped US decision-making since its hasty retreat from Afghanistan in 2021. In addition, an array of actors including Switzerland, which claim to be strong proponents of human rights and routinely broadcast their concern about the fate of Afghan women, are also complicit in policies that are inhumane and totally at odds with the notion of justice and a shared humanity.

Whatever the politics, Afghan lives do matter. This is reflected in a variety of initiatives that call for an end to manufactured poverty and the suffering it entails. From the outset, United Against Inhumanity (where I am engaged) and other groups called for an end to the arbitrary sequestration of Afghan assets and for the re-capitalisation of the DAB. This can be done gradually, by disbursing a minimum of $150 million monthly under an internationally monitored framework. States with a history of donor funding during the post 9/11 era should also invest in sustainable capacity-building programmess for Afghans, with a focus on livelihoods, including entrepreneurship options for women.

The post “Do Afghan lives matter?”, by Norah Niland. appeared first on United Against Inhumanity.

On Thursday, 5 March 2026, United Against Inhumanity will co-host, with the Geneva Graduate Institute, a public roundtable asking a pertinent and urgent question:

Economic Warfare: Do Afghan Lives Matter?

📍 Geneva Graduate Institute, Maison de la Paix
🕕 18:30–20:00 CET
🌍 Hybrid: In-person & online

Afghanistan may no longer dominate headlines — but the impact of sanctions, frozen assets, coerced returns, and economic restrictions is shaping daily life for millions.
Behind policy language lie very real consequences: collapsed livelihoods, shrinking public services, deepening poverty, and mounting vulnerability — particularly for women and girls.
This roundtable brings together leading experts and Afghan voices to examine:
The impact of seized sovereign reserves
The long-term effects of sanctions
The consequences of forced refugee returns
The intersection of economic pressure and Taliban governance

Speakers include:
Graeme Smith, Lead author ICG report “After the Aid Axe: Charting a Path to Self-reliance in Afghanistan”
Grégoire Mallard, Geneva Graduate Institute
Alessandro Monsutti, Geneva Graduate Institute
Norah Niland, United Against Inhumanity
Hassina Syed, Afghan entrepreneur

Moderated by Antonio Donini, United Against Inhumanity

This discussion forms part of UAI’s ongoing campaign to release Afghanistan’s sovereign, external reserves and challenge economic policies that perpetuate harm and suffering.

The post Economic Warfare: Do Afghan lives matter? appeared first on United Against Inhumanity.

Four years after their return to power, the Taliban are consolidating the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The Supreme Leader increasingly directs the country’s political course by centralising power, with an authoritarian drive also manifested in gender persecution — sanctioned by the recent arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court. The de facto government has received its first formal recognition from the Russian Federation, along with the normalisation of relations with neighbouring countries. This process coincides with a growing rift with the Euro-Atlantic community, which is deepening its diplomatic and financial disengagement, frustrated by the pragmatic wing of the Taliban’s inability to revise the most oppressive laws. The United States has restructured the entire humanitarian ecosystem, ending financial aid — with devastating consequences for the population, which is facing a dire humanitarian crisis. This is exacerbated by the flaws in an economic system that shows some signs of macroeconomic recovery but is unable to redistribute wealth or reduce inequality, hindered by the freezing of the central bank’s reserves, lack of liquidity, and the isolation of the banking system.

The West “withdraws,” but the Emirate gains its first formal recognition

Diplomatically, 2025 has been marked by the recognition of the Emirate by Moscow, the normalisation of relations with regional countries, and increased estrangement from the Euro-Atlantic community — further driven by the Trump administration’s decision to end humanitarian aid.

A chapter seems closed: Western diplomats had long waited for the pragmatic Taliban — a heterogeneous coalition of factions — to re-establish promises aimed at rebuilding reasonable relations with the West and accessing new resources. They had long assured that secondary schools for girls, closed for over 1,400 days, would reopen, that segregationist policies would be revoked or amended, and that the extremist, authoritarian, and repressive turn would be mitigated. None of this has happened. The pragmatic wing lost credibility and was marginalised by Amir Haibatullah Akhundzada, who used both financial tools and radical, discriminatory decrees — particularly targeting women — to undermine Western outreach and to reclaim total control.

Relations with the West will likely remain frozen — if not worsen. Few European diplomats today expect any short-term changes. On the contrary, some countries are scaling down diplomatic presence in Doha, the Qatari capital that has hosted many Western missions since the Islamic Republic’s collapse in 2021.

The UN reaffirms its objectives: a peaceful Afghanistan, reintegrated into the international community and respecting its international obligations. To achieve this, it promotes a comprehensive, structured multilateral approach, including technical working groups on key issues like the private sector and narcotrafficking. UN Special Representative Roza Otunbayeva emphasised these goals during her 23 June briefing to the UN Security Council. She acknowledged concerns about the strategy’s effectiveness but warned that without international engagement, the situation would be far worse. However, the UN continues to face fallout from the sometimes flawed management of the 2024 Doha meetings, which excluded civil society and women representatives from official events. This deepened the divide between regional pragmatism and Western value-based approaches. A year later, coordinated diplomacy is being replaced by bilateral, often opaque dialogues — such as Germany’s informal deal to repatriate Afghan migrants in exchange for diplomatic concessions, including, it seems, accepting the presence of IEA functionaries in Afghan diplomatic missions in Germany.

