As resistance against long-term Rohingya presence in host countries grows, the refugees’ fate is back in the headlines. Malaysia is a recent example. Its government has yielded to growing hate speech against Myanmar refugees, and Rohingya in particular. In September, Malaysia and Myanmar negotiated a controversial repatriation agreement for 5,000 refugees that is not supported by the UN or its refugee agency. Resentment in India and Indonesia has also grown.

Following large-scale Rohingya returns from Bangladesh to Myanmar in the 1970s and 1990s, repatriation efforts started again in 2017, after the enforced flight of 750,000 Rohingya from Myanmar to Bangladesh. Initially, they were based on a Chinese offer to mediate between the two countries. Even though these and later efforts failed, Bangladesh’s pursuit of repatriation continues, and Malaysia has now joined in.

There are many reasons why the repatriation initiatives of the past 10 years have not been successful. A largely unmentioned one is that many initiators wrongly assume that traditional diplomatic relations between states can lead to meaningful dialogue and conflict resolution. This state-centric approach overlooks the key question at the heart of Myanmar’s decades-old volatility:  how power and political authority are shared between Myanmar’s center and its highly diverse regions and ethnic nationalities.  Moreover, since the country’s 2021 military coup, the regime in Naypyitaw has lost control over much of the country. In Arakan (Rakhine State), the birthplace of most Rohingya refugees—and where some 500,000 of them still live—the current regime has control over only three of the state’s 17 townships.

Today’s Myanmar is in transition. It is a country with multiple centers of authority. In some, local territorial control has been in place for decades; in others, it has been established since the military coup of 2021. These ethnic and regional authorities are not against a federal state as such. They are against the current federal union that is based on a constitution that concentrates significant power at the center, and particularly with the armed forces.

Right now, the key question is whether a new form of federalism can emerge, one that leaves a highly centralized system behind and, instead, focuses on existing and newly emerging centers of political authority. A long road lies ahead but in many parts of the country progress is clearly visible.

Arakan is a prime example. As the territorial dominance of the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA) grows, particularly since 2023, it has been transforming into a central administrative authority with local administrative, security and judicial mechanisms.  The Institute for Strategy and Policy in Chiang Mai recently reviewed the progress that has been made and concluded that “despite persistent challenges, a solid institutional framework is emerging”. But it also cautions that following rapid territorial expansion, a performance gap has emerged between public expectations and the administration’s delivery capacity.

A key reason for the delivery gap is that right now Arakan is a war zone with almost daily ground clashes between the AA and Myanmar’s armed forces, as well as attacks by Bangladesh-based Rohingya militias. Moreover, Arakan is now a prime target for attacks by Myanmar’s air force, which deliberately targets civilian structures with bombs of up to 500 pounds. The devastation on the ground is massive, with hundreds of civilians killed and maimed, while schools, markets, clinics and prayer houses have been destroyed. Physical infrastructure is also heavily affected, including by recent massive floods, leading to large-scale disruption of livelihoods and food security.

According to a recent report by the UN Development Programme, 68.4 percent of Arakan’s population (all ethnicities) experience multi-dimensional poverty, while a further 20 percent is at risk of falling into that category. Arakan’s current population is thought to stand at just over 2.4 million, while a Doctors Without Borders report in 2024 estimated that only 636,000 Rohingya remained in Arakan. Today that number will have fallen significantly, as approximately 150,000 more Rohingya have fled to Bangladesh since then.

To be clear, Rohingya repatriation from Bangladesh and other countries will take time. Refugees cannot return if armed conflict continues and before the underlying reasons for their flight have been addressed. To achieve this, a central role for both ULA/AA and the people of Arakan, including the Rohingya, is critical. But at the same time, various factions on the Rohingya side stand in the way of a united approach, particularly those supporting armed militias. Moreover, some of them have been used as a divide-and-rule tool by Myanmar’s military-backed regime.

Arakan’s problems are manifold and a broader vision of identity is critically important, one that acknowledges inclusion and equality as basic building blocks for a stable, secure and prosperous Arakan.

This understanding led the Rakhine Advisory Commission of 2016-17, chaired by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, to focus on solutions to address the legitimate grievances and suffering of all Arakan’s diverse people. Its report and recommendations to Myanmar’s leaders remain highly relevant, based as they are on the central objective of developing conditions in Arakan that will lead to a peaceful, fair, harmonious and prosperous future for all communities. In 2018, the commission published a lessons-learned report focusing on how it operated in Myanmar’s highly politicized and complex context.

Obviously, much has changed since the report was released but it remains relevant, even after the National League for Democracy’s violent removal in 2021. It analyzes Arakan’s situation around three major crises:  a security crisis, an economic and development crisis, and a human rights crisis. These crises persist and could form the basis for an all-of-Arakan approach.

Since 2017, the Annan report has been re-acknowledged annually by an overwhelming majority of the UN General Assembly and the UN Human Rights Council. Yet, no efforts have been made to establish how it might serve Arakan’s people under their current circumstances, and particularly since 2024, when most of Arakan came under the control of the ULA/AA.

Any process leading to a comprehensive plan for Arakan will be complex, not least because of the wide range of actors, functioning at diverse levels. In “The Dilemma of Hard Choices”, published in August, the Center for Arakan studies identifies the heterogeneity of agents as a key issue and adds that it is compounded by the problem of ownership, where most states, armed groups, civil society and international bodies each deflect overall responsibility while pursuing their own narrow strategic interests.

Precisely these diverging interests would make the Annan report a helpful starting point for dialogue. For good reasons, the commission’s recommendations are not highly prescriptive.  Its general understanding was that, while basic principles of governance and human rights should guide the implementation process, details could be developed as part of dialogue processes. The report contains 88 recommendations on a comprehensive set of issues, ranging from economic and social development to freedom of movement, citizenship, health, access to justice, intercommunal cohesion, humanitarian access and internally displaced persons.

Obviously, dialogue cannot be based on the Annan report alone, but it could be a starting point. Additional questions must be raised to take account of developments since 2017.  The first is the clarification of victimhood.  Who are the victims of decades of oppression, persecution and violent conflict? A second is the “fog of war” that distorts a clear view of what is happening on the ground.

Obviously, it is not necessary to argue that the Rohingya are victims; that is accepted around the world. But what about the other communities in Arakan—the Rakhine, the Maramagyi, the Mro, the Chin, the Hindus and others?

They too are victims, yet their plight has been getting far less attention. They too have had their villages bombed and burned, their clinics, schools and livelihoods destroyed, while thousands are displaced in areas where relief goods cannot reach them. But their plight is not as widely documented. Acknowledgment that all Arakan’s people are victims could be a first step in reconciliation. And clearly, there are different degrees of victimhood and these too must be acknowledged.

The second point concerns the current “fog of war” and the urgent need to establish independent investigations. As in other places around the world, violent conflict, displacement and hunger obscure a clear view of developments on the ground. In such situations, deliberate disinformation thrives. We should not pretend that we have a clear view of what is happening in Arakan and in the refugee camps in Bangladesh. Lack of independent access and blocked internet facilities compound the problems.

Independent investigations will be needed to establish what has happened in Arakan and Bangladesh since 2017. While a significant body of research about the Rohingya exists, research on Arakan’s other communities remains scant. Moreover, research should also focus on disturbing allegations about what has been happening in Bangladesh. How did Rohingya militias manage to get a firm grip on the population in the refugee camps? Where did funding for their arms and operations come from? And how can large numbers of refugees and militia fighters continue to cross the Bangladesh-Myanmar border seemingly unnoticed?

Since 2018, the Independent Investigating Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) has been collecting and preserving evidence to facilitate criminal prosecutions of those most responsible for atrocity crimes. But it only shares its findings with investigative, prosecutorial and judicial authorities in national and international courts. As a result, a vast body of information remains inaccessible to the public. Moreover, IIMM’s mandate does not cover other truth-seeking needs, such as documenting and public acknowledgment of crimes through truth and reconciliation bodies and publicly accessible archives. These limitations underline the importance of establishing additional mechanisms to ensure that accountability is pursued as an integral part of transitional justice and reconciliation. This should be part of a comprehensive approach: an all-for-Arakan approach.

Using the Annan report as a credible starting point for dialogue could be a first step towards creating a better understanding of the needs of all Arakan’s people. Moreover, its repeated recognition by the UN General Assembly might help to rally much needed support for such an exercise at a time when resources are scarce.

Laetitia van den Assum is a former Dutch diplomat. She was also a member of the Rakhine Advisory Commission (2016-2017), chaired by Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary-General.

The post “An ‘All-for-Arakan’ Approach Is Needed to Address the Rohingya Refugee Crisis” by Laetitia van den Assum. appeared first on United Against Inhumanity.

Five years after the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA), officially known as the Pretoria Agreement, between the government of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), Ethiopia faces another round of conflict with wider political and humanitarian implications. On Sunday, October 4th, Ethiopian National Defense Force troops recaptured Mekelle after it had been taken over by TPLF forces. These developments come as communities in Tigray are dealing with a severe El Niño–driven drought while still recovering from the war that ended in 2022.

On September 20th, six armed factions from the Amhara, Afar, Oromo, Benishangul-Gumuz and Somali regions joined the TPLF to announce the formation of the ‘Ethiopian Alliance for Survival’, with the objective of overthrowing the government in Addis Ababa. There is speculation about the alliance’s prospects: whether the combined forces will be strong enough to unseat the government, and whether they offer a real, coherent policy to tackle the many issues facing Ethiopia.

These events are also occurring during a global climatic event that is affecting livelihoods and food security in the Horn and in many other regions of the world.

Aid Reduction Impact in Ethiopia

In January 2025, the international development and humanitarian community was rocked by an earthquake emanating from Washington, DC: the sudden and abrupt cutting of all US aid programs and the start of the process of dismantling USAID.

USAID, with an annual budget of over $40 billion, had been supporting millions of people across the globe. Nowhere was this truer than in Ethiopia, long its second-largest recipient: between 2020 and 2023, for example, humanitarian spending in Ethiopia exceeded $3.8 billion.

The cuts have had a severe impact, resulting in program reductions, staff redundancies and terminated vendor contracts. The hardest-hit sectors have been health, education, water and agriculture, along with the very important Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET). Despite the cost to organizations, Ethiopia still has a large community of national NGOs, with 368 currently registered under the Consortium of Christian Relief and Development Associations (CCRDA). It also has its own national Red Cross society, one of the oldest in Africa. All of them continue, to the best of their ability, to work at local and regional level alongside international agencies, and they can reach communities in need.

Still, Ethiopia has long hosted a large UN and NGO presence, and it now has to adapt to these changes in the middle of ongoing conflict and refugee influxes from the crises in Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia. This is bound to cause additional strain and to weaken capacity to prepare for and respond to sudden new displacement and to crises affecting health, water, food security and livelihoods.

There is also the memory of strained relations with the government during the last conflict (2020–2022), when UN agency staff were expelled.

Ethiopia’s new national disaster policy on emergency assessments, targeting and relief provision asserts control over data collection and distribution, as part of major commitments to self-reliance and “statistical and humanitarian sovereignty”.

These measures could allow penalties for public discussion of aid and for sharing false information about it, which could affect national and international agencies alike.

For two years running there has been no Humanitarian Appeal Process. The country was also excluded from the 2026 Global Report on Food Crises because of disagreements over estimates of beneficiaries and internally displaced people, and because of restricted access to the crisis-affected areas.

Violence, Modern and Conventional

Warfare in Ethiopia is itself changing, with both government and opposition forces using drones. The Ethiopian government has invested heavily in its own capacity to manufacture different kinds of weapons and in improving its technical capacity in drone technology.

Drones helped stall the 2020 conflict with Tigray and have been used ever since in several parts of the country to target militias, often harming civilians and civilian structures. In a surprising development, there have been reports of sporadic drone attacks in Addis Ababa.

At the same time, conventional ground fighting has killed and displaced thousands. Traditionally, forces have occupied towns by first shelling them heavily and dispersing their populations. The 2020–2022 war with Tigray, which killed over 600,000 people, was notable for its viciousness, vengefulness, human rights violations and weaponized sexual violence. Blockades of humanitarian assistance, the targeting of civilians and humanitarian staff, and the looting of schools, hospitals, warehouses and other infrastructure caused a breakdown of basic services and inflicted extreme suffering and displacement on civilians.

The resumption of fighting today raises the specter of renewed atrocities and protection concerns.

An already militarized society will become further militarized through more recruitment and conscription of young people and the creation of new civilian militias to fight the opposition.