While the Euro-Atlantic community, frustrated by the limited results in dealing with a regime that is multifaceted yet seemingly immovable in its policies of gender persecution, is pulling back diplomatically, countries in the region are increasingly normalising relations. “At least 17 countries have established embassies in Taliban-run Afghanistan. Taliban-appointed diplomats also represent Afghanistan in most capitals across Asia, albeit at chargé d’affaires level,” notes the International Crisis Group. The normalisation of diplomatic relations with the Taliban following their takeover in 2021 has occurred gradually but continues. A prime example is the decision by the Russian government to formally recognise the Emirate. It is the first country in the world to do so — and it will not be the last.

Recognition by the Russian Federation

Since 3 July 2025, the white flag bearing the shahada (Islamic declaration of faith) flies over the former Afghan embassy in Moscow, replacing the tricolour of the Islamic Republic that collapsed in August 2021. According to Russia’s Foreign Ministry, the recognition “will boost productive bilateral cooperation.” Afghanistan’s de facto foreign minister Amir Khan Muttaqi called it “a courageous step” and expressed hope it would inspire others.

The recognition of the Emirate is part of a very long political and diplomatic process — certainly not a turning point. In this gradual approach, a key role over the years has been played by Zamir Kabulov, the special envoy of President Putin. With a long history in the country dating back to the Soviet occupation, when he was a diplomat at the Soviet embassy in Kabul, Kabulov has been among the most insistent voices urging Putin to open up to the Taliban — even against the advice of intelligence services. And not just recently. It is also thanks to him that Moscow has been able to overcome what Russian scholar Vladimir Boyko has called a true “Afghan syndrome,” a legacy of the failed Soviet occupation that began in December 1979 and ended in February 1989. That syndrome was still evident during the time of the first Emirate. But with the overthrow of the first Taliban government in 2001 and the subsequent NATO presence, things began to change. Moscow initially adopted a wait-and-see approach, eventually beginning to build ties with the Taliban, who at the time were the armed opposition to the Kabul government — particularly starting in 2014, with the beginning of NATO’s long withdrawal. In 2016, Kabulov set the tone in an interview with Turkey’s Anadolu Agency: “The majority of the Taliban, including the leadership,” he said, are merely “a local force” that “has abandoned the idea of global jihad.” Moscow’s Foreign Ministry then stated the need for “a flexible approach to remove certain figures from the UN sanctions list.” Already five years before their return to power, then, the Taliban were treated as legitimate interlocutors — even as allies against global jihadist groups (like the Islamic State, al-Qaeda, and others), which were considered a serious threat to the outermost borders of the Russian sphere of influence, and as partners in preventing the inflow of opium and its derivatives into the region. These remain key concerns for Moscow, as they do for many other countries in the region. It is no coincidence that Kabulov himself recently called for the delivery of military aid to the Taliban for counterterrorism purposes.

Kabul’s role in the fight against the local branch of the Islamic State — the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP or ISIS-K) — as well as the de facto government’s “desire to connect Central Asia to South Asia through various mega-projects in electricity, trade, oil pipelines and the Trans-Afghan Railway, have served a key role in driving Afghanistan and nearby countries closer together,” was recently highlighted by Ibraheem Bahiss of the International Crisis Group. According to him, “countries across South and Central Asia are likely to continue exploring ways to deepen engagement with the Taliban-led government” and follow Russia’s lead in formally establishing diplomatic relations — including China, which in December 2023 became the first country to officially accredit a Taliban diplomat as ambassador, and which the de facto Afghan authorities regard as a key economic partner.

No Real Opposition

The Taliban’s skill in diplomatically “sealing” all borders — through agreements, meetings, and trade exchanges that also prevent potential breaches through which weapons for opposition forces could enter — makes the prospect of an armed resistance highly unlikely, at least for now. Armed opposition is deeply fragmented, with minimal financial resources and virtually no regional or political backing, especially as even Tajikistan appears to have reached a compromise with Afghanistan’s de facto authorities.

In its first two years of Emirate rule, the local Islamic State branch (ISKP) seriously attempted to undermine the regime through military actions, as well as a calculated “defamation” campaign via jihadist propaganda channels. But both efforts proved futile. Contrary to ISKP’s intentions, the Emirate is increasingly viewed by the jihadist ecosystem as a true Islamic government — one untainted by compromise with the “corrupt West” and capable of “staying the course” despite external pressure. Militarily, ISKP has suffered from Taliban pressure, though it remains capable of troubling foreign governments due to its ability to plan and carry out terrorist attacks. According to a report published in February by the United Nations team tasked with monitoring sanctions, ISKP still represents “the greatest extraregional terrorist threat” and the most serious danger to the Taliban, ethnic and religious minorities, the United Nations, foreign nationals, and diplomats in Afghanistan.

Gender Persecution

Ties between countries in the region and the Emirate have also been strengthened by a recent decision by judges at the International Criminal Court, who on Tuesday, 8 July, issued arrest warrants for Haibatullah Akhundzada, the supreme leader of the Taliban, and Abdul Hakim Haqqani, Chief Justice. According to the Court’s judges, there is sufficient evidence to believe that the two “committed — by ordering, inciting, or soliciting — the crime against humanity of persecution.” Persecution “on the basis of gender, against girls, women, and others who do not conform to the Taliban’s policies on gender and identity.” These acts include “direct violence, but also systemic and institutionalised harm, including the imposition of discriminatory social norms.” The warrants for the Amir al-Mu’minin, the Commander of the Faithful — who dictates the Taliban’s hardline, isolationist policy from Kandahar — and for Abdul Hakim Haqqani — author of one of the few notable works on the Emirate’s institutions — only partially dampen the celebrations with which the Taliban have welcomed Moscow’s recognition, and with which they are currently marking four years in power.