Regional Implications

All this is happening in a regional and global context of accelerating volatility that threatens to spread and engulf neighboring countries in the Horn.

Tensions between Ethiopia and Egypt over the Nile are ongoing, and Ethiopia also accuses Egypt of thwarting its attempts to gain access to the Red Sea and the port of Assab. Relations with Sudan have been complicated: Tigrayan rebels have been accused of receiving support from the Sudanese Armed Forces in Khartoum. In response, the Ethiopian government has allowed the Sudanese anti-government Rapid Support Forces to operate inside Ethiopia’s borders. The government perceives that Egypt and Eritrea have now joined forces with the internal Alliance for Survival, and that together they pose an existential threat to the nation. Further complications arise from the US–Iran war and the Houthis’ recent moves to control access and transport along the entire Red Sea coastline.

Conclusion: Urgent Action on Protection and Assistance

The international community cannot stand by and allow internal and external actors to push Ethiopia and the region further into chaos, destruction and potential famine. There must be a concerted effort to stop the fighting. In all mediations, the warring parties must commit to allowing immediate humanitarian access, and resources must be accelerated to maintain emergency logistics and pipelines.

• The monitoring mechanism established by the African Union must be reconvened and made operational in the country, to ensure neutral, accountable monitoring and public reporting on conditions in the conflict area and on citizens’ access to aid.
• The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights should closely monitor the situation in Ethiopia, release regular public reports and brief the UN Human Rights Council.
• The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission must also be allowed access to all areas.
• The Ethiopian government must ensure that civil society organizations working with survivor communities have immediate access to provide physical and mental health support to victims of sexual violence.
• The federal government and the warring parties must allow Ethiopian and other journalists to cover and report on conflict-affected areas.
• Assessment and monitoring missions should ensure equal representation of the National Disaster Commission, the Ethiopian Red Cross, the Red Crescent, local NGOs, and the UN and donor agencies in the country.
• Donors are encouraged to fund flexibly, targeting local organizations already working at regional and community level.

Angela Raven-Roberts is an independent researcher and consultant focusing on the Horn of Africa. She is a former senior program officer in UN’s Emergency Programs.

The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author of the presentation and do not necessarily represent the views of United Against Inhumanity (UAI).

The post “Ethiopia: A Plea for Protection and Assistance” by Angela Raven-Roberts appeared first on United Against Inhumanity.

The cuts to humanitarian aid by key donor countries are having devastating impacts on the lives of millions of the most destitute people in the world. The cuts are also having a profound, structural, and long-lasting impact on the organisations that provide aid. The operations, services, and response capacities of the global humanitarian system are being seriously weakened, leading to dramatic consequences for those people who rely on this system. 

International funding for humanitarian assistance – a key solidarity and foreign policy instrument of our times – had been steadily rising over the past decade in response to mounting needs. It reached an all-time high of $43 billion in 2022, when response to the COVID19 epidemic and the new crisis in Ukraine triggered extraordinary donations. Aid flows started to decline in 2023, with Germany, the US, the UK and several other Western countries leading the way, with some noticeable exceptions (Ireland, for example). As of 2025, global funding had dropped by approximately 35%, reaching the lowest levels in a decade, with further declines expected in 2026. Funding from private sector and philanthropies also contracted significantly during the period. 

The drastic, unplanned and uncoordinated cuts to humanitarian aid, conducted in stark contrast to the commitments made by states in the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative, adopted over two decades ago , have exposed the fragility of an international aid system that relied on voluntary donations of critically needed resources to ensure the lifeline of millions of vulnerable people. 

This contraction in funding takes place at a time when humanitarian needs continue to rise due to the combined effects of armed conflicts, socio-economic downturns and climate change. Initial estimates indicate that US cuts alone, including the abrupt shutting down of USAID, will cause up to 22 million additional and preventable deaths by 2030.  

How has the international humanitarian system responded to this unprecedented funding crisis? Instinctively, most international and national organisations moved into an “emergency management and survival mode,” adopting inward looking response measures principally aimed at cost-containment. This has included the hyper-prioritization of response with a focus exclusively on life-saving interventions, slashing internal workforces by up to 40%, implementing a drastic reduction in capacities, services, geographical presence and outreach, and dropping programmatic links and synergies, notably with agencies focused on peace and development 

Humanitarian goals and ambition levels have collapsed. In 2026 only 87 million vulnerable people out of the over 239 million people identified as in need will be “prioritized” and reached by international aid, if adequate resources come in.  This will leave largely unattended the assistance and protection needs of millions of women, men and children living in fragile conditions. It is an announced humanitarian catastrophe in the making.    

Deep cuts have also impacted system-wide emergency preparedness capacities at a time when the world is entering a hyper-complex poly-crisis, driven by overlapping local and global factors, including escalating conflicts and violence, the onset of a severe El Niño, the wide socio-economic effects of the Hormuz crisis and war in Ukraine, and climate change. The value of investing in preparedness is well documented with evidence of significant return on investment in terms of future response costs, community empowerment, local institution building and shortened emergency response times. Slashing global capacities to anticipate, prepare for, and mitigate the effects of preventable crises is irresponsible and potentially catastrophic for the lives and livelihoods of millions of people. 

What is most striking is that the global humanitarian aid system has not yet been able to move beyond its own initial survival mode response, attempting to restore confidence and elaborate a vision and narrative for the future. Within the humanitarian space the concerns the impact of defunding have been widespread, however leaders from the donor community, international organizations, national entities and the UN system have thus far failed to develop a common, reality-facing strategy in relation to the tragedy of the hundreds of millions of people who will not be reached by international aid and will be left behind. They have not been able to get the message about these dramatic developments across in a coherent manner. Lack of public awareness of the impending humanitarian crisis may help to explain why politicians and decision makers in donor capitals are not under more pressure to respond. This is why, for example, governments can afford a war in Iran costing well over $1 billion per day, when a single month without such war would help cover the cost of nearly the entire humanitarian appeal for 2026.

Now is the time to confront this reality as part of our collective responsibility towards those most in need. The current crisis provides us with the opportunity to move forward with a long-awaited reform of the global aid system in a world undergoing important transformations. Leadership and vision are urgently needed. It is hoped that this reform and the debate about the future of humanitarian principles and action will be a priority on the agenda of the new UN Secretary General. Underpinning all this, a far-reaching reflection is required that brings together local community groups, civil society organizations, national governments and private constituencies, humanitarian actors and organizations, UN entities and governing bodies, and international donors, to agree on the meaning of human solidarity, our common ethical obligations, the future of humanitarian action and the future of our civilization.