According to the Emirate’s spokesperson, the Taliban do not recognise any institution called the International Criminal Court, “nor do we have any obligations toward it,” while the decision to “labelling the laws of Islamic Sharia as inhumane and oppressive” is seen only as “open hostility and hatred toward the sacred religion of Islam.” Human rights organisations, on the other hand, have welcomed the move, seeing the warrants as at least a symbolic break in a cycle of impunity that has lasted far too long. For Richard Bennett, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan — who was ultimately denied access to the country by the de facto authorities — the decision is historic. It aligns with the findings of his most recent report, presented to the UN on 11 June, and focused on access to justice for women and girls: “The Taliban are weaponising the legal and justice sector in Afghanistan as part of their efforts to consolidate a system of institutionalised gender oppression, persecution, and domination,” Bennett stated at the time.

According to Rawadari, an organisation that monitors the denial of rights in Afghanistan and includes among its members Shaharzad Akbar, the former head of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, the action by the International Criminal Court “represents an important step toward holding those responsible for crimes committed in this country accountable, and could pave the way for judicial proceedings in other cases related to international crimes.” Rawadari interprets the Court’s decision as an indirect response to Russia’s recent announcement: “Recognising the Taliban not only obstructs justice, but also enables the continuation and support of widespread human rights violations.”

However, the organisation also emphasises “the need to address all cases related to international crimes in this country.” Alongside other Afghan organisations — Afghanistan Human Rights and Democracy Organisation (AHRD), Organisation for Policy Research and Development Studies (DROPS), and Human Rights Defenders Plus (HRD+) — Rawadari recently announced the launch of a special session for Afghan women at the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal (PPT), an initiative aimed at countering impunity for gender persecution in Afghanistan.

“With the launch of this session, Afghan civil society and women’s rights groups aim to create a channel to hold the Taliban accountable for their crimes and demand justice, to raise the alarm about the normalisation of the Taliban’s oppression of women, and to give women and girls the chance to be heard worldwide,” reads the website of the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal — the international people’s tribunal founded by Lelio Basso, which deals with serious human rights violations, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide.

The arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court have been welcomed by civil society, the Afghan diaspora, and many human rights organisations, for their immense symbolic and practical value and for the clear message they carry: “The dire situation of Afghan women and the atrocities committed by the Taliban have not gone unnoticed.” Many regional countries will likely disregard the warrants, but for others, they could serve as a disincentive to any potential normalisation of relations.

Inside Afghanistan, however, the effects are more complex, as the warrants reinforce the Taliban’s perception that they remain at war with the West. They have also led to a further tightening of repression. Immediately after the Court’s announcement, the activities of the muthasibin — officials of the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, tasked with enforcing laws, monitoring morality, and, as their spokesperson Saif-ul-Islam Khyber explained to us in Kabul last October, warning and advising where necessary — began to intensify. According to many testimonies, these interventions are increasingly forceful. These social control activities add to the repressive efforts of the security apparatus, which is blamed for many of the ongoing rights violations.

The latest human rights report by UNAMA (the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) was published just a few days ago. It covers the period from April to June 2025 and includes a significant new development compared to previous reports, which have all been marked by incidents and trends showing continued rights violations in the country: in May, some Afghan female employees of the United Nations received direct death threats. However, the spokesperson for the Ministry of the Interior, Abdul Mateen Qani, denied any such threats, adding that “the ministry has an independent department dedicated to this issue, and we have a strategic plan for protection and security, so there is no threat to them in any area.”

The Humanitarian Crisis

The activities and effectiveness of the humanitarian ecosystem have been severely compromised by the decision of the Trump administration to halt nearly all financial aid, despite the population’s needs remaining critically unmet, with at least half the population requiring basic assistance. In his June report on the situation in Afghanistan, UN Secretary-General António Guterres noted that the decrease in foreign funding for humanitarian aid has “further worsened the disastrous economic situation of millions of Afghans,” who are suffering “multiple challenges,” including widespread poverty, limited access to basic services, natural disasters, and the oppressive Taliban regime. For the current fiscal year, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) requested $2.42 billion from donors to support life-saving humanitarian services for 22.9 million people in Afghanistan. However, the United States has ceased humanitarian aid to Afghanistan through Executive Order No. 14169, signed by President Trump and titled “Re-evaluating and Realigning United States Foreign Aid.”

This decision has had profound repercussions for the Afghan population, as described by Kate Clark of the Afghanistan Analysts Network. In 2024, the United States was in fact the main donor to the UN’s Humanitarian Response Plan, accounting for 45% of total funding with a contribution of $736.6 million. Historically, the US has played a central role: according to OCHA, it has been the largest donor to Afghanistan’s humanitarian response since 2013, and was vital in emergency situations, including famine prevention in 2021 and 2022 through robust support for food security and nutrition interventions. The loss of such a key donor, as noted in the latest report by SIGAR (the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction of the US Congress), has forced OCHA to scale back its efforts, now targeting not 22.9 million people but 12.5 million among those it considers in severe need. The funding request has also been lowered from $2.42 billion to $1.62 billion.

The Trump Administration Ends Financial Aid

The consequences of the Trump administration’s decision will need to be assessed over the medium to long term, but they have already begun to unfold, and the main United Nations agencies are warning of the danger: following Washington’s announcement, the World Food Programme stated that the halt in funding “could amount to a death sentence for millions of people suffering from extreme hunger and malnutrition.” In June, the agency had to suspend monthly nutritional support for around 100,000 Afghan children and 150,000 pregnant and breastfeeding Afghan women. The World Health Organization (WHO) announced it had to close 422 health facilities since the United States withdrew its financial support, affecting approximately 3 million people across 30 provinces. In May, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) said it could no longer support 500 of the 900 clinics it had been funding before the cuts.