About the authors:

Carlo Scaramella, Independent Researcher and Advisor, former UN World Food Programme Senior Official. 

Amir Mahmoud Abdulla, Former Deputy Executive Director, UN World Food Programme & Former UN Coordinator Black Sea Grain Initiative.

Martin Barber, Secretary of United Against Inhumanity (UAI) and former Director of the UN Mine Action Programme.

The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the author of the presentation and do not necessarily represent the views of United Against Inhumanity (UAI).

The post “The Defunding of Humanitarian Aid – Leaving Millions Behind” by Carlo Scaramella and others. appeared first on United Against Inhumanity.

Recent events in Ceuta, a Spanish enclave on Moroccan territory, cost over 100 lives and affected thousands of people. Their causes and potential impact are debated, but UAI is concerned by the facts, which are not contested.

When the Prime Ministers of Italy and Denmark persuaded 22 other European countries to sign a letter to the European Commission condemning the Spanish government and justice system for offering what they considered a threat to European borders and the Schengen area, not only the Spanish government but also Spanish civil society reacted strongly, defending those policies and correcting much of the disinformation surrounding them.

One of the strongest reactions came from Jorge Serrano Paradinas, the coordinator of the citizen-led initiative behind Spain’s regularization of undocumented immigrants. It is his response to the joint letter by European leaders that we publish here.

Mr Serrano’s letter strongly rebuts many of the myths and inaccuracies that have found favour among certain elements of society and government.

The crucial points in Serrano’s letter

Spain’s regularization is strictly retroactive and grants no rights to anyone crossing into Spain today. It therefore cannot logically be a “pull factor”, as some leaders have claimed. Blaming the policy for a crisis it could not have caused deflects attention from the harder question of why people are still dying at Europe’s borders.

What the Spanish law reveals is a truth that UAI and its campaign partners have argued since the Campaign’s inception: safe, legal, and dignified pathways are possible where there is political will.

The Spanish law is the result of the mobilization of more than 700,000 Spanish citizens, over 1,000 organizations, and some 17,000 volunteers, and it was adopted by 310 parliamentary votes against only 33.

Not new detention or new deterrence

Despite improvements in the situation, events such as those in Ceuta continue to be the object of manipulation and opportunistic political instrumentalization.

If Ceuta becomes a pretext for weakening Schengen, expanding detention, or further outsourcing migration control, then more people will die, not fewer. This is precisely the warning given by UAI and its campaign partners in their June 2026 statement on the EU Pact and Strategy.

The five steps set out in the Manifesto of the Campaign to Stop the Inhumanity at Europe’s Borders remain the alternative: stop pushbacks and protect life at sea; humanize reception; end third-country containment; build real safe routes; and guarantee justice and redress.

Watch, read, and join us

Watch Jorge Serrano’s speech; read our statement on the EU Pact and Strategy; and read the Campaign Manifesto in full.

There is another and better way. Let us embrace it.

The post Ceuta: Crisis, Instrumentalization, and UAI’s Better Way appeared first on United Against Inhumanity.

Afghans are caught between Taliban repression and international punitive policies. Both deepen poverty, undermine rights and leave millions paying the price for political decisions beyond their control.

Afghanistan is no stranger to abysmal levels of poverty that have long threatened the survival and life chances of much of its population. This was the case during the post-9/11 years of the US-led war economy, when economic inequality increased even as access to food, education, healthcare and employment improved. Impunity and corruption were rife and greatly benefitted warlords, international contractors and government-linked urban elites.

The return of the Taliban to Kabul in August 2021, upon the withdrawal of US and allied forces, opened a new economic chapter driven by policies that further marginalised impoverished and vulnerable Afghans. International development aid to Afghanistan mostly disappeared. As part of its punitive, post-occupation policy, Washington also abruptly ended its economic support to Kabul that had covered some 75% of government expenditure. In addition, Washington, in collaboration with some European allies, seized some US$9.1billion of Afghanistan’s sovereign external reserves, thereby significantly disabling the country’s central bank, Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB). This greatly restricted the DAB’s ability to maintain a stable exchange rate, a measure that is key to curbing inflation, thereby enabling the poor to purchase basics such as food and fuel for heating and cooking. Blocking access to the DAB’s reserves throttled the economy and banking system, a situation made worse by the overcompliance of external banks that makes international transactions extremely difficult. 

The re-emergence of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) was welcomed by many in-country Afghans as it heralded the end of armed conflict, air strikes, night-time raids and widespread use of improvised explosive devices. However, the IEA soon launched a series of restrictive decrees that greatly subverted the lives of females including their freedom of movement, access to employment and to formal education for girls beyond 12 years. These measures are detrimental to individuals, their families and society in general, notwithstanding various initiatives by civil society and others to reduce their impact. The IEA is infamous for its contempt for fundamental human rights standards and obligations, a stance that has gained it widespread opprobrium and little international support or formal recognition.

The IEA is routinely denounced, albeit to little effect, in the human rights (HR) arena and various fora which tend to prioritise civil and political rights to the detriment of economic rights. The interdependence of gender equality, the right to work and individual economic security is obvious, but it is difficult to understand why formal HR entities routinely ignore the economic warfare and collective punishment resulting from the seizure of Afghanistan’s external reserves. There is widespread awareness of the ramifications of extreme poverty for individuals and groups. However, there has been little effort to advocate for the ending of policies that actually manufacture poverty and undermine the enjoyment of human rights notwithstanding their harmful and deadly consequences.

Human cost of policies antagonistic to human rights and humanitarian values

The drastic reduction in support for humanitarian action geared to helping those who are most at risk has further exacerbated the vulnerability and marginalisation of women and girls. In 2025 the international humanitarian appeal for Afghanistan received only 42% of the $2,4 billion requested. At the time of writing, the 2026 appeal had only received 26% of the smaller, US$1,7bn requested.

This situation is compounded by the millions of Afghans who have been forced to return from Iran and Pakistan in recent years with some 2.5 million expected by the end of 2026. According to a UNDP report “more than 80% of households are in debt while nearly three quarters rely on negative coping strategies to manage getting through the day”; 92% of recent returnees are unable to secure the basic necessities of life. In provinces heavily impacted by returnees “only 3 per cent of people have formal employment, while 78 per cent rely on casual day labour.”