The multiple crises weighing on the country are further exacerbated by return migration flows, particularly from Iran and Pakistan, the two countries that have taken in the largest numbers of Afghan migrants over the decades. In recent months, both have increased repatriations, pushbacks, and even forced deportations. Recently, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) warned that Afghanistan is not able to absorb the 1.9 million Afghans forced to return from Iran and Pakistan in 2025 alone. The UNHCR representative in Kabul also urged the international community to respond with emergency aid and long-term support, stressing that “the decline in international support is compounding the complex and overlapping crises in Afghanistan.” Without immediate and substantial funding — according to the UNHCR, which on 4 July issued a call for additional funding — the scale of returns could destabilise the already fragile situation in the country.

The new position of the United States government — which had spearheaded the NATO military intervention and later the humanitarian engagement of the Euro-Atlantic community also after August 2021 — is, however, clear. It was explicitly expressed on 7 July 2025, when the US was one of only two UN member states to vote against a resolution calling for increased humanitarian aid to Afghanistan. The resolution passed with 116 votes in favour, 2 against, and 12 abstentions. The US State Department commented on the decision as follows: “It is the position of the United States that we cannot continue to support the Taliban while simultaneously demanding that they uphold Afghanistan’s international commitments and obligations.”

This is a decision that worsens an already compromised situation due to earlier actions. As recalled in the latest statement from United Against Inhumanity (UAI) — a global movement of groups and individuals with extensive professional experience in UN agencies and Afghanistan — “NATO members that have waged war in Afghanistan cut all development funding in 2021.” More recently, “they have abruptly cut financial support for humanitarian programmes despite the increased scale of humanitarian needs this year.” Alongside the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Belgium have also cut their humanitarian funding, even though the European Commission has recently pledged €161 million for the Afghan population, both within the country and in the broader region.

According to UAI, these aid-reduction policies reveal inconsistency:
“Sustained rhetoric by various governments about the importance of respecting the human rights of Afghan women and girls” ignores the fact that their own policies are having harmful effects — “especially on women, who are further marginalised and disadvantaged by poverty.”

Indeed, the economy continues to struggle: the latest World Bank report records signs of partial and gradual recovery, estimating GDP growth of around 2.5% for 2024. However, the trade balance remains heavily imbalanced, the country is dependent, productive sectors are limited, and wealth is far from equitably distributed. Compared to the past, the overall contraction of the economy remains significant, as the substantial external resources that once covered much of public spending under the Islamic Republic — mostly in the form of development aid — have all but disappeared. The current economy is mostly sustained by mining extraction agreements and a heavily burdened tax system pushed to its limits. Recent staff and salary cuts in many ministries, apparently including those of Defence and the Interior, reflect both a rationalisation of resources and their insufficiency.

Poverty continues to afflict the majority of the population, affecting daily food intake, access to healthcare, and overall well-being. It is further deepened by the isolation of the international banking system and the freezing of the Afghan central bank’s foreign reserves (Da Afghanistan Bank — DAB), as also highlighted in the latest SIGAR report, which states that Afghanistan: “is suffering from a liquidity crisis due to its isolation from the international banking sector and the inability of its central bank, Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB), to print new afghani banknotes or replace the existing ones.”

According to United Against Inhumanity, “the only sustainable response is the development of a functioning economy. This highlights the obvious and urgent need to recapitalise the DAB.” Such recapitalisation can be done in phases, according to United Against Inhumanity, “with intermediary third-party monitoring” to ensure compliance with anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing regulations.

Unresolved Issues

Beyond the economic challenges, the question of the institutional architecture of the Emirate remains unresolved. This is an issue only seemingly secondary, as it determines the distribution of power and, consequently, whether internal conflict dynamics stabilise or escalate — dynamics that could potentially damage the Taliban government. The less clearly the state structure and the corresponding divisions of tasks, mandates, responsibilities, and authority are defined, the more fragile the governance.

So far, internal conflicts have been managed, partly thanks to the Amir’s ability to restore order among those who sought to obstruct his rise, limit his power, or delegitimise his decisions. Nevertheless, institutional uncertainty remains a significant vulnerability for the Emirate.

The authoritarian and repressive tendencies within also persist: currently, there are no conditions for popular rebellion, as the population is crushed by the humanitarian crisis and intimidated by the government’s intelligence apparatus. However, frustration and growing intolerance towards discriminatory policies against women — as observed during our latest visit to the country in October 2024 — are increasing day by day. Support for the Taliban remains essentially limited and partial. The country’s history, however, shows that monopoly over force and violence alone does not guarantee institutional stability.

The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of United Against Inhumanity (UAI).

The post “Four years of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: an assessment”, by Giuliano Battiston appeared first on United Against Inhumanity.

In a time of distressing headlines, and searing images of distraught people in brutal warzones facing death, displacement or diminishing prospects of survival, the situation of Afghans is often dismissed, ignored or forgotten.  Indeed, their suffering, after four-plus decades of armed conflict, occupation and corrupt governance, is routinely misrepresented.

There is little acknowledgement of the longstanding reasons for the abysmal situation of millions of impoverished Afghans whose numbers, already in 2020, were set to increase “from 55% to 72% of the population” given prolonged warfare, economic contraction, structural inequalities and corruption.  Thus, while the sound of gunfire has largely receded from Afghan valleys and cities, economic warfare, associated with the seizure of the country’s sovereign external reserves by the US and some European allies – assets that are vital for a functioning economy and trusted banking system – deepens poverty and deprivation.