Food insecurity,which had diminished significantly during the first 12 years of the Republic thanks to large scale food aid for hungry families and investment in agriculture, is now dramatically on the rise. In 2026, 3.7 million children under five are at heightened risk of malnutrition, with severe acute malnutrition cases significantly increasing due to food insecurity and inadequate diets. The situation is exacerbated by reduced international food aid, leading to a severe hunger crisis affecting millions.

A combination of fewer female healthpersonnel and reduced support for health care means reduced access to services with, invariably, fatal consequences. The World Health  Organization estimated that 521 mothers died for every 100,000 live births in 2023, more than double the global average. The UN Population Fund has warned “that continued disruption to health services could lead to 1,200 additional maternal deaths by 2028.” Meanwhile, the closure of more than 420 health facilities this past year has contributed to a “3 to 4 percent increase in infant mortality” and a noticeable increase in maternal deaths.

Notwithstanding prominent narratives and rhetoric on the difficult situation endured by women in Afghanistan, support for organisations geared to helping such women has also declined significantly. A UN survey of 74 Afghan women’s organisations found that nearly three-quarters experienced funding cuts in 2025. More than half of the organisations surveyed indicated that “they were likely to suspend operations or close entirely within the next year.” Similarly, support that helps women earn a living is also shrinking. In Afghanistan, where female-focused organisations are often the only entities able to reach women on the margins of society, they face mounting difficulties to maintain programmes and outreach given significant aid cuts. UN Women notes that “the weakening of women’s organisations is occurring at a time of massive humanitarian need and growing restrictions on women’s rights.”

Need for Community-based sustainable empowerment

External stakeholders that prosecuted the post 9/11 war and propped up the widely despised Republic era governments, coupled with the IEA’s lack of commitment to inclusive and accountable governance, are greatly responsible for appalling levels of poverty and destitution. The competing agendas of the IEA in Kandahar and those who oppose them have sacrificed the human rights and well-being of Afghans for their own ends. Time is running out for millions of impoverished Afghans but it is not too late to re-think failed agendas and invest in community-based, sustainable empowerment programmes. Investment in small-scale enterprises, including those headed by women and other marginalised groups, should be a priority as well as strengthening basics such as agriculture, irrigation and climate-related risk reduction.

Abandoning the imperial-style seizure of the country’s sovereign reserves could be easily done at no cost to donors. This would enable the DAB, the banking sector and the economy to function in a manner beneficial to all Afghans. Recapitalising the DAB in a monitored fashion is a straight-forward proposition; it would help undo the harm that has been imposed on the people of Afghanistan without any acknowledgement of the human cost involved.

While the IEA remains ostracised by the international community, poverty and deprivation remain chronic. The prospect of international development aid remains bleak despite the reactivation of some limited World Bank and Asian Development Bank projects. More can definitely be done to support local and sustainable development. This could mean direct support to communities as well as small enterprises, including some, that the Taliban seem to tolerate, that are run by women.

In the current geopolitical climate marked by drastic across the board cuts to humanitarian and development aid, more creative approaches are needed. These should focus on local employment and the availability of essential services. In Afghanistan as elsewhere, sustainable development projects at the local level have been shown to yield positive results and break the cycle of dependency on humanitarian aid. The recipes are there but the will to use them is missing. This must change. Meanwhile, by releasing the arbitrarily sequestered Afghan reserves, Western donors would give some meaning to the often-repeated phrase that “Afghan lives matter”.

Other relevant articles published by ISPI in August 2026 on this topic:

Afghanistan, Five Years of Taliban Rule: An Assessment, by Giuliano Battiston

Five years after the Taliban’s return, Afghanistan remains trapped in a cycle of crisis. As the regime consolidates power and gains international recognition, a new approach is needed – one that puts Afghans’ rights, needs and long-term stability at the centre.

https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/five-years-of-taliban-rule-five-major-trends-243316

The Geopolitics of the Emirate, by Antonio Giustozzi

Five years after their return to power, the Taliban can still boast diplomatic recognition from only one foreign state: Russia. Other countries in the region – primarily China and Iran – have gradually moved closer to diplomatic recognitionbut have stopped short of taking the final step. In their case, reservations certainly do not stem from the segregation of women within the Emirate or a lack of respect for human rights; the issues lie elsewhere – above all, in the conflict with Pakistan.

https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/the-geopolitics-of-the-emirate-243279

Back to Uncertainty: Afghan Returnees from Iran and Pakistan, by Jelena Bjelica

As Pakistan and Iran expel millions of Afghans, return has become less a durable solution than the start of a new cycle of displacement, poverty and uncertainty in a country ill-equipped to absorb them.

https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/back-to-uncertainty-afghan-returnees-from-iran-and-pakistan-243266

The World’s Worst Women’s Rights Crisis Demands Solidarity and Action, by Shaharzad Akbar

Afghan women face the world’s gravest assault on their rights. As the Taliban institutionalise gender apartheid, governments must prioritise accountability over diplomatic normalisation.

https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/the-worlds-worst-womens-rights-crisis-demands-solidarity-and-action-243325

“The Taliban Continue to Entrench Their System” – Interview with Richard Bennett by Giuliano Battiston

https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/the-taliban-continue-to-entrench-their-system-243280

The EU and the Taliban: Deportations Prioritised Over Human Rights, by Thomas Ruttiq

Behind the language of ‘technical engagement’, the EU is expanding cooperation with the Taliban to enable deportations – testing the credibility of its human rights commitments.

https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/the-eu-and-the-taliban-deportations-prioritised-over-human-rights-243287

The post “Afghanistan: Double Jeopardy”, by Norah Niland and Antonio Donini. appeared first on United Against Inhumanity.

Detention. Deportation. Eviction. Exploitation. Separation. Victimization. Criminalization. Intimidation. Frustration. Exhaustion.

Those are all common experiences for refugees, asylum seekers and other migrants arriving and settled in Europe. And those experiences do not happen by chance. Throughout much of the continent, governments, politicians and the media have set out, in a very conscious and calculating manner, to create what a British Prime Minister infamously described as a “hostile environment” for people seeking sanctuary in the region — the most prosperous in the world and one supposedly committed to progressive values.

It does not have to be this way. Two years ago, we set out to end the inhumanity at and within Europe’s borders, issuing a statement that called on all of the region’s states to treat new arrivals from other parts of the world with dignity and respect.