On the occasion of the 4^th anniversary of the mid-August 2021 return of the Taliban to Kabul, poverty in Afghanistan is no less a debilitating scourge than before. According to the UN Development Programme (UNDP), economic shocks in 2024 “affected 90 percent of Afghan households.”  UNDP also noted recently that “nine in ten households reported cutting back on basic needs” while many have been obliged to reduce food intake. Indeed, a recent UNICEF report on child poverty indicates that “3.5 million young children suffer from wasting” with a high proportion at risk of death.  The World Food Programme (WFP) warned last month that some 10 million Afghans could face hunger this summer.

Deepening precarity is exacerbated by the coerced returns of Afghans from neighbouring countries which have hosted millions for decades. According to Volker Türk, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, over 1.9 million Afghans have been pushed or otherwise obliged to leave Iran and Pakistan in recent months.  In July, Germany deported dozens of Afghan nationals in the context of its tougher migration policy.

NATO members that have waged war in Afghanistan cut all development funding in 2021. They have, now, abruptly cut financial support for humanitarian programmes despite the increased scale of humanitarian need this year. The US, which provided 45% of humanitarian funding in 2024, has slashed its support with dramatic consequences for women and others dependent on food, maternal health care, hygiene and other support for survival.  The UK, Germany, Holland, Sweden and Belgium have also cut their humanitarian funding.  

Such policymaking illustrates a profound lack of coherence and the absence of an ethical framework in foreign policy decision-making; this has had major repercussions for Afghans, both in the past and now.  It illustrates utter contempt for the lives and well-being of the Afghan people and their society.  Contempt and incoherence can be traced to high profile and sustained rhetoric by various Governments on the importance of respecting the human rights of Afghan women and girls while, at the same time, ignoring that their policies have deleterious effects, especially for females that are further marginalized and disadvantaged by poverty.

End Collective Punishment

No less an authority than the US government’s Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) latest report, issued in July, found that Afghanistan “suffers from a liquidity crisis due to its isolation from the international banking sector and its central bank’s – Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB) –  inability to print new, or replace existing, afghani bank notes.”  

Sanctions on the DAB, since February 2022, not only cratered the economy but continue to punish the poor.   The Central Bank is widely seen to have done a credible job in upholding the value of the afghani, the local currency, thereby inhibiting inflationary forces and maintaining the population’s access to bread and other fundamentals.  However, the DAB is prevented from organizing a print order to replace the much-degraded, existing afghani bank notes, currently held together with sellotape and, increasingly, not accepted by shopkeepers and others. This is a critical problem for most Afghans who operate in a heavily cash-dependent environment.

The only sustainable answer to woeful levels of poverty, hunger and limited access to health care and livelihoods is to develop a functioning economy.  This points to the obvious and urgent need to recapitalize the DAB, that concurs with a USAID assessment to strengthen its in-house capabilities in terms of anti-money laundering (AML) and combating the financing of terrorism (CFT). Such re-capitalization can be done, in stages, with international third-party monitoring.  

It is also an imperative that means are identified to re-print much needed Afghanis.   One potential option is for the Afghan Fund in Switzerland to use accrued interest on the US$3.5 billion of Afghan external reserves that were shipped to Berne by the Biden Administration in September 2022 for safekeeping and disbursement “for the benefit of the Afghan people.”

The not-for-profit Fund, managed by four Trustees with the help of a Secretariat has, apparently, been preoccupied with internal administrative matters since then. Now is an opportune moment to deliver on its responsibilities. Mobilizing a print order for fresh afghani bank notes would be a relatively small task for the Fund but a hugely useful and helpful step for millions of impoverished Afghans.

UAI, long concerned about the devastating effects of economic warfare, reiterates the importance of releasing the assets of the Afghan people.

It also calls for people-centered, sustainable development and responsible decision-making geared to alleviating the imposed and inherited strictures that make life unlivable for many Afghans.

Discover more about UAI’s campaign by clicking here

The post “Meanwhile in Afghanistan…” – UAI Statement. appeared first on United Against Inhumanity.

Refugee repatriation is often championed as a solution that honours the right of return, a fundamental principle enshrined in international law. But how closely does this principle align with the realities faced by refugees and returnees? Are their rights, or is repatriation increasingly becoming a tool of political convenience?

Voluntary repatriation, in theory, must always respect the principle of non-refoulement and be informed, safe, and dignified. However, while governments present repatriations as humane and sustainable, the reality is frequently at odds with this narrative. Refugees are often returned to regions still struggling with the aftermath of crisis, conflict or inadequate infrastructure, as currently witnessed in Syria, Afghanistan and Sudan.

Syria

In Syria, shifts in the political landscape following the fall of President Bashar al-Assad have influenced repatriation dynamics. Countries such as Turkey, hosting close to four million Syrian refugees, report a steady stream of voluntary returns that are monitored by UNHCR. Many returnees initially travel alone to assess conditions in their homeland, encouraged by improved security in certain areas. And yet, pervasive economic hardship, social insecurity and ongoing conflict render the prospect of sustainable reintegration tenuous at best. 

In Europe, Syrians who have secured long-term residency or citizenship contrast starkly with those under temporary or subsidiary protection, vulnerable to legal uncertainties and potential status revocations. For individuals whose asylum claims were based on fears of persecution by the Assad regime, EU law allows governments to decline the renewal of their status or even revoke it under specific circumstances. As of December 2024, more than 780,000 Syrians in the EU remained under refugee or subsidiary protection.

European countries such as Germany and Austria have paused asylum applications for Syrians, with the latter planning organised repatriation programmes. However, experts caution that despite political changes, economic instability and security concerns in Syria may deter immediate large-scale returns.