Our campaign has a number of important features. It is Europe-wide, encompassing EU and non-EU states, and also stretches to contiguous regions such as North Africa, which are seriously impacted by European refugee and migration policies.

It is a decentralized campaign, involving around 160 civil society organizations across the region. It is a non-political campaign, based on the principle that all states, governments and political parties must be held to account for their actions.

The campaign has deliberately avoided a legalistic approach to refugee and migrant rights, given the number of organizations already pursuing this approach. It is non-discriminatory in nature, based on the principle that all people who are on the move, whether they are categorized as refugees, asylum seekers or migrants, deserve to be treated fairly.

Finally, while the campaign is certainly idealistic, it is not naive. We have not called for the abolition of all borders. We recognize that some of the people arriving in Europe might not have a right to remain there. And we acknowledge that there are bad actors involved in the movement of people — including corrupt government officials, smugglers, traffickers, criminal gangs and unscrupulous immigration and asylum advisors — all of whom must be brought to justice.

On the subject of naivety, we are also painfully aware of the extent to which the political environment for refugee and migrant protection in Europe has deteriorated, even in the short time that we have been preparing the Manifesto. And nowhere is this to be seen more clearly than here in the UK, where a new government started out in a very positive way — by scrapping the awful deportation deal with Rwanda — but which has since joined the populist race to the bottom in terms of the inhumane treatment of people on the move.

After two years of consultation, consideration and analysis, we are pleased to announce the publication of our Campaign Manifesto, which we are launching here today. We hope that you find it convincing, compelling and constructive. It has been written in an accessible and jargon-free style and published in multiple languages. And it is based on five key demands that we hope will be used as a basis for advocacy activities throughout the continent by our partner organizations.

First, save lives, and stop using the threat of death as a deterrent to new arrivals.

Second, humanize the reception arrangements provided to refugees and other migrants and, most particularly, stop the use of detention.

Third, end the policies of containment and externalization that encourage and oblige states elsewhere in the world to act as gatekeepers for Europe.

Fourth, establish safe routes that will enable people to arrive in Europe in a regular and orderly manner.

And fifth, enable people on the move who have been subjected to human rights violations by states to seek justice and redress.

If you look at the Manifesto, you will see that we make a number of specific recommendations under each of these headings, and we very much welcome any feedback that you wish to provide on them.

While the Campaign Manifesto seeks to challenge the harmful policies that undermine the psychosocial wellbeing and mental health of people on the move, it does make recommendations with respect to the specific interventions that can be made to address those issues. And that is what we are here to discuss today, thanks to our colleagues from the University of East London.

We regard this evening’s event as a landmark in the campaign, which we hope to develop in a number of ways.

First, we hope to build our capacity. The campaign is almost entirely run by volunteers and we have very few financial resources at our disposal. Please let us know if you wish to support our efforts, whether that be by donating some of your time or by making a financial contribution.

Second, we want to strengthen our network of signatory organizations, as some European countries are unrepresented or underrepresented. We are also eager to extend the network to areas at the periphery of Europe, North Africa being a good example, and encourage all signatories to engage in advocacy activities at the national and local levels, using the different language versions of the Manifesto as a basis.

Third, we aim to improve our dissemination and promotional endeavours. We will consider the production of additional language versions of the Manifesto.

We will try to establish better contact with individuals and institutions in Brussels, especially in the European Union. And we will encourage international organizations such as UNHCR and IOM to engage in more vigorous public advocacy on the issues highlighted in the Manifesto. Finally, we will make every effort to be more positive!

While the European refugee and migration situation is generally a gloomy one, we are aware of the fact that positive things are also happening, especially at the local and community levels. Looking to the future, we will be developing new methods of identifying and publicizing the many positive initiatives that are being taken to ensure that new and recent arrivals in Europe are treated in a respectful, dignified and humane manner.

This publication is an excerpt from Dr. Jeff Crisp’s keynote address delivered at the launch of the United Against Inhumanity Manifesto at the University of East London on 16 April 2026.

About the author: Dr. Jeff Crisp is a Visiting Fellow at the Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, former Head of Policy Development and Evaluation at UNHCR, and a volunteer with United Against Inhumanity (UAI).

The post “Humane borders: a Manifesto for European migration and asylum policies”, by Dr. Jeff Crisp appeared first on United Against Inhumanity.

The collective punishment of the Afghan people who had no say in arrangements that have pauperized them or the conditions that contributed to the death of many, poses moral as well as political questions that have largely gone unanswered.

Following the Taliban takeover in Kabul in 2021, some US$9.5 billion of Afghanistan’s external reserves were seized by the US government.  Roughly US$7 billion held in the US Federal Reserve Bank in New York, and smaller amounts held in Europe, were effectively frozen. This action triggered a long legal and political dispute over ownership and control of these assets. Under President Biden’s 2022 Executive Order 14064, US authorities split the American-held reserves into two parts: US$3.5 billion was allocated to a Swiss-based not-for-profit Foundation, the “Fund for the Afghan People” also known as the Afghan Fund in Switzerland (AFS) while the remaining US$3.5 billion was set aside for litigation claims brought by American victims of the 9/11 attacks.[1]

The freezing of Afghanistan’s central bank, Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB) reserves revived long-running litigation tied to claims by families of victims of the September 11 attacks and other terror related cases against the Taliban. Plaintiffs, in legal parlance, sought to attach, meaning to seize or take control of the DAB’s reserves held at the Federal Reserve Bank, arguing that the Taliban’s control over Afghanistan entitled a claimant in receipt of a judicial decision to pursue a legal claim against the seized reserves. Civil society organizations filed amicus briefs opposing the seizure, contending that the reserves belonged to the Afghan state and the population rather than to the Taliban as a sanctioned entity.

In a series of rulings beginning in 2022, federal courts in New York rejected attachment claims finding that DAB assets retained sovereign immunity protection under the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and could not be treated as Taliban property.[2]  In 2025, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld these decisions, confirming that private litigants could not seize the reserves to satisfy 9/11 related judgments. Although the rulings prevented confiscation of the reserves, they did not restore Afghanistan’s legitimate access to them, leaving most of the assets beyond reach or “frozen”.

While the Afghan Fund in Switzerland is accruing interest, there has been no disbursement to-date to recapitalize the DAB although the stated aim of the AFS is to “protect, preserve, and – on a targeted basis – disburse its assets for the benefit of the Afghan people”.