Afghanistan

For Afghan refugees, the reality is even more severe. Since the Taliban’s resurgence in 2021, Afghanistan has faced severe economic collapse, widespread instability and restricted freedoms, particularly for women and girls. Neighbouring countries such as Pakistan and Iran, struggling with economic and political pressures, have escalated deportation campaigns, forcing hundreds of thousands of Afghans to return to unsafe and unstable conditions. 

Since 2023, over 100,000 Afghans have submitted first-time applications for international protection across the 27 EU member states. Germany hosts the largest Afghan community in Europe. By the end of 2022, approximately 425,000 individuals of Afghan descent resided in Germany, including refugees, asylum seekers, and German citizens of Afghan origin. Many Afghan refugees remain in legal limbo, with some at risk of losing their refugee status as governments reassess the changing conditions in Afghanistan.

Sudan

Sudanese refugees face similarly dire prospects. The ongoing conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has plunged the country into turmoil, displacing millions internally and across borders. Host countries like Chad, overwhelmed by the refugee influx, have struggled to provide adequate support, with camps overcrowded and underfunded—by late 2024, Chad alone was hosting over 600,000 Sudanese refugees,many in overcrowded and underfunded camps. 

Despite these challenges, some refugees are pressured to return under the guise of ‘voluntary’ repatriation, often to conditions of rampant violence, food shortages and inadequate healthcare. For Sudanese refugees in Europe, the uncertainty surrounding temporary protection further compounds their vulnerability.

Upholding refugee rights

The cases of Syria, Afghanistan and Sudan highlight the widening gap between the principle of non-refoulement and its real-world application. Political, economic and social pressures frequently drive returns that fail to meet the standards of safety and dignity mandated by international law. 

Addressing these challenges demands not only strict adherence to legal protections but also substantial international support for host countries and sustainable reintegration efforts. Without these measures, the ‘right of return’ risks being reduced to a hollow ideal, failing the very populations it is meant to protect. The reality on the ground paints a grim picture. Many refugees face formidable obstacles upon their return, ranging from unsafe conditions in conflict-ridden zones to severe economic hardship in fragile states. Basic necessities like healthcare, education and job opportunities are often unavailable, leaving returnees struggling to rebuild their lives. 

Adding to this burden is the psychological trauma many carry from years of displacement and instability, compounded by the stress of returning to uncertain futures. Rather than resolving the refugee crisis, rushed or coerced repatriations often perpetuate cycles of displacement, undermining the very principles of dignity and safety that international refugee law aims to protect.

A truly compassionate approach to refugee repatriation begins with prioritizing the safety, dignity and autonomy of displaced populations. Policies must go beyond superficial gestures, ensuring that repatriation is genuinely voluntary and that refugees are equipped with the resources needed to rebuild their lives. 

This means creating robust reintegration programmes that address critical needs such as housing, employment, education and access to healthcare. Governments must work alongside international organizations to guarantee that returning refugees are not forced back into precarious or life-threatening conditions but instead have a foundation for stability and self-sufficiency.

Conclusion

Truly compassionate policy starts with shared responsibility and it is only through collective effort that lasting solutions can be achieved. Ultimately, policies must reflect the principle that refugees are not mere statistics. They are human beings with aspirations, dreams and the right to a future free from fear and suffering. 

By committing to safety, sustainability and collaboration, we can transform refugee repatriation from a process of coercion and hardship into one of hope and renewal. Together, we can ensure that the right of return is more than just a promise—but a real pathway to dignity and opportunity.

About the author: Pilar Aguilar has worked with the UN as a UNICEF Senior Education Advisor, leading efforts in complex emergencies across different regions. With over 30 years’ experience in education during crises, she has dedicated her career to supporting vulnerable children, including those on the move. Her mission is to ensure every child, no matter their situation, has the opportunity to grow, learn and thrive.

The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of United Against Inhumanity (UAI).

The post “Refugee Repatriation: a right or a ruse?”, by Pilar Aguilar. appeared first on United Against Inhumanity.

In 2024, 233,000 people were killed in wars, a 30 percent increase from 2023. The trend seemed inexorable. Political apathy in the face of relentless human suffering fuelled public disgust with government leaders. But then, on 8 December, came a rare piece of apparently good news. One of the world’s most brutal dictators, Bashar al-Assad of Syria, was overthrown.

Does this outbreak of good news herald the arrival of new opportunities for peace-making, or is it just a pause in the agony? This article looks at the situation in Syria from the perspective of a retired UN official who worked in humanitarian, refugee and peacekeeping operations, as well as on UN humanitarian policy and disarmament. How does this historical moment in the Levant look from this perspective?

Lost Opportunities

In early 2012, living in the UAE, I made a bet with a colleague that Assad would be gone from Syria by the end of June of that year. On 8 December 2024, nearly 13 years later, it finally did happen. In the meantime, half a million of the Syrian population of less than 30 million people had been killed, nearly 7 million had fled the country, around the same number had been uprooted, many more than once, within Syria, and tens of thousands had been incarcerated, tortured, and killed in the regime’s notorious prisons. A once stable economy was wrecked, and widespread poverty took hold. All this was the consequence of failures of international leadership and many lost opportunities to shorten the conflict.

The Failure of UN Efforts

As I watched Kofi Annan, Lakhdar Brahimi, Staffan de Mistura, and Geir Pedersen struggle in vain to bring Assad and opposition leaders to the negotiating table, it became clear that the lack of pressure on Assad to accept compromise had doomed their efforts.

Human Rights and Justice

Senior diplomats from the US, the UK, France, Canada, Germany, and the Netherlands often voiced support for dislodging Assad and holding him accountable. However, they did not put enough resources or political capital behind efforts to achieve this objective. As one commentator put it, ‘In Syria, billions have been spent on weapons, billions on humanitarian aid, millions on political initiatives, but almost nothing on justice and accountability’. Blessed are the peacemakers, but our governments will spend their money on weapons and humanitarian aid to help those wounded by the weapons.

The Military Industrial Complex and the International Humanitarian System

The military-industrial complex thrives on war, and can always find ambitious leaders to pursue their political ambitions with violence. Humanitarian organizations have always been ready to request more funds for relief. Until now, wealthy governments have preferred to be seen as generous in disbursing aid but have shied away from prioritizing genuine peacemaking efforts and enforcing adherence to the laws of war, enshrined in the Geneva Conventions.

What to Expect in Syria in 2025

Will the international community learn from the failures in Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan? Will refugees be able to return without premature pressure? Will transitional justice be introduced in a region that lacks precedents for such initiatives? A paper from the ICG (International Crisis Group) warns against repeating in Syria the mistakes of Afghanistan, while Khaled Mansour argues for a complete overhaul of the UN’s presence in Syria.

No to Early Elections

Rushing to elections often undermines peace-building efforts. It pushes political leaders to take extreme and polarizing positions to ‘shore up their bases’. Yet Western states and the UN have often insisted on this approach. This obsession must be resisted.

Syrians Are Up for the Challenge

Despite the 13-year delay in Assad’s downfall, I remain optimistic. The people of Syria are ready to take on the challenge. Let’s try not to get in their way.

Conclusion: A New Beginning for Syria

The fall of Assad presents an opportunity for Syria to rebuild on a foundation of justice and accountability. However, the international community must resist the urge to impose rushed solutions, such as premature elections, which could destabilize the fragile recovery process. Instead, efforts should focus on removing sanctions that impede economic recovery and on supporting Syrians in establishing inclusive governance structures that break away from the past cycle of authoritarianism. Given the space, Syrians can re-shape their country’s governance system in ways that escape the constraints of patron-client relationships and offer genuinely equal rights and opportunities to all citizens.

About the author: Martin Barber is an Associate Fellow at Chatham House, a former Director in the UN Department of Peace-keeping Operations and a co-founder of United Against Inhumanity (UAI).

The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of United Against Inhumanity (UAI).

The post “Syria after Assad: How should the UN and its member states respond?” by Martin Barber appeared first on United Against Inhumanity.

Afghanistan is no longer a major focus of international media attention, but on-the-ground perspectives present a mixed and nuanced picture of everyday life under Taliban rule. Releasing Afghanistan’s seized external reserves – US$9.2 billion – remains as critical as ever to secure a functioning economy and banking system, which is key to reducing poverty and deprivation and enabling economic stability.

The situation in Afghanistan remains of grave concern. Economic warfare translates into the deepening pauperization of millions of Afghans. Vulnerable Afghans were already struggling to survive a hand-to-mouth existence after decades of warfare and dysfunctional governance when the Taliban returned to Kabul in August 2021. Three years later, heavily dependent on diminishing humanitarian support, 23.7 million Afghans – 52 percent of whom are children and 25 percent are women – are trapped in a debilitating cycle of poverty, increasing indebtedness, displacement, and disasters associated with natural hazards, including the effects of the climate crisis. The bulk of the population is routinely hungry; this is particularly threatening for a significant proportion of Afghans experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity.

A key factor in the deprivation that Afghans suffer is the policy of the US and some European allies to seize and block access to the country’s sovereign reserves – the assets of the Afghan people – upon the withdrawal of US and allied troops from the country and the emergence of the Islamic Emirate (IEA) three years ago. Efforts to dismantle or sideline Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB), the country’s central bank, persist, as do restrictions that prevent arrangements with correspondent banks, which are essential for international transactions and access to the global financial system. Afghanistan has many unique features, but as in any setting, a functioning economy is fundamental to everyday survival, including livelihoods, at the local and national levels.

The human rights situation in Afghanistan is also of great concern. The multiethnic nature of Afghan society is often ignored in governance structures, to the detriment of minorities and prospects for an inclusive and equitable future. Measures that entrench deep-rooted discriminatory norms against females are widely condemned but to little apparent effect. The latest round of Vice and Virtue regulations further restricts the freedom of women and girls outside the home, including in relation to education, employment, freedom of movement, and expression. This will exacerbate the marginalization of females and diminish their life options.

Such discrimination undermines effective humanitarian action and other assistance programs, which, in turn, risks additional reductions in donor funding. It also complicates initiatives to promote constructive engagement with the de facto authorities, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA). Such an approach is needed to avoid making Afghanistan a pariah state and further isolating Afghans. It is also incumbent on human rights actors to acknowledge that the policy of disabling the DAB has harmful consequences for Afghans. This is particularly the case for destitute families who sometimes resort to adverse coping mechanisms such as the exchange of young girls in marriage.

There is broad consensus, inside and outside Afghanistan, that the IEA will remain in place for the foreseeable future as will its unique interpretation of Sharia law. This does not mean that changes will not occur. Afghanistan, and the wider region, is not immune to changing geopolitical dynamics. This includes, for example, the fallout of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that brings to the fore the perceived double standards of Western bloc countries, including their rhetoric on human rights and the relevance of the rule of law.

The IEA has made reference to this when claiming that human rights issues are a domestic concern. Thus, while different Western countries debate the extent to which they should engage but not recognize the IEA, various regional neighbors and others are keen to strengthen trade and other relations. Recent times have seen a surge in diplomatic activity involving high-level officials. China, for example, welcomed an IEA Ambassador to Beijing in January. The United Arab Emirates did so in Abu Dhabi in August. Uzbekistan’s Prime Minister visited Kabul in August.