Critics describe the AFS as an unprecedented form of external financial control over a sovereign state’s reserves; the legal basis for administering and allocating central bank assets in this way could be challenged.[3]  The creation of the AFS also signals that externally-held central bank assets may be exposed to political and legal risk during periods of geopolitical dispute.  At the same time, supporters of the AFS mechanism argue that it prevents misuse by a sanctioned regime even though there is no evidence that the DAB has acted unlawfully or in a manner contrary to its statutory purpose.[4]

Efforts by UAI and others to elicit information on the AFS activities and plans have not proved productive. As of mid-June 2026, the Fund’s website had not been updated for over a year with the exception of the recent announcement of the appointment of Jonathan Greenstein of the US Treasury Department to the Board of Trustees. The general lack of AFS action and transparency raise questions about its usefulness and Switzerland’s role as an enabler of US foreign policy agendas that are tantamount to imposing collective punishment on the Afghan people. Meanwhile the AFS continues to accrue interest – presumably in the millions of US$ – while Afghans struggle to survive in desperate conditions.

The outcome of Biden’s 2022 decision is a prolonged state of paralysis in which the DAB lacks access to Afghan reserves. In addition, the creation of the AFS shows the increasingly blurred line between internationally authorized sanctions and unilateral coercive measures. Although many restrictions imposed after 2021 were presented as “sanctions” against the Taliban, the use of the reserves did not arise from a UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions regime but rather from unilateral actions by the US and other Western governments. This distinction matters because measures lacking explicit UNSC authorization, raise questions about the legality of unilateral measures such as these.

Meanwhile, the chronic poverty and harrowing deprivation suffered by millions of Afghans, have worsened as international aid budgets continue to diminish. Humanitarian organizations have repeatedly warned that funding cuts by major donors have forced reductions in food assistance, healthcare, and nutrition programmes even as millions of Afghans face hunger, drought, displacement, and economic collapse. Child malnutrition is a major concern. Nearly 40% of infants, who were less than six months when admitted for treatment, suffered severe wasting with medical complications according to the UN in June 2026.[5]

Of course, aid reductions and sanctions-related restrictions are connected. Before 2021, external assistance made up a large share of Afghanistan’s GDP and public spending. In recent times, much needed humanitarian and other support has been slashed drastically

Financial restrictions, including the freezing of central bank reserves and limits on banking transactions, have isolated Afghanistan from global markets, restricted liquidity, and weakened private-sector confidence. Sanctions-related banking barriers have also complicated trade, disrupted remittance flows, and hindered humanitarian operations even where formal exemptions exist.

The Afghan case serves as a stark reminder that while sanctions and financial restrictions are formally aimed at governing authorities, their real effects are borne primarily by affected citizens including children born into desperate levels of poverty and deprivation.

The post “Deepening deprivation blights Afghan lives while politics obstruct the release of seized sovereign reserves” appeared first on United Against Inhumanity.

This keynote explores how detention, deportation systems, and undocumented status generate forms of legal precarity that profoundly shape psychosocial wellbeing. It connects border regimes and immigration policy to lived experiences of uncertainty, stigma, and suspended belonging. Moving beyond narrow individualised framings, the talk situates distress within the structural and relational conditions that produce it. It argues that humane and effective responses to forced migration must address legal architecture and public narrative alongside care and support.

When we witness the suffering of people labelled as asylum seekers, refugees, and undocumented people, our immediate societal impulse is often to reach for the vocabulary of Western psychology. We speak of “trauma”, stress, and resilience. We look at individuals and try to diagnose their pain.

But what if the frameworks we use to understand this distress are narrowing our vision?

Mainstream Western psychology and psychiatry operate on a straightforward, almost mechanistic logic: if you want to understand a person, you break them down into constituent parts (their thoughts, emotions, behaviours, symptoms, and diagnoses). The assumption is that if you treat the individual parts, you heal the person. However, this clinical vocabulary is far from a neutral or universal truth. It emerged from highly specific Euro-American traditions. While it can be useful in certain clinical contexts, it carries a distinct danger when applied to forced migration: it locates the pathology entirely within the person’s interiority. By focusing solely on the individual’s mind as the site of dysfunction, we effectively sanitise and obscure the hostile social, legal, and political conditions that actively produce and sustain that suffering.

The Performance of “Trauma”

In the context of the global border regime, this clinical over-coding takes on a deeply bureaucratic, almost violent significance. People who were forced to migrate find themselves navigating legal, humanitarian, and clinical systems that demand their lived experiences be rendered legible to Western metrics of trauma.

To secure safety or legal status, individuals are required to narrate their deepest histories of displacement in ways that are linear, coherent, and recognisable to the state (which includes within specific linguistic registers). Within these administrative spaces, fear is transformed into a form of currency; suffering becomes an objectified asset that must be repeatedly displayed, performed, and verified.

This system traps people within rigid, dehumanising dichotomies. They are forced to occupy the script of either the passive, completely shattered victim or, conversely, the hyper-resilient, idealised hero. This reductive casting privileges easily pathologised, discrete expressions of distress (such as the neat criteria of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)) while utterly delegitimising the more pervasive, insidious forms of suffering that define daily life at the border.

Legal Precarity as a Living Environment

We often talk about “legal precarity” as if it were a neutral administrative category or a temporary state of limbo. Precarity functions as a totalising psychological, somatic, and relational environment. To live indefinitely without knowing whether you will be permitted to stay, work, settle, form safe relationships, or imagine a future is to be cast into a chronic state of suspended belonging. This suspension fundamentally fractures a person’s phenomenological relationship with time, turning the future from a horizon of hope into an unpredictable source of dread. It erodes the capacity to trust and estranges one’s relationship to community. When we look closely at this environment, we see that acute psychological distress is not merely a psychological artifact carried forward from past experiences of conflict or persecution. It is being actively, dynamically manufactured in the present moment by the structural violence of systems that deliberately keep people in prolonged states of state-enforced uncertainty and hyper-conditionality. 

The border is not just a geographical boundary; it is a moving psychological apparatus that replicates itself within the very bodies and minds of everyone, especially those forced to navigate it in this alienating way.

The Risk of Therapeutic Containment

This poses a profound ethical challenge for those of us in the helping professions. Practitioners, therapists, and humanitarian workers offer vital spaces of human connection and relief. But we must ask an uncomfortable question: what are the limits of our interventions when they take place within systems that continue to systematically inflict harm?

If care and psychosocial support are offered in a vacuum (entirely divorced from an explicit commitment to rights and structural justice) there is a distinct risk that our work degenerates into a tool of containment. Instead of acting as a site of healing, the therapeutic space can inadvertently become a mechanism that helps marginalised people adjust to, tolerate, and endure hostile state architectures that remain fundamentally inhumane. Care without a critique of power subtly shifts the burden of adaptation onto the shoulders of the oppressed, leaving the oppressive system entirely unchallenged.

Shifting the Paradigm Toward Justice

If we are to respond meaningfully to the psychosocial impact of forced migration, we must radically expand our understanding of what wellbeing is. 

Well-being is not a product of individual coping mechanisms, cognitive restructuring, resilience or privatised clinical treatment. It is co-constituted by material and social realities: unrestricted access to safety, legal protection, collective community, meaningful activity, equity and belonging, and the concrete viability of a future.

Humane responses to forced migration must therefore move resolutely beyond individualised compassion or paternalistic charity. We must step away from the narrow question of how best to support individuals who are suffering, and instead ask the more urgent, uncomfortable question: what structural changes are we willing to fight for to dismantle the very systems that manufacture that suffering in the first place?

This publication is an excerpt from Dr Claire Marshall’s keynote address delivered at the launch of the United Against Inhumanity Manifesto at the University of East London on 16 April 2026.

About the author: she is a senior lecturer and chartered counselling psychologist in the university’s School of Childhood and Social Care. Her work focuses on areas such as refugee and forced-migration mental health, psychosocial interventions, trauma, humanitarian operations, and critical psychology. She has worked as a clinician, researcher, academic, and consultant with organizations including projects linked to international humanitarian and policy initiatives.

The post “Borders, Belonging and the Psycho-Social Impact of Precarity”, by Dr Claire Marshall appeared first on United Against Inhumanity.

About the Book

Un-welcome to Denmark: The Paradigm Shift and Refugee Integration, written by Michelle Pace with Sarah El-Abd. Manchester University Press, 2025

The Danish «paradigm shift»

In 2019, Denmark enacted what it officially called a «paradigm shift» in migration policy: refugees were no longer conceived as people who would integrate into Danish society, but as temporary guests expected to return to their countries of origin as soon as conditions allowed. For thousands of Syrians who had spent years building a life in Denmark, this meant the loss of their residency permits and the permanent threat of deportation.

Michelle Pace, Professor of Global Studies based in Roskilde, Denmark has spent more than a decade documenting this process. Together with Sarah El-Abd, she has produced a comprehensive analysis combining in-depth interviews with Syrian refugees, welfare professionals and private-sector employers, alongside a detailed examination of the Danish legislative framework from 1983 to the present day.

The theory of the «unwelcome migrant»

The book’s central concept is that of the unwelcome migrant — an analytical category that illuminates how the Danish state, through its laws, programmes and official narratives, actively produces and perpetuates the precarity of those seeking protection. This goes beyond restrictive policies: it is an institutional gaze that frames refugees as «undeserving» subjects, subjected to constant surveillance, permanent conditionality and an insecurity that pervades every aspect of their daily lives.

The book traces with precision how this gaze has been materialised in concrete instruments — from the Aliens Act to the IGU labour integration programme, through the political discourse that has normalised the language of exclusion. It also documents the experience of those working within the system — social workers, counsellors, private companies — who are forced to navigate its contradictions while attempting, in their own ways, to «repair» the harm it produces.

Why we recommend this book

Un-welcome to Denmark is far more than an analysis of a single national case. It is a first-rate contribution to current debates on welfare nationalism, the securitisation of migration, human rights and the limits of integration as conceived across Europe. At a time when many countries are debating the direction of their asylum and reception policies, this book offers a well-grounded warning and a clear map of the human consequences of the most exclusionary choices available.

Its strength also lies in the plurality of voices it brings together. Moving beyond abstract narratives about migration, Pace (with El-Abd) centres real people: Syrians describing the anxiety of living inside a bureaucratic maze with no clear way out; professionals trying to support them without being able to change the rules of the game; and employers seeking pragmatic ways to sustain their presence in the labour market.

It is, in short, a book that deliberately unsettles — and that compels us to ask what kind of society we want to build, and what human cost we are prepared to accept for our political choices.

The book is available from Manchester University Press (2025).

For more information about the author and her research,  see her public profile on LinkedIn

The post «Un-welcome to Denmark»: when the world’s happiest country closes its door. appeared first on United Against Inhumanity.

UAI joins the #VoteJustice4Palestine initiative launched by the Ceasefire Now coalition during Eurovision week, calling for justice, freedom, and solidarity with the Palestinian people.

As millions tune into Eurovision, Palestinian artists and cultural leaders are transforming the language of the contest itself into an act of solidarity: an alternative vote — not for a winning song, but for justice, freedom, dignity, and the right of Palestinian culture to exist and endure.

At a moment when many institutions refuse to take meaningful action, initiatives like #VoteJustice4Palestine show the power of culture, creativity, and collective participation to break silence and build international solidarity.

At the heart of the campaign is a newly re-recorded version of “The Drone Song” by Ahmed Abu Amsha and Gaza Birds Singing (music by Zaid Hilal), alongside a week of public engagement, social media actions, and cultural discussion running through the Eurovision final on 16 May. It is a powerful reminder that music and art can become tools against erasure.

Today, 12 May, a different kind of vote is proposed.
A vote grounded in conscience rather than competition.

Ahead of tonight’s Eurovision semi-final, a live cultural conversation brings together Palestinian cultural leaders to speak about Israel’s systematic destruction of Palestinian cultural heritage across the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

This conversation is about celebrating Palestinian cultural heritage and identity, despite the suffering, the destruction, the ongoing genocide and siege.

📅 Webinar: Today, 12 May
🎤 Eurovision Final: 16 May

Register here:
https://us02web.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN__7H3kDz5Q-qRYeZd92EGTg

Webinar invite/social post:
https://www.instagram.com/p/DYKnHxAiG3T/?igsh=YjNlcTYxODRzcmo2

Please share widely. Culture and identity are fundamental human rights.

The post A Different Kind of Vote appeared first on United Against Inhumanity.