Kabul announced in September that some 40 Afghan embassies and consulates now report to the IEA. Such diplomatic breakthroughs will, in principle, facilitate trade and investment in Afghanistan, a country that is one of the poorest and least developed in the world.

Conscious of the debilitating level of poverty in Afghanistan as well as reduced support for humanitarian action and access to public services, including health care, UAI remains focused on securing the release of the seized external reserves. These assets are vital for the work of the DAB, economic growth, and stability. It has been clear for some time that humanitarian action is not a substitute for a functioning economy and banking sector. It is also apparent that social change and reduction of inequalities are unlikely in a context of grinding poverty. Afghans need an end to the collective punishment inherent in the “frozen funds” policy. Afghans need, and have a right to, socio-economic development that is sustainable while addressing structural inequalities.

The Afghanistan Task Team relies on an array of contacts and networks to maintain a nuanced understanding of evolving events, including the impact of different fatwas around the country, taking into account local ethnic and other realities.

The “Release Afghanistan’s Frozen Funds” Campaign remains actively engaged on various fronts. Since mid-2023, UAI has issued various statements, blogs by a broad cross-section of authors, and periodic updates. All of these, together with articles posted on the Media Watch section, are readily available to the public on the Campaign’s dedicated website: https://www.against-inhumanity.org/campaigns/afghanistan-campaign/

UAI has engaged in different forums and panel events to discuss the “Frozen Funds” problem and the evolving situation in Afghanistan. UAI interacts on a routine basis with media personnel, NGO colleagues, and academics interested in Afghanistan. The Task Team keeps track of the activities and statements of the Fund for the Afghan People in Switzerland; it was established in 2022 when the Biden Administration transferred US$3.5 billion – half the amount of the seized Afghan sovereign reserves in the US – to this dedicated Fund that is mandated to protect and preserve these assets for the benefit of Afghans.

UAI continues to advocate that these resources are used to recapitalize the DAB. In common with other stakeholders, UAI, since the beginning of the campaign, has indicated that the DAB should have limited, conditional, and internationally monitored access to a minimum of US$150 million monthly. This would help the DAB, for example, hold regular currency auctions to help stabilize the value of the local currency, the afghani. UAI also concurs with the need to strengthen the DAB’s AML/CFT (anti-money laundering/counter-financing of terror) capabilities, a step that should be pursued quickly to avoid further delays that continue to harm Afghans in innumerable ways.

UAI’s Afghan Task Team meets periodically to review and take decisions geared to advancing the release of the “Frozen Funds.”

The post “Afghanistan: Still in Need of a Functioning Economy” – by Norah Niland (UAI) appeared first on United Against Inhumanity.

UAI’s latest newsletter focuses on how the return of the Taliban to Kabul on the 15^th and the US troop withdrawal on 30^th August marks the end of the US-led occupation that began in October 2001 with the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom. The three-year anniversary of these tumultuous events is also an occasion to reflect on the current and evolving situation from the perspective of in-country Afghans.

The funds remain frozen
UAI remains preoccupied with the ramifications of the US-led seizure of US$ 9.2 billion of Afghanistan’s external reserves.   This arbitrary confiscation hobbled the economy and the Afghan central bank – Da Afghanistan Bank – which nonetheless has done a reasonable job in avoiding levels of inflation that would further impoverish millions of poor Afghans.

UAI’s statement published on 15th August challenges the narrative of widespread concern about the day-to-day reality of Afghan women and girls; their historical experience of marginalization has been exacerbated by the many discriminatory edicts of the de facto authorities. However, such narratives simultaneously ignore the collective punishment and related deprivation that harm Afghan females who are most adversely affected by the manufactured poverty inherent in the disastrous frozen funds policy.  

Inside the Taliban’s Afghanistan
Jean-François, a member of UAI’s  Afghanistan Task Team, and Sonia, who live in Kabul, recently made a road trip with their two adult children around Afghanistan, a country they “have loved for decades” and where they have worked on various occasions. Their wide-ranging article is full of reflections worthwhile read!

The article shows that regular Afghans appreciate the end of decades of armed conflict and much improved physical security as evidenced in crowded bazaars. However, poverty and deprivation are readily apparent. On the plus side, corruption has much reduced. Travelling in rural Afghanistan during the wheat harvest season, the Cautains found fields full of busy “men, women and teenagers”. Agriculture remains greatly dependent on physical labour and basic tools such as the sickle notwithstanding the billions of international aid dollars poured into Afghanistan during two decades of nation-building. Discussions with farming families and others show that the unregulated use and depletion of underground water resources raise a range of critical issues including the overdue need for investment in sustainable food production and other infrastructure.

As Afghans wrestle with deepening poverty, the marginalized situation of females and a host of other problems, there is some hope that constructive and pragmatic diplomatic dialogue will enable more political space for engagement and the availability of resources needed to build a more productive and peaceful future.

Our Media Watch Is Always on Duty
UAI, in the Media Watch section of the “Release Afghanistan’s Frozen Funds” campaign site, routinely posts relevant articles and reports. In August, postings include for example, an International Crisis Group report by Graeme Smith “Afghanistan Three Years After the Taliban Takeover”.

Join us against inhumanity
UAI, in collaboration with other civil society actors, in and outside Afghanistan, will persist in promoting an end to the arbitrary and questionable seizure of Afghanistan’s sovereign reserves.
Everyone interested in joining this campaign is invited to do so!  

Any suggestions or queries can be sent to contact@against-inhumanity.org

The post “Afghanistan at a Crossroads: Three Years of Taliban Rule and Ongoing Challenges”. appeared first on United Against Inhumanity